楞伽阿跋多羅寶經註解 2.79

2.79

三種量者，謂現量、比量、聖言量也。量即楷定義，譬升斗量物也。現量者，現即顯現，親得法體，離妄分別，而非錯謬也。比量者，比即比類，比類量度而知其然，如隔山見煙必知有火，隔牆見角必知是牛，雖非親見，亦非虛妄。聖言量者，謂以如來正教為準繩故。五分論者，一宗、二因、三喻、四合、五結。宗、因、喻三，亦云三支比量。合、結但成此三義耳。如外道妄計執聲為常，於聲明中立量云：「聲是有法，定常為宗。」因云：「所作性故。」同喻「如虛空。」然而虛空非所作性，則因上不轉，引喻不齊，立聲為常不成。若佛法中聲是無常，故立量云：「聲是有法，定無常為宗。」因云：「所作性故。」同喻「如瓶盆。」如《楞嚴》云：「音聲雜語言，但依名句味。」豈常也哉？外道種種計著，自謂過人，若不類彼立量破之，執何由破？故如來敘三種量、五分論，雖各建立，修之則得自覺聖智，能離緣起、妄想二種自性。而愚夫迷教，猶計有性，妄想分別也。

The three kinds of pramāṇa are direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (śabdapramāṇa / āptāgama). 'Pramāṇa' means standard and definitive determination, just as pecks and bushels measure things. Direct perception: 'direct' means manifest; it directly obtains the substance of dharmas, free from false conceptualization, and is not erroneous. Inference: 'infer' means comparison and categorization; by comparing and measuring categories one knows how things are, just as seeing smoke across a mountain one definitely knows there is fire, or seeing horns across a wall one definitely knows there is an ox; although not directly seen, it is also not false. Authoritative testimony means taking the Tathāgata's correct teaching as the measuring line. The five-part syllogism comprises: first, proposition (pratijñā); second, reason (hetu); third, example (dṛṣṭānta); fourth, application (upanaya); fifth, conclusion (nigamana). The three of proposition, reason, and example are also called the three-membered inference. Application and conclusion merely complete these three meanings. For example, when tīrthikas falsely calculate and cling to sound as permanent, establishing a syllogism in the science of sound (śabdavidyā), they say: 'Sound is the subject (dharmin); it is definitely permanent as the proposition (pratijñā).' The reason states: 'Because it is produced.' The similar example is: 'Like space.' However, space is not something produced, so the reason does not apply, and the cited example does not match; establishing sound as permanent is not accomplished. If in the Buddhadharma sound is impermanent, one thus establishes the syllogism, saying: 'Sound is the subject; it is definitely impermanent as the proposition.' The reason states: 'Because it is produced.' The similar example is: 'Like a jar or basin.' As the Śūraṅgama says: 'Voice is mingled with spoken words, merely relying on names, phrases, and syllables.' How could it be permanent? The tīrthikas have various clingings and consider themselves superior to others; if one does not follow their method of establishing syllogisms to refute them, by what means could their attachments be refuted? Therefore the Tathāgata explains that although the three kinds of pramāṇa and five-part syllogisms are each established, if one cultivates them one attains pratyātmāryajñāna and can transcend the two kinds of svabhāva: paratantra and vikalpa. Yet foolish people are confused about the teaching, still calculating intrinsic entities and engaging in discrimination through vikalpa.