四分律行事鈔資持記 2.20

2.20

In the first answer, the first two lines show that it is indeterminate, and the next two lines establish it in terms of existence. Regarding "entering into dispute," the "Chapter on Dispute" in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Good sons! In the sūtras, I have spoken thus: 'If there is a bhikṣu who has committed the four gravest offenses, he is no longer called a bhikṣu, nor can he again generate the sprouts and seeds of goodness; just like scorched seeds do not produce fruit, etc.' My disciples, having heard this teaching, did not understand my intention, and proclaimed: 'The Tathāgata has said that all bhikṣus, once having committed the gravest prohibitions, lose the bhikṣu precepts' (this is clinging to non-existence). Good sons! In the sūtras, I spoke to Cunda of four kinds of bhikṣus: first, those who have ultimately reached the path (the aśaikṣa); second, those who show the path (the first, second, and third fruits); third, those who receive the path (encompassing internal and external worldlings); fourth, those who defile the path (those on the coarse ground). Those who commit the four gravest offenses are precisely those who defile the path. My disciples, having heard this teaching, could not understand my intention, and proclaimed: 'The Tathāgata has said that all bhikṣus, even having committed the four gravest offenses, do not lose the prohibitive precepts' (this is clinging to existence)." Question: The sūtra only says "they do not understand my intention"; what was the Buddha's intention? Answer: It is not even the realm of bodhisattvas or the two vehicles, how much less of vulgar worldlings! However, although it is hard to fathom, it must also be briefly indicated: One should know that what the Buddha taught, if it exists, it certainly exists, and if it is non-existent, it is definitely non-existent. Why is this so? The Tathāgata sees the nature of sentient beings' good and bad karma in accordance with reality; he speaks appropriately according to suitability, truly and without falsehood. (The old records erroneously invented the Buddha's intention by saying: "The reception-essence still remains, so he is called a bhikṣu, but it lacks efficacious function, therefore it is like scorched seeds." This just turns back into clinging to existence; how could it be called the Buddha's intention?) The explanation in the Za xin says: "Some say that committing the foremost aggregate of offenses (the aggregate refers to the division [pārājika]) is called relinquishing the code. This is not so! If it were relinquishing the code, then having committed a root offense and returned to lay life, one should be able to go forth again, because one has already relinquished the code." It also says: "With respect to the prātimokṣa code, he is a bhikṣu; with respect to the undefiled code, he is not a bhikṣu." It also says: "It is only violating the precepts, not relinquishing the precepts" (thus the text). Question: This is still positing existence; should it not constitute a dispute? Answer: It was a dispute for them, but today it is not a dispute. Why? Because it accords with the time and suitability, deeply understanding the Buddha's intention, and is not a stubborn attachment. For this reason, the chapter "Saṃgha Governance" makes clear that keeping cats and dogs, and the chapter "Concomitant Marks" explains that keeping the eight impure things, both definitively cause the loss of the precepts. People do not see this, so they hesitate and doubt so much.