注大乘入楞伽經 3.28

3.28

From here down, he cites and refutes it again. It means: if this discrimination were definitely different from the hare's horn, it would not be the cause of the horn; if it were definitely not different, it would again arise on account of it, meaning both lack intrinsic nature. Analyzing the ox's horn down to an infinitesimal particle, it cannot be found through seeking. To be different from an existing horn while also stating there is no horn—discriminating like this is definitely unreasonable. That is, if existence is taken as existence, non-existence is taken as non-existence; since existence is not existent, non-existence is not non-existent. Hence it says: 'Both are non-existent; what depends on what?' From this we know that both the ox's horn and the hare's horn lack intrinsic nature, so in reference to what dharma does one speak of existence or speak of non-existence? If mutual dependence is not established, speaking of the non-existence of the hare's horn by depending upon existence should not be discriminated, because it is an improper cause. That is, existence being the cause for non-existence, and non-existence being the cause for existence—this cause is improper. Since both causes are improper, the two results of existence and non-existence naturally fail to be established in principle. Therefore, in concluding the refutation, it says: 'For those who theorize on existence and non-existence, clinging to existence and clinging to non-existence both fail to be established.'