注大乘入楞伽經 3.28

3.28

自下再牒破也。言若此分別定異兔角者，則非角因；若定不異者，又是因彼而起，言俱無自性也。分析牛角，乃至極微，求不可得。異於有角而又言無角，如是分別者，定非理也。謂若以有為有，則以無為無，有既不有，則無無也。故云：二俱非有，誰待於誰？是知牛角、兔角二俱無性，而對何法言有言無耶？若相待不成，待於有故言兔角無者，不應分別，不正因故。謂有與無為因，無與有為因，此因不正也。既二因不正，有無兩果理自不成，故結破云：有無論者，執有執無，二俱不成也。

From here down, he cites and refutes it again. It means: if this discrimination were definitely different from the hare's horn, it would not be the cause of the horn; if it were definitely not different, it would again arise on account of it, meaning both lack intrinsic nature. Analyzing the ox's horn down to an infinitesimal particle, it cannot be found through seeking. To be different from an existing horn while also stating there is no horn—discriminating like this is definitely unreasonable. That is, if existence is taken as existence, non-existence is taken as non-existence; since existence is not existent, non-existence is not non-existent. Hence it says: 'Both are non-existent; what depends on what?' From this we know that both the ox's horn and the hare's horn lack intrinsic nature, so in reference to what dharma does one speak of existence or speak of non-existence? If mutual dependence is not established, speaking of the non-existence of the hare's horn by depending upon existence should not be discriminated, because it is an improper cause. That is, existence being the cause for non-existence, and non-existence being the cause for existence—this cause is improper. Since both causes are improper, the two results of existence and non-existence naturally fail to be established in principle. Therefore, in concluding the refutation, it says: 'For those who theorize on existence and non-existence, clinging to existence and clinging to non-existence both fail to be established.'