四分律行事鈔資持記 1.96

1.96

別示中，初至前事，即第一俱闕例。能決有二，一例二理。例中。如律無解戒場法，例三小界翻結成解；諸律無受七日法，例半月眾法白文立之；又無請二師文，例準請和尚法。此據作法釋也。又如破白讀羯磨，舉誦戒為例；忘不持衣往會不及，以長衣開忘為例；牒多緣受日，以懺殘多罪同法為例；惡心解界不成、疑界不得重結，並以淨地為例；三種安居，以三品鉢為例（上是本宗，下引他部。）；明相會夏，以《僧祇》護衣為例；安居依閏，以《多論》受雨衣為例。此約行事釋也（餘更尋之）。理決中。言理有者，此謂無例，道理合然。如此界僧為別處三寶病緣及僧次請，皆開受日；又當日出界遇難，義判得夏；又十六遮中負債人準理得戒。此等並無文義及例，故云理也。又說恣中前後梵唄偈詞唱告、上座誡勅，不出教文者；及受戒中開示境心、威儀安慰；正羯磨時白告警策等，亦名理有而成前事也。二文義具闕。如律盜四方僧物犯蘭，決云此約暫礙僧用故輕，理須犯重。又云：至二三人所共作法，成賊住難，決云：此約眾法對首為言。又得受布薩錢，決云準須付他。《四分》夏中和諍開直去，不須受日；決云約緣而受，不傷大理等。如是尋之。論言者，古記云，即是《善見》，尋文未獲，此所謂不以文害意也。三義具文闕。如有難移夏，準《摩夷》不破安居；遇緣出界忘不受日，引《五百問》憶即悔者得；又《四分》不明重受日法，引《五百》、《明了》二文決之。據義雖當，恐謂師心，故云息謗也。問：如上所引，非無相濫，更請分之？答：無文引事相比，名為例決；又復無例，號為理決；以意定文曰義決通；引文成事曰文決通。問：義之與理，如何分別？答：通而為言，理義不別。下義決云，以理為正；別而為語，非不如上。問：上則單配，有相兼否？答：理決一種，定無相兼；餘三相兼，略舉一二。初明例得兼理。不兼文義，以無文義方成例故。如依閏安居，以雨衣為例；仍云夏是制教，理宜通護。二義決中，三句。自有義決兼於例者。如《四分》邊罪等二十二人，今師定自言不足數義云：體既非僧，若僧同知，故不足數；必不知者成足。又引不持戒和尚四句為例等。自有義決亦兼文者。如《四分》盜畜犯重，決云此望鼠心未定從人判罪；仍引《十誦》、《多論》等文盜畜物犯吉。復有兼文例二種者。如律令夏竟解界，決云此為諸界同受德衣，仍云文如《十誦》，又引安居未竟自恣不破夏為例。三文決通中亦三句。自有文兼例者。如移夏不破，引《摩夷》文；又引《十誦》、《僧祇》二處受衣為例。亦有文兼義者。《四分》但云尼開受七日，引《僧祇》云尼無羯磨受法；仍云所以然者，以尼入俗，生善義少故。又如引《五分》一一說欲，又加義評等。自有兼義例者。如自然界無異界定圓，有則不定，此即義決；仍引《了論》三由旬界合角量取為例；又引《十誦》、《善見》等文。問：今言決通，為決本宗？為他部耶？答：昔人不曉，並云決通《四分》。今意不然，但由時事，或昔所未行、或諸家異見，學者疑壅，故有決通。若爾，何以前文敘律闕耶？答：秖由律闕，故令事暗，更為明之。一自有本文還決本律。如受欲中釋餘處行，即以自恣中出界外決之；又此律宿欲不被所為事，還以《四分》明相欲出，開略說戒決之；又如合河結界，還以尼律界中渡河決之；如前所引惡心解界，引淨地等，皆本律事耳。二自有本律一文，即自決通。如三小界不立相，還以三小羯磨決之；又如淨地不得僧住，文云除去比丘；又立淨地唱相，律云應唱房名，還即本文以決本事（上二句屬義決通）。三自有他部還決他律。如〈集僧〉中，《多論》道行一俱盧，即以《十誦》六百步決之；又如《僧祇》七樹中間，不明兩眾半分，乃以《多論》比丘遊行有縱廣自然決之。四自有本宗反決他部。如《十誦》可分別聚落齊行來處，乃以《四分》村界院相決之。用此諸意，遍尋一部，無不通達。問：文義俱闕，為局當部？為通他部？答：通該三藏，何止本異。他部有文，即落後句；由無文故，即無義也。問：義決通中，為通為局？答：亦通他部。《十誦》、《伽論》：尼無捨戒再受之義；決云應得作下二眾。又《十誦》令五眾受日，五眾邊受；決云準此當眾相共作之，無者準前言告等。古多錯解，不覺太繁；略亦非難，但恐不解。餘亦未盡，學者更詳。

In the specific explanation, from the beginning up to 'the preceding matter' constitutes the first category: where both [text and meaning] are lacking. There are two means of resolution: the first is by precedent, and the second is by principle. Under precedent: for instance, since the Vinaya has no method for dissolving a precept-platform, by precedent of the three minor boundaries one turns their establishment into a dissolution; since the various Vinayas have no method for receiving the seven-day period [of absence], one takes the text of the motion (jñapti) for the sangha transaction of the half-month as a precedent to institute it; and since there is no text for requesting two teachers, one takes the method for requesting the upādhyāya as a model precedent. This is explained based on formal transactions (karmans). Furthermore, for example, taking the recitation of the precepts as a precedent for breaking the motion to read the karmavācanā; taking the allowance for forgetting extra robes as a precedent for forgetting to carry a robe and failing to make the gathering in time; taking the shared procedure of repenting multiple saṃghāvaśeṣa offenses as a precedent for stating multiple conditions to receive days; taking the clean ground (śuddhabhūmi) as a precedent for the failure to dissolve a boundary with an evil mind and the inability to re-establish a boundary in case of doubt; and taking the three grades of bowls as a precedent for the three kinds of varṣā retreat (the above are from our own school; below, other schools are cited): taking the Mahāsāṃghika rule on guarding robes as a precedent for meeting the varṣā retreat at dawn's light; and taking the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā's receiving of the rain-season robe as a precedent for relying on the intercalary month for the varṣā retreat. This is explained based on operational matters (search for the rest further). Under resolution by principle: as for stating that 'it exists in principle', this means that there is no precedent, yet according to reason and principle it ought to be so. Such as: for monks of this boundary who face conditions of sickness regarding the Triratna elsewhere or are invited in order of the sangha, all are permitted to receive days; also, if one leaves the boundary on that very day and encounters adversity, by meaning it is determined that one obtains the varṣā retreat; also, among the sixteen obstacles, a debtor according to principle obtains the precepts. All of these lack both textual meaning and precedent, hence it is called 'principle'. Furthermore, during the poṣadha and pravāraṇā ceremonies, the chants, verse words, proclamations, and admonitions of the sthavira beforehand and afterward that do not stem from the scriptural text; as well as explaining the field and mind, deportment and consolation during the reception of precepts; and the announcements and warnings during the actual karmavācanā—these are also termed 'existing in principle' and bring to completion the preceding matters. Second, where both text and meaning are complete and lacking. For instance, where the Vinaya states that stealing property of the sangha of the four directions incurs a sthūlātyaya, it is resolved that this is said regarding temporarily obstructing the sangha's use and is therefore light, but according to principle it must incur a grave offense. Again, it states that going to two or three people to perform a transaction together constitutes the obstacle of 'dwelling as a thief', which is resolved: this is stated with respect to sangha transactions and face-to-face matters. Again, regarding whether one may receive poṣadha money, it is resolved that according to the standard it must be transferred to others. In the Dharmaguptaka, during the summer retreat, for resolving disputes one is permitted to go straight away without needing to receive days; it is resolved that one receives them according to the conditions, without harming the great principle, and so forth. Examine [the text] in this manner. Regarding the statement 'the treatise states', the ancient records say it refers to the Samantapāsādikā, but in searching the text it has not been found; this is what is called 'not letting the letter harm the meaning'. Third, where the meaning is complete but the text is lacking. For instance, if one encounters adversity and moves the retreat, based on the Vinayamātṛkā the retreat is not broken; if one encounters conditions, leaves the boundary, and forgets to receive days, citing the Five Hundred Questions, if one repents immediately upon remembering, one obtains it; again, the Dharmaguptaka does not explain the method of receiving days again, so one cites the two texts of the Five Hundred Questions and the Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra to resolve it. Although it is correct according to the meaning, fearing that people might call it 'the teacher's own bias', it says 'to quell slander'. Question: In what is cited above, are they not devoid of mutual confusion; please distinguish them further? Answer: To cite matters for comparison without a text is called 'resolution by precedent'; where there is furthermore no precedent, it is termed 'resolution by principle'; to determine the text through meaning is called 'resolution and comprehension through meaning'; to cite a text to accomplish an affair is called 'resolution and comprehension through text'. Question: How does one distinguish between 'meaning' and 'principle'? Answer: Speaking generally, principle and meaning are not different. Below, resolution through meaning states that 'principle is taken as correct'; speaking specifically, they are indeed as stated above. Question: Above they were matched singly; are there cases where they are combined? Answer: Resolution by principle alone is definitely without combination; the other three combine with one another, to cite one or two briefly. First, explaining that precedent can combine with principle. It does not combine with text and meaning, because it only becomes a precedent precisely when text and meaning are lacking. For example, relying on the intercalary month for the varṣā retreat takes the rain-season robe as a precedent, yet it states that the retreat is a regulative teaching, and according to principle it is appropriate to protect it generally. Second, under resolution through meaning, there are three clauses. There are cases where resolution through meaning combines with precedent. For instance, concerning the twenty-two persons with border offenses and so forth in the Dharmaguptaka, our Master now determines the meaning of 'he himself says he does not count toward the number' by stating: since in essence he is not a monk, if the sangha mutually knows it, he does not count toward the number; if they definitely do not know it, he fulfills the number. Furthermore, he cites the four clauses of the upādhyāya who does not maintain the precepts as a precedent, and so on. There are cases where resolution through meaning also combines with text. For instance, where the Dharmaguptaka states that stealing an animal incurs a grave offense, it is resolved that this is judged based on the human, as the rat's mind is indeterminate; it further cites texts such as the Daśādhyāya-vinaya and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā stating that stealing an animal's property incurs a duṣkṛta. There are also cases combining both text and precedent. For instance, where the Vinaya orders that the boundary be dissolved at the end of the summer retreat, it is resolved that this is done so that all boundaries may receive the kaṭhina robe together, yet it states that the text is like that of the Daśādhyāya-vinaya, and furthermore cites the fact that holding pravāraṇā before the retreat ends does not break the retreat as a precedent. Third, under resolution and comprehension through text, there are also three clauses. There are cases where text combines with precedent. For instance, moving the retreat without breaking it cites the text of the Vinayamātṛkā, and also cites the two places in the Daśādhyāya-vinaya and the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya concerning receiving robes as a precedent. There are also cases where text combines with meaning. The Dharmaguptaka only states that nuns are permitted to receive seven days; citing the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya, it states that nuns have no procedure of receiving [days] by karman; yet it states that the reason is that when nuns enter secular life, the meaning of generating goodness is slight. Furthermore, for instance, citing the Mahīśāsaka-vinaya where each one expresses consent (chanda), and adding an evaluation of meaning, and so on. There are cases combining meaning and precedent. For instance, if a natural boundary has no different boundary, it is definitively round, but if it has one, it is indeterminate—this is resolution through meaning; yet it cites the boundary of three yojanas in the Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra being measured by matching the corners as a precedent; and further cites texts like the Daśādhyāya-vinaya and the Samantapāsādikā. Question: When speaking of 'resolution and comprehension' now, does it resolve our own school, or other schools? Answer: People of the past did not understand, and all said it was resolving and comprehending the Dharmaguptaka. The present view is not so; it is simply because of matters of the time, either not practiced formerly or where various masters held differing views, so students were doubtful and obstructed; therefore there is resolution and comprehension. If so, why did the previous text describe the deficiencies of the Vinaya? Answer: Precisely because of the deficiencies of the Vinaya, matters were made obscure, so they are clarified further. First, there are cases where its own text resolves its own Vinaya. For instance, in receiving consent, explaining 'traveling elsewhere' is resolved by 'going outside the boundary' in the pravāraṇā; again, that an overnight consent in this Vinaya does not cover the matter undertaken is resolved by the Dharmaguptaka's allowance to shorten the recitation of precepts when dawn's light is about to appear; again, joining across a river to establish a boundary is resolved by crossing a river within the boundary in the Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya; like the earlier citation of dissolving a boundary with an evil mind citing the clean ground, etc., these are all matters of our own Vinaya. Second, there are cases where a single text of our own Vinaya itself resolves and comprehends. For instance, that the three minor boundaries do not establish markers is resolved by the three minor karmans; again, like the sangha not being permitted to reside on clean ground, where the text states 'excluding the bhikṣus'; and establishing the markers proclaimed for clean ground, where the Vinaya states that one should proclaim the names of the rooms—using the text itself to resolve the matter itself (the above two clauses belong to resolution and comprehension through meaning). Third, there are cases where another school resolves another Vinaya. For instance, in the 'Gathering the Sangha' chapter, the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā's traveling one krośa on the road is resolved by the Daśādhyāya-vinaya's six hundred paces; again, in the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya, regarding the middle of seven trees, which does not explain the halving between the two sanghas, it is resolved by the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā's natural boundary of length and breadth where bhikṣus travel. Fourth, there are cases where our own school conversely resolves other schools. For instance, the Daśādhyāya-vinaya's distinguishable village where one comes and goes is resolved by the Dharmaguptaka's boundary and enclosure markers of a village. Using these intentions to search throughout the entire work, there is nothing that will not be comprehended. Question: When both text and meaning are lacking, is this restricted to our own school, or does it extend to other schools? Answer: It extends throughout the three piṭakas, so how could it stop at our own or different schools? If another school has a text, it falls under the later clause; because there is no text, there is also no meaning. Question: In resolution and comprehension through meaning, is it comprehensive or restricted? Answer: It also extends to other schools. The Daśādhyāya-vinaya and the Abhidharmapiṭaka-prakaraṇa-śāstra state: nuns do not have the meaning of relinquishing precepts and receiving them again; it is resolved that they should be able to become members of the lower two assemblies. Again, the Daśādhyāya-vinaya directs the five assemblies to receive days and receive them beside the five assemblies; it is resolved that according to this, the members of that assembly should perform it mutually together, and if none exist, according to the previous statement, they make an announcement, and so on. The ancients mostly misunderstood, without realizing it was overly burdensome; to be brief is also not difficult, but one fears people will not understand. The rest is also not exhausted; scholars should examine it further.