四分律行事鈔資持記 2.1498

2.1498

能持犯中，初牒名。用下，出體，上句正示。疏云：若不思慮，不成持犯。故以意思為能持犯體。下句簡非。以身口色，但是成業之緣，非正業本。疏云：身口是具，不名為業。故下，引據。初即《成論》推業之本；彼又續云：離心無思，無身口業。次引本律，彼序偈云：造善具三業，今以備具普之，以通持犯故。意業是主，身口由成；故偏審之，以明成不。而言等者，如律結犯，竝問何心；諸不犯中，例開忘誤。下指如後，即第三門。問：論云：三業皆但是心，此即心王，那得上定意思為體？答：心王意思，體用分耳。論推三業之本，故就體論；此定成業之能，故從用說。若爾，何不如論從本明者？答：體通四陰，用局行心；捨通從局，論業彌顯。又復心未必是思，思必是心；體不兼用，用必得體；今云意思，則體用齊收，義無乖異。問：受中作戒，色心為體；今此能持，即是隨作；何但取心，而不兼色？又問：唯心造業，何異大乘？又問：既簡身口，何以後成就門，復通三業？此恐文繁，如別所顯。

In "Capable of Maintenance and Violation," first the name is cited. Below "using," the essence is identified; the upper line directly indicates it. The Commentary says: "If one does not deliberate, it does not constitute maintenance or violation." Therefore, it takes conscious volition (saṃcetanā) as the essence of the capable maintenance and violation. The lower line excludes what is not: because form of body and mouth is merely a condition for completing karma, not the root of proper karma. The Commentary says: "Body and mouth are tools; they are not called karma." Below "therefore," it cites authorities. The first is precisely the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra's tracing the root of karma; it further continues: "Apart from the mind there is no intention, and there is no bodily or vocal karma." Next it cites our Vinaya; its introductory verse says: "Creating good possesses the three karmas," but here it universalizes it with "possesses entirely," so as to apply to both maintenance and violation. Mental karma is the master, and body and mouth are completed by it; therefore it specially examines it to clarify whether it is constituted or not. Speaking of "and so forth," as when the Vinaya concludes an offense, it always asks what mind was present; and in the various non-offenses, it uniformly permits exceptions for forgetting and error. Below it points to "as later," which is the third gate. Question: The treatise says: "The three karmas are all merely mind." This is the primary mind; how can it definitively settle on conscious volition as the essence? Answer: Primary mind and conscious volition are divided by essence and function. The treatise traces the root of the three karmas, so it discusses in terms of essence; this settles the capacity to complete karma, so it speaks from function. If so, why not illuminate it from the root as the treatise does? Answer: Essence extends through the four aggregates, whereas function is restricted to the volitional mind (saṃskāra-skandha); setting aside the general to follow the restricted, the discussion of karma becomes much clearer. Furthermore, mind is not necessarily volition, but volition is necessarily mind; essence does not combine function, but function necessarily attains essence; now saying conscious volition, both essence and function are gathered together, and there is no contradiction in meaning. Question: In the reception [of precepts], action-precept takes form and mind as its essence; now this capable maintenance is subsequent action; why take only mind and not also form? Also question: If only mind creates karma, how is this different from the Mahāyāna? Also question: Having already excluded body and mouth, why does the later gate of completion again penetrate the three karmas? Fearing this would make the text too lengthy, it is revealed elsewhere.