首楞嚴義疏注經 2.330

2.330

先答無是。若立是者，即須對非便有二相，故云則二文殊。次答無無，若立無者即成斷滅，將何名為真文殊體？但於真體無是非相，亦不可說真體全無。見之與緣亦復如是，同是一真故無二相也。

He first answers that there is no "is": if one establishes "is," it must oppose "is not" and there would immediately be two characteristics; hence he says, "there would be two Mañjuśrīs." Next he answers that there is no "not": if one establishes "not," it would become annihilation, and by what could the true substance of Mañjuśrī be designated? It is merely that on the true substance there are no characteristics of "is" and "is not"; nor can one say that the true substance is entirely non-existent. Seeing and conditions are also like this: being identically the one reality, they are devoid of the two characteristics.