四分律行事鈔資持記 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Shi Yuanzhao of Yuhang in the Great Song

The title of the middle fascicle is explained the same as before. The text sets forth four chapters, collectively clarifying personal practice; all consist in departing from evil and protecting what was originally received. Following the sequence of practice, when virtue is accomplished, it becomes useful; thus they are combined into the upper fascicle. Now, looking at the maintenance of the Dharma, its efficacy has superior and inferior aspects; hence it occupies the next position.

2.3

In the enumeration of chapters: all the chapters above and below take karmavācanā as their primary guide; the four chapters of this fascicle all rely on the Prātimokṣa. The first three pertain to precise maintenance, and the last one pertains to offenses and repentance. Moreover, among the upper three, the first two follow the text, and the third concerns the general doctrine. Furthermore, among the first two, the first explains the general names, and the second clarifies specific marks. Because of these various differences, they are divided.

2.4

Chapter Explaining Categories and Classes

2.5

Categories and classes are the grand divisions that encompass offenses, the guidelines on which judgments are based; they distinguish the weight of karma and determine the depth of retribution. "Category" (piān) is the designation for a chapter or section, meaning that offenses are categorized into distinct sections; "class" (jù) is the title for an aggregation, meaning that offenses have specific branches. "Category" comes from the Mahāsāṃghika, while "class" comes from our own Vinaya; the names differ but the meaning is one, which is why both are headlined here. The Commentary quotes an ancient explanation: that which possesses the three uniformities is called a "category": first, uniformity of name (within their respective categories, they share one name; uniformity means equality); second, uniformity of nature (because the offense and repentance are the same); third, uniformity of culmination (not serving as the preparatory stages for other categories). Those that do not possess them are called "classes", such as the thullaccaya and duṣkṛta; they only have uniformity of name, while their nature is not uniform (thullaccaya is divided into three kinds of repentance, duṣkṛta is divided into two kinds of deśanā), and their culmination is not uniform (thullaccaya is restricted to arising from the first two, while duṣkṛta extends to the preparatory stages of all categories). Our master does not take this view; the names "category" and "class" are general and do not necessarily correspond exclusively; they are distinguished as uniform or mixed solely based on the five and seven [classes]. Hence the Commentary says: "Even though a class follows the five positions, its meaning possesses the three uniformities; while the name 'category' resides in the seven, because it originally gathers the mixed." Question: If based on the Prātimokṣa, there are naturally eight categories; now that they are divided into five and seven, how do they correspond? Answer: What is now called categories and classes is not confined to the Prātimokṣa; it is merely an established designation that collectively gathers all offenses. If the number five is used to correspond to the Prātimokṣa, the thirty and the ninety are combined into one, and the indefinite and the settling of disputes are subsumed under duṣkṛta. However, the original establishment of names does not follow textual forms; as long as what is prohibited by the vinaya rules pervades environments numerous as dust and sand, their causes, effects, gravity, and lightness are collectively subsumed under the five or the seven. The only difference is that the five gather the fundamental offenses, while the seven mix the fundamental causes. Question: Since the single class of duṣkṛta lacks the meaning of the three uniformities, how can it enter into the five? Answer: It is truly as your objection states; therefore in the text below, the distinction between uniform and mixed is based only on the first four. Now, in accordance with the Precept Commentary, we provisionally speak in terms of the one hundred precepts of the Prātimokṣa. In the title, the terms "categories and classes" are general, running through the "names and retributions" below; "names and retributions" are specific terms, which are the subsequent two headings. "Name" refers to the penalty instituted by the teaching; "retribution" refers to the fruit brought about by the cause. By examining the name, one understands the teaching; by observing the fruit, one knows the cause. The origin of this chapter can be seen from this. (Some editions have "future retribution", which is an error in transmission.)

2.6

In stating the intention, first subsection: the top two sentences pose the inquiry. Below, where it says "Truly...", it explains the reason. The precept-essence is the accumulation of wholesome dharmas, the foundation of the noble path; surpassing humans and devas, it is worthy of worldly offerings; generating merit and benefiting the world truly stem from this. Below, where it says "This...", it cites proof. Reception refers to the reception-essence; maintenance refers to subsequent practice. "Nature" is the essence itself.

2.7

In the next section, first, explaining conformity and benefit, the first two lines concern practice for self-benefit. The upper line is a metaphor for maintenance through cessation; the lower line is a metaphor for maintenance through action; or it may be that the upper is mental action, and the lower is bodily and verbal [action]. The substance of ice is clear and clean; the nature of jade is warm and moist. Departing from defilement and fulfilling virtue, they are appropriately taken as metaphors. 'So [it is...]' and what follows concerns practice for benefiting others: the upper line clarifies efficacy, and the lower line reveals renown. Good seed and field of merit are both stated as dharma and metaphor. If speaking of the reception-essence, it is also called a good seed; here, relative to generating [benefit for] others, it is therefore compared to a field. 'If not...' and what follows clarifies violation and harm: the first line shows the mind that can commit offenses. Being contrary to the above two maintenances, it is therefore said, 'If not.' Indulging means giving free rein to lustful sentiments; resisting means contravening the holy teachings. The next line shows the faults that are committed. They do not go beyond the two violations. 'Bequeaths' means gifts. 'This' means that. 'Distress' means grief and distress, a term encompassing both cause and effect. Offenses are made by the mind and are not imposed by others; it is a self-inflicted gift. 'Then...' and what follows explains the above 'this distress'. The upper line constitutes the cause; the lower line brings about the result. 'Fault' means offense. As for 'hell', in Sanskrit it is called naraka, which here is translated as 'vessel of suffering'; nāraka, which here is translated as 'sufferer of pain'—namely, the two retributions of insentient environment and sentient being. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra clarifies sixteen hells: The eight hot ones are: first, the pit of charcoal; second, boiling urine; third, the burning forest; fourth, the forest of sword blades; fifth, the path of knives; sixth, the forest of iron thorns; seventh, the salty river; eighth, the copper stakes. Furthermore, each of these eight hot hells has four gates; each gate has four secondary hells of increasing torment (where persons with aggravated offenses suffer pain): first, hot embers; second, corpses and dung; third, sharp blades; fourth, the blazing river. The eight cold ones are: first, Arbuda (having a few holes); second, Nirarbuda (having no holes); third, Hahava (the sound of shivering with cold); fourth, Ahaha; fifth, Huhuva (both being sounds of suffering from cold); sixth, Utpala (the outer walls resembling blue lotus blossoms); seventh, Padma (red lotus blossoms, in which offenders are born and suffer pain); eighth, Mahāpadma (great red lotus blossoms). All dwell beneath Jambudvīpa, adjacent to the great hells. The sūtras and śāstras explain the hells with many different names and characteristics; here we temporarily rely on one text and speak of the two eights. 'Therefore...' and what follows reveals the intention of the teaching. By means of the gravity and lightness of the sections and clusters, pointing the way back to maintenance and violation: clarifying violations causes one to avoid them; revealing maintenance causes one to conform to them. In the text, the five and the seven each correspond to maintenance and violation; as the text is interwoven, the meaning is not one-sided or restricted.

2.8

In the third [part], clarifying harm, the first two lines clarify dullness of nature. 'All' means entirely. The next two lines clarify lack of study. 'Regulations' means the types within the sections and clusters; 'statutes' refers to the marks of violation and non-violation. 'Along with...' and what follows clarifies ignorance of the teachings. 'Concomitant precepts' refers to the precept-marks. Wandering in mist and gazing upon the sea are both metaphors for lack of clarity. 'Leading to...' and what follows reveals the fault. The upper two lines clarify following dust and indulging in desires, hence it says 'forgetting to return'; the lower two lines [clarify] letting karma pull one into rebirth, hence 'not knowing how to turn back'. 'Going' means departing. The Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra says: In the past, a person fled from two drunken elephants (birth and death), climbed down a vine (the life faculty) into a well (impermanence); there were black and white mice (sun and moon) biting the vine and about to sever it; at the side were four snakes wishing to sting (the four great elements); below, three dragons spat fire and spread their claws to ward him off (the three poisons); the person looked up at the two elephants, which had already reached the top of the well, and he was distressed with nothing to rely on; suddenly a bee passed by and dropped honey that fell into his mouth (the five desires); this person licked the honey, completely forgetting danger and fear. Here this is a metaphor for a bhikṣu who does not fear the myriad sufferings and greedily attaches to the five desires, having no intention of disgust or turning away. 'Therefore...' and what follows adduces proof. That text clarifies that receiving offerings while breaking the precepts will certainly bring about immediate retribution: one's belly will split open and the kāṣāya will fall from one's body; or if there are no such marks, it is because there is retribution in the next life; hence it is said.

2.9

In the fourth [part], establishing the sections, first the basis of karma and retribution is recounted. Karma is the cause, referring to the two completed violations; retribution is the fruit, referring to the number of kalpas spent falling into hell. Cause and fruit are both mind, a statement common to both the Great and Small [Vehicles]; one must determine the shallow and the deep by relying on the limits of the teaching. 'Certainly...' and what follows sets forth the intention of the composition. The first two lines indicate the text. Looking forward to the chapter 'Explaining the Marks', it is therefore said, 'First layout cause and fruit'; that is, in the subsequent section on 'Violations and Retribution', first distinguishing the arising of karma is clarifying the cause, and subsequently quoting the texts clarifies the fruit. The names of the marks are the names and meanings of the six clusters, corresponding to the subsequent two headings; the order of the text's exposition is not strictly sequential, following the convenience of expression, with truly no other intent. 'Causing...' and what follows reveals the intent. The words 'disciples of the Buddha' refer broadly to those who uphold the Dharma in the final age; praising them in terms of the Great [Vehicle] deeply accords with the sect's intention. 'Observing the fruit' means beholding the painful retribution of long kalpas; 'knowing the cause' means examining the karmic wrong of a brief moment. Knowing it through the teaching, once known, there must be fear. Furthermore, the mind arises by conditioning objects, and the fruit comes to fruition from the cause. Commission and reception mutually reinforce one another, sinking into transmigration for long kalpas; when causes and conditions converge, they do not differ in the least, just like form and its shadow. As for being scorched by fire and boiled in scalding water, the pain cannot be endured; in the frost and freezing ice, the cries cannot bear to be heard; ten thousand pains assault the heart, like a mass of molten iron; reflecting back on past karma, though one repents, how can it be undone! How much more so when wearing horns and bearing fur, flying in the sky and diving into water, one's life and breath tied to butchers and hunters, flesh and blood abandoned in kitchens! Or with torch-like mouths and needle-thin throats, hunger and emptiness piercing the body, eating foul pus and dirty excrement merely to survive! Below, the recounting of Niraya discusses only the general retribution; the miscellaneous types of the three evil destinies, how could they ever be exhausted as they follow karma? Truly! Calamity and fortune have no fixed doors; rising and sinking depend on oneself. How much more so when the Buddha's sūtras extensively indicate this, and the patriarchs' instructions repeatedly display it, yet with evil accumulated over time, there is almost no faithful adherence! Alas! Sentient beings are foolish and blind; life and death are vast and distant. Skillful means have many gates—who is there that awakens once? How can one, beneath the kāṣāya, not cherish the human body! How can one, within the good field of merit, personally sow thorns and briars? Moreover, those of middling capacity can be spoken to about what is higher, and the wise must think thrice before speaking; seeing evil should be just like dipping into boiling water, and encountering good should always be as if one could not reach it; only then can one be named a disciple of the Buddha, scarcely answering to [the name of] a śramaṇa; observing the fruit and knowing the cause, he has found the right person! Although the words are verbose, how could the intention ever be exhausted?

2.10

In 'Opening the Chapter'. The outline says, 'First clarifying the precept-guard', because it intends to clarify that the sections and clusters are severe and fierce, and the retribution for violations is profound and cruel; it truly arises because the efficacy of what was received is deep, bringing about heavy punishments when there is a violation. It must especially be shown first so as to reveal the subsequent text. 'Substance' is the root.

2.11

In 'Clarifying the Precept-Guard', the first section begins by raising the inquiry. 'Due to...' and what follows explains and resolves it. Because it is the relying cause of samādhi and wisdom, and the master of the myriad practices, it is therefore said, 'It is supreme in generating good.' Because it supports and guides the lineage of the Saṅgha, and condition-sustains the Buddha's Dharma, it is therefore said, 'Its establishment is strong.' Briefly raising the two points reveals its essence and function. When the statement of the thesis says: conforming [with it], the Triratna is maintained and the tasks of a bhikṣu are accomplished; contravening [it], the true Dharma is destroyed and one conversely plants painful karma—this has the same meaning.

2.12

In 'Quoting the Treatises', under the heading, it first shows the source. Speaking of 'precept-guard', raising the title denotes the essence, and concurrently encompasses the dharmic marks. 'It means...' and what follows explains the names and marks, first dividing and matching delusions and karma. That treatise's treatment of the mind's delusions in the three realms is named 'counteractive guard', hence it says 'resides in the mind'; guarding against the deviant karma of body and speech is then named 'precept-guard', hence it says 'resides in body and speech'. (Here it only says 'precept', distinguishing them provisionally.) 'Having a guard...' and what follows shows the single and the compound. Taking delusion as the root of karma, if one only guards against mental delusions and does not extend to body and speech, it is therefore said that one 'does not necessarily have precepts'; furthermore, karma depends on delusion to be formed, so if one prohibits and guards against deviant karma, one must also guard the mind, hence it is said that it 'must certainly be a guard'. However, guarding against and treating delusions does not refer to contemplation of principle, but rather to precept practice; in that treatise it is referred to as the 'vinaya of delusion'. 'In the sūtras'—it is not yet clear which text this refers to; perhaps it is quoted by the Liaoshu. (The ancients said that it refers to itself within the treatise, but upon inspection there is no such text.)

2.13

In 'Itemized Explanations'. The eight passages each have a dharma and a metaphor; the first three are metaphors for the precept-essence, and the latter five all speak of cherishing, which are metaphors for precept practice. The fourth is conflated with the first: the former directly uses a prince to illustrate the reception-essence, while the latter uses a father loving his son to illustrate the subsequent practice. The eye is a metaphor for right view, provisions are compared to the auxiliaries to the path, the kingdom refers to possessing virtue, and the medicine is the removal of obstacles; by examining the text it can be known. In the third, as for the wish-fulfilling jewel, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra says: It comes from the brain of a dragon; when sentient beings obtain it, it removes poverty and dispels poison. (Others say it is the heart of a garuḍa, or the relics of an ancient Buddha.) Good destinies are humans and devas; bodhi is the fruit of Buddhahood; the three vehicles are omitted in between, hence it says 'and even'. The three things in the seventh: sufficient wealth refers to the kingdom being rich; desire-dusts refers to the objects of form, sound, and so on; when the kingdom has sufficient dusts, the king's mind is gratified, which below is joined with 'the mind being at peace'; proper law refers to rites, music, commands, and orders not losing their proper place. In the matching of dharma, the three lines beginning with 'immeasurable' correspond to the three things above.

2.14

In 'Concluding Exhortation'. 'Its efficacious karma is heavy' summarizes the eight metaphors above and returns them to the prior two meanings; the rest all belong to 'supreme in generating good'; the first, the fourth, and the end of the seventh metaphor are 'its efficacy in establishment is strong'.

2.15

Next, clarifying the sections and clusters. In the direct explanation, the first section begins by recounting the discrepancies in names and numbers. The five sections take uniformity; the seven clusters rely on variety, yet differentiate bodily and verbal [offenses], hence it says 'in terms of meaning'. The duṣkṛta offenses are numerous, being divided into two according to the instruments; since the offenses do not have different substances, there are only six. Question: Previously, quoting the ancient explanation, it fixed five as sections and seven as clusters; now, in the various texts throughout our school, all speak of five sections and seven clusters, still identical to the ancient attachment. What is the meaning of this? Answer: Merely refuting their narrowness reveals that the names 'sections' and 'clusters' are interchangeable; since they are said to be mutually interchangeable, what could be wrong with using them as one pleases? 'Now...' and what follows lists the names according to the formulation of offenses. The Buddha arose in Central India and established these penal designations; this land originally did not have them, so how should they be translated? Therefore, the various names below are either in consideration of the holy path (such as pārājika and sthūlātyaya), or according to karmic practice (pārājika, saṅghāvaśeṣa, and duṣkṛta), or relative to the Saṅgha's legal acts (pārājika and saṅghāvaśeṣa), or based on future retribution (pārājika and pāyattika), or following the method of deśanā (saṅghāvaśeṣa, niḥsargika-pāyattika, and pratideśanīya). It is generally like this, and the rest is as explained below.

2.16

In the first, the pārājika cluster, the Mahāsāṃghika[-vinaya] first gives a general translation in the opening line. 'Three...' and what follows explains it separately. It possesses all three meanings, manifesting the extreme of evil. First, the meaning of falling and sinking, as in the questions and answers below. The 'two kinds of Saṅgha' are the same as in the Four-Part [Vinaya] below. Falling into Avīci: The Maudgalyāyana-paripṛcchā-sūtra only shows the kalpas and does not reveal the name of the hell; in the Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra, one falls into the blazing hot hell for one day and one night; this text clearly judges it, and together with the Daśacakra-sūtra both say Avīci, which is the Uninterrupted Hell; as the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: with no intervals of temporary joy (because one constantly suffers pain), and with no interval of empty space (one's body being equal in size to the hell, eighty thousand yojanas), it is therefore called uninterrupted. When a wise person observes this, how could they not be terrified!

2.17

In the Daśādhyāya[-vinaya]. First quoting the vinaya text, it translates pārājika as 'falling'; that is, after receiving the precepts, the four fallings are preached to him. The meaning of falling in the Mahāsāṃghika[-vinaya] is an extended explanation of extreme evil, which is not the same as this. In the text, there are many occurrences of the character 'meaning' (意); upon comparison with the ancient manual of the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya Vibhāṣā, none of them have it. Speaking of 'inferior', it means being inferior to Māra, which is the meaning of defeat; quoting the treatise's explanation below clearly shows it was a scribal error. There are four kinds of Māras who constantly plot harm; one should use the weapons of the precepts to defend and combat them; however, when the current practitioner's precept power is deficient, the army of Māra gains victory, hence it is used as a metaphor.

2.18

The three meanings in our own Vinaya: First, "severed head" is one of the four similes given when explaining the marks during the reception of the Dharma. Next it says, "like severing the heart of a tāla tree"; third, "like a broken needle's eye"; fourth, "like splitting a stone in two." Although the illustrating similes are four, they equally illustrate the destruction of the entity; [the transgressor] is eternally hindered from the noble path, hence it says, "unfit for the practice of the Dharma." Next, "without remainder" refers to the exclusionary formula stating: "If one is excluded from performing acts with no basis and without remainder, etc." (The saṃghāvaśeṣa is "with remainder," which designation also derives from that.) One's practice being ruined, there is no merit, and one does not participate in the affairs of the saṃgha; hence it says, "cut off from any share." Therefore, below it cites proof—namely, the verse preface of the Vinaya, which was already cited in the upper fascicle. Third, "no longer dwelling together," which designation appears in the prātimokṣa. Question: How is this different from the above "without remainder"? Answer: The former is stated from the perspective of oneself, like a corpse; the latter is discussed with respect to the saṃgha, like being cast out by the ocean. In comparison with the previous Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya: the first meaning is quite similar; these latter two names correspond to its second meaning.

2.19

In the question and answer, the phrasing of the question has two parts: first, it connects to the preceding; next, following "Accordingly," the main question has two parts: first, asking about repeated violations; second, asking about existence or non-existence [of the precepts].

2.20

In the first answer, the first two lines show that it is indeterminate, and the next two lines establish it in terms of existence. Regarding "entering into dispute," the "Chapter on Dispute" in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Good sons! In the sūtras, I have spoken thus: 'If there is a bhikṣu who has committed the four gravest offenses, he is no longer called a bhikṣu, nor can he again generate the sprouts and seeds of goodness; just like scorched seeds do not produce fruit, etc.' My disciples, having heard this teaching, did not understand my intention, and proclaimed: 'The Tathāgata has said that all bhikṣus, once having committed the gravest prohibitions, lose the bhikṣu precepts' (this is clinging to non-existence). Good sons! In the sūtras, I spoke to Cunda of four kinds of bhikṣus: first, those who have ultimately reached the path (the aśaikṣa); second, those who show the path (the first, second, and third fruits); third, those who receive the path (encompassing internal and external worldlings); fourth, those who defile the path (those on the coarse ground). Those who commit the four gravest offenses are precisely those who defile the path. My disciples, having heard this teaching, could not understand my intention, and proclaimed: 'The Tathāgata has said that all bhikṣus, even having committed the four gravest offenses, do not lose the prohibitive precepts' (this is clinging to existence)." Question: The sūtra only says "they do not understand my intention"; what was the Buddha's intention? Answer: It is not even the realm of bodhisattvas or the two vehicles, how much less of vulgar worldlings! However, although it is hard to fathom, it must also be briefly indicated: One should know that what the Buddha taught, if it exists, it certainly exists, and if it is non-existent, it is definitely non-existent. Why is this so? The Tathāgata sees the nature of sentient beings' good and bad karma in accordance with reality; he speaks appropriately according to suitability, truly and without falsehood. (The old records erroneously invented the Buddha's intention by saying: "The reception-essence still remains, so he is called a bhikṣu, but it lacks efficacious function, therefore it is like scorched seeds." This just turns back into clinging to existence; how could it be called the Buddha's intention?) The explanation in the Za xin says: "Some say that committing the foremost aggregate of offenses (the aggregate refers to the division [pārājika]) is called relinquishing the code. This is not so! If it were relinquishing the code, then having committed a root offense and returned to lay life, one should be able to go forth again, because one has already relinquished the code." It also says: "With respect to the prātimokṣa code, he is a bhikṣu; with respect to the undefiled code, he is not a bhikṣu." It also says: "It is only violating the precepts, not relinquishing the precepts" (thus the text). Question: This is still positing existence; should it not constitute a dispute? Answer: It was a dispute for them, but today it is not a dispute. Why? Because it accords with the time and suitability, deeply understanding the Buddha's intention, and is not a stubborn attachment. For this reason, the chapter "Saṃgha Governance" makes clear that keeping cats and dogs, and the chapter "Concomitant Marks" explains that keeping the eight impure things, both definitively cause the loss of the precepts. People do not see this, so they hesitate and doubt so much.

2.21

In the second answer, it first answers on the basis of the school's doctrine. This is the text from the broad explanation of the first precept; the prātimokṣa also says: "Subsequent violations are also like this." Below this, it distinguishes the designations and kinds. Repeated violations are twofold: first, offenses of the same designation—meaning the four gravest offenses viewed in relation to one another; second, offenses of the same kind—meaning each of the four precepts considered individually. The former applies generally to the Daśādhyāya-vinaya; the latter is restricted to our own school. The text discusses the gravest offenses separately for each of the four precepts; this precisely clarifies the meaning of "the same kind" in our present school.

2.22

Regarding "combining proof": this is because having precepts and committing repeated violations are conceptually inseparable. In citing the text, it first recounts the school's doctrinal intention: The code conforms to objects, so it is called "individual liberation" (prātimokṣa); the path and concentration conform to the mind, so they are "general liberation." As below, it cites the treatise to explain thoroughly; first, it adduces the text. Reception is a prospective projection, so it can be universally generated; violation is confronting the specific object, so it is only violated individually. Following "Now," it illustrates them one by one; first, it clarifies universal generation. According to the chapter "Explaining the Marks," that treatise only applies the three poisons across the seven paths of action; that the three become seven is a deduction made by our present interpretation, fully explained below. In the text, it specifically cites the path of sexual misconduct to clarify, and the rest can be understood by analogy. The objects of sexual intercourse are classified by path: three for female, two for male; the mind of sexual desire has the three poisons: three single, three compounded, and one fully combined; arising intermittently according to conditions, traversing objects with the mind, many precepts are generated, as listed in the text. Following "Now," it clarifies individual violations. Question: If other acts of sex are not violated, there is a repeated violation; but if, with a mind of greed, one again engages in sex with the former woman via the original path, does it constitute a repeated violation or not? Question: The Daśādhyāya-vinaya does not establish repeated violations; why take its treatise to substantiate our own school? Question: If one cannot violate various precepts at the same time, how can the offense of non-learning be violated simultaneously? Reflect upon it like this.

2.23

In the analogical proof, there are two points: first, it draws an analogy from repenting grave offenses. Below "Moreover," it is the analogy of striking and slandering. Among the ninety [pāyattikas], striking a bhikṣu, and among the saṃghāvaśeṣas, slandering—in these two precepts, the fully ordained monk is considered without distinguishing pure or defiled. Following "If," it questions inversely: because striking and slandering members of the three assemblies are all duṣkṛtas.

2.24

In the first objection: The question has two clauses, which are two objections. In the Vinaya, those subject to the two expulsions and those undergoing penance do not count toward the quorum. Moreover, the name "severed head" means "unfit for the practice of the Dharma," like a corpse; now it is said: "The entity of the remaining precepts is pure, bright and without transgression." Is this not contradictory? Therefore, it must be explained in detail.

2.25

In answering counting toward the quorum: first, based on deśanā, it clarifies that one does count toward the quorum. That is, it excludes the two expulsions, which are not under discussion. As below, it offers analogical proof: the Daśādhyāya-vinaya permits one to perform the karmas of poṣadha and pravāraṇā (not permitting other rites), and also allows one to recite the Vinaya amidst the assembly (where there is no other capable person); since one is allowed to preside over and execute the rite, and one's person is admitted among pure monks, in principle it is the same as counting toward the quorum, hence it says "it is logically appropriate." But following "However," it clarifies not counting toward the quorum based on the fault. If the affective fault is deep, it is committing the extreme evil; if one is unfit for use, one's virtuous practice is deficient. Therefore, below it cites to show, the Vinaya saying: "When the saṃgha performs poṣadha and karmavācanā, their coming is not at their will." Therefore, know that although one repents, there is definitely no principle of counting toward the quorum; even if permitted to preside over the rite, one's person does not enter the count; it is merely regarded as superior in comparison to the two expulsions, where material goods and Dharma are forever lost, and one has no participation in the saṃgha's affairs. Above it was said "it is logically sufficient," which text contains two intentions: first, to rescue the ignorant who claim it is lost, and so commit offenses by analogy; second, to rescue offenders who cling to their faults without repentance. Therefore, these texts give detailed and indirect admonitions. Question: People commonly say that the Hinayāna has no text on repenting grave offenses; why say "repenting and becoming pure"? Answer: Both the Mahāyāna and Hinayāna equally clarify repenting grave offenses; although the Hinayāna permits deśanā, it merely blocks hell karma and cannot restore the original state, hence it says "there is none." If so, if one becomes pure by relying on Mahāyāna deśanā, may one count toward the quorum? Answer: The teaching of conversion and the teaching of regulation are different. Conversion is based on the path of karma; regulation relates to transgressing the rules. Even if, relying on the Vaipulya sūtras, the phenomenal and ultimate deśanā extinguishes [the sin], according to the present disciplinary regulations, if one does not repent, one must be expelled; if one repents, one undergoes penance. If one performs the disciplinary deśanā, even if the karma is not eradicated, one is still called pure. One must know that the methods of deśanā in conversion and regulation are as different as heaven and earth. Many people are deluded about this, so it is analyzed in detail. The rest is in the subsequent fascicle.

2.26

The answer to the meaning of "severed head" is as in the question and answer below.

2.27

Regarding "the source of the second objection": The passages above are entirely based on the Vinaya and treatises; wishing to make evident that there is scriptural authority, and to generate subsequent exhortation, this question was raised.

2.28

In the direct answer, the first line points to the preceding; following "Furthermore," it marks what follows. Below, it cites the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya, where the marks of penance practice are all identical to the saṃgha; the Daśādhyāya-vinaya: having begged for the karmavācanā, one receives and practices all the precepts instituted by the Buddha; the Mu lun: having been given the method of repentance, one is called a pure keeper of precepts, etc.; hence it says "the entity remains," etc.

2.29

In refuting the deluded, the first text has three parts: first, it recounts the error. She [懾] is pronounced zhi-she, meaning fear. The Sūtra of One Hundred Parables says: "A person raised two hundred and fifty cows; one of the large ones was eaten by a tiger; the owner thought: 'Since the number is no longer complete, what use is there in guarding them?' and thereupon killed them all at once." A foolish bhikṣu is also like this: having violated one precept, he treats the rest in the same way; this accords quite well with that idea. Following "How could," it directly refutes. Following "How," it shows again: the upper two lines clarify the purity of the same kind; following "Rightly," it clarifies the purity of the same designation: being steadfast and unmoving is called "solemn and intact"; following "Lower," it clarifies the purity of different designations and different kinds.

2.30

In the next section, the first two lines entrust those who are addressed. Because reception and subsequent practice are equal, they are called "those of the same Dharma." Following "If," it directly encourages; first, it shows the practice of maintenance. Strictness means careful restraint; the pure consciousness is precisely the mind; the five sensory objects are all the cognitive realms; this is what is called preparatory right mindfulness, constantly prepared as an antidote. Alas! In this degenerate age, ordinary people have long been drowned; in restraining thought and leaving defilement, one sees no such person. Unless one is perfumed by past wholesome roots and guided by an enlightened teacher, diligently seeking the noble teachings, meticulously selecting what is good and clear, aiming one's resolve toward the solitary and lofty, aspiring in practice to the pure and eminent, untiring moment by moment, fresh day by day; either realizing the external objects and seeking back to the root of desire, or merging the mind with what was received, single-mindedly and comprehensively maintaining it; thus being unperturbed when facing objects and resolute when encountering conditions; soaring before perching, silently knowing it; this is just like waving one's hand in empty space, completely unobstructed! Donning armor and entering battle, what is there to fear? Yet while afflictions and karma are not yet dissolved, are birth and death not to be dreaded? How could mere words be pure ascension? Living amidst desire yet remaining far from dust—I truly fear this is beyond your reach; residing as an ordinary person while learning the sage, one must nevertheless compel oneself to do so. Do not act casually; you ought to be earnest. Mentioned because of this, reflect deeply on it once. Following "If," it encourages repenting violations; the upper two lines clarify the completion of an offense. Following "Having," it shows the benefit of repentance. Following "If," it clarifies the loss from non-repentance. Harboring is just the mind; concealing illness is a metaphor for covering up faults. If the entity is not purely functional, it cannot sustain offerings; covering up faults and falsely receiving them is called "presuming." One's own loss is self-explanatory; as for "the loss of others," in performing rites the prior matter is not accomplished, and in receiving alms the donor also falls. Following "How could," it expresses sorrow, hoping they will change their past ways. Great compassion is universal love, leaving out nothing among beings; even for those of evil conduct and lowest foolishness, one painstakingly guides and pulls them up. The extent of the Patriarch's grace cannot be fully known.

2.31

In the third question: This poses an objection against the preceding simile of the severed head.

2.32

In the text of the answer, in the Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra, it first makes it clear through a simile. The four places are the brain, throat, heart, and waist. Following "Due to," it indicates the meaning of not ascending [the stages]—namely, what the Za xin calls: "He is not a bhikṣu in the ultimate sense."

2.33

In the *Daśacakra*, it first clarifies the retribution for violations. It specifically employs the four major [transgressions] as the basis for drawing in slandering [the teachings]. Entering Avīci refers to retribution in the next birth. The phrase 'such [people]' and so forth clarifies the obstruction of the Path. 'Fetters' refer to afflictions such as views and deliberations. The phrase 'falling into evil [destinies]' explains how the fetters are not exhausted. Nowadays, many study perverse emptiness, reviling the Buddhas and slandering the teachings; spreading vulgar and base words, they conversely pride and boast themselves. How could they know that a single instance of contempt for the Honoured Form leads to long submersion in dark paths, and a single instance of slighting the sacred scriptures brings perpetual falling into the forest of perverse views? The principle of karma is glaringly obvious; how could one not believe it? The phrase 'if [one upholds...]' and so forth demonstrates the benefits of upholding [the precepts]; it first seeks out the person who upholds them. The four major [transgressions] of the first division give birth to all precepts, and hence are called the fundamental ones. The phrase 'one [who...]' and so forth indicates meritorious practice. 'All' encompasses the four requisites in their entirety. The phrase 'even to the point of...' urges firm adherence. Saying 'abandoning one's life' is identical to the admonition in our Vinaya to prefer death. 'What the three vehicles rely upon and abide in' is because they are the foundation of supramundane practices. Having often read this text, I respectfully examine the Buddha's words in detail; the expressions are earnest and the principle is evident, truly sufficient to serve as a mirror. May you single-mindedly recite it in your heart to urge yourself to diligence.

2.34

In the comparison with nuns: 'The latter four are as in the separate [section]' refers to the 'Chapter on Separate Practices'; that is, rubbing and touching, the eight acts, concealing a major [offense], and following one who has been suspended. The retribution of women is weak, and their disposition is prone to violations; therefore, the offences of the branches are regulated like the major ones by rule.

2.35

Third, in [the views of] other schools: it first marks the tenets of the schools. The phrase 'the same [category...]' and so forth indicates the difference. Having committed [an offense of] the same kind, committing it afterward incurs a duṣkṛta, and therefore there is no major offense. The phrase 'this [passage]...' discriminates confusions. The difference in kinds in the lower divisions is twofold: first, looking mutually between higher and lower, having a major offense can be understood, as in the cited text where studying repentance violates a saṃghāvaśeṣa; second, within the jurisdiction of the lower cluster itself there are also major offenses, as the 'Chapter on Separate Practices' says that the lower division depends on light and heavy.

2.36

Fourth, explaining the number of categories. In citing the treatise: in the first section, the upper line repeats the root treatise. 'In the Vinaya' refers to the school relied upon, the Saṃmatīya. The phrase 'explaining [as follows]' is the commentary's explanation, which first shows the differences in regional languages. Just as in the *Mahāsāṃghika*, the five clusters of the *Dharmaguptaka* are also close to it. The phrase 'now...' explains the meaning of 'cluster' (varga); it first marks it in general. The phrase 'having...' shows it specifically. The preparatory stage and the fundamental [transgression], through possessing the two meanings, constitute a faction and category; hence it obtains the name 'cluster'.

2.37

In the itemized listing: saying 'each and every one' at first points to the four major precepts.

2.38

In the separate explanation of the four passages: first, in the preparatory stage, it provisionally brings up the matter of sexual misconduct to explain the sequence. Saying 'generating the mind' is an offense of the mind, the same as in the present *Dharmaguptaka*, yet without a definitive limit; therefore, one must definitively determine heavy conditions and intention, setting aside fleeting thoughts. The above clarifies mental offenses, which do not yet involve form. Under 'the next preparatory stage', both clarify bodily offenses, returning to mind as their source. Moving the body and speaking with the mouth are identified in terms of their complete marks. Universally calling them duṣkṛtas generally indicates both distant and intermediate [preparatory stages]; their names are the same, but their substances differ. In the proximate preparatory stage, it first shows the mark of the offense. The phrase 'anticipating...' resolves doubts. Touching fundamentally violates a saṃghāvaśeṣa, but here it is designated as a sthūlātyaya; hence this must be resolved and settled. While anticipating intercourse ought to be major, here it is conversely light; playful amusement ought to be light, so how is it conversely major? However, being light, there is a fruit to advance toward; being heavy, it constitutes karma in its own substance—this is why they differ. In 'confessing before a person', that text explains sthūlātyaya offenses without distinguishing the three repentances; in phrasing, it is broad and ambiguous, as fully explained below.

2.39

In the third, the preceding part explains the meaning of 'accomplishment'. Because the later fruit and the fundamental cannot be violated abruptly, they depend on those [preceding stages] to mutually complete them. The phrase 'if the fundamental...' explains the meaning of 'compliance'. The moment it reaches the fruition offense, they together form one single entity, and there is no separate preparatory stage. This is identical to the *Dharmaguptaka*, but differs from the *Daśādhyāya* and the *Mahāsāṃghika*. The rest indicates the analogies.

2.40

In the reconciliation: it first cites three texts. In the *Dharmaguptaka*, where it is not accomplished, it does not state more or less. In the *Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra*, there is only one category, which does not show heavy and light. Only this *Daśādhyāya* has very clear outlines; the commentary cites its text where the first two divisions each have distant and proximate preparatory stages (it posits only two preparatory stages), the positions being divided into three ranks: the proximate of the first division is confessed before the saṃgha within the boundary (superior rank); the distant of the first division and the proximate of the second division are repented before four persons outside the boundary (both being middling rank); the distant of the second division is repented before one person (inferior rank). Accompanying the three offenses in maintenance and violation, one relies on the *Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra* for the distant being a heavy duṣkṛta—this is based on our own school; the intermediate and proximate two sthūlātyayas are entirely taken from the *Daśādhyāya*. The phrase 'however...' reconciles the intermediate offenses. The intermediate sthūlātyaya of the *Daśādhyāya* is the heavy duṣkṛta of the *Vinayadvāviṃśatividyā-śāstra*; now wishing to use sthūlātyaya to substitute for duṣkṛta, it shows this briefly to make it known, the rest being indicated below. Whenever determining the substance of an offense, one must discuss it in terms of repentance; although the intermediate sthūlātyaya relies on the Dharma before a minor assembly, in terms of actually relinquishing the root offense, it is still the same as a duṣkṛta, being extinguished before one person. 'The substance is common to both' points to the two texts. 'Understanding by analogy' causes one to compare the two offenses.

2.41

Second, saṃghāvaśeṣa. In the *Samantapāsādikā*, it explains its name and meaning solely in terms of practicing repentance. 'Saṃgha' is general, running through before and after; the initial 'avaśeṣa' (remainder) is specific, being the two dharmas at the head and tail when life is repented, thereby subsuming the middle. Combined, it should say: 'saṃgha' means assembly; however, in this context, the convention is to call a person 'saṃgha'. Therefore, these various texts use Sanskrit to explain Sanskrit, rather than translating mutually. Saying 'following the object' means the object is the person faced.

2.42

In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the name and meaning are largely the same as in the *Dharmaguptaka* and the *Mātṛkā* below. It first separately explains the meaning of saṃgha, identical to the above. The word 'remainder' designates the offense, meaning that for one who violates this offense, there is a small remainder of conduct left. The phrase 'there is...' combines and concludes.

2.43

In the *Dharmaguptaka*, it first points out the similarities. The phrase 'further...' shows the differences. 'Having a remainder' is also the meaning of 'remainder' (avaśeṣa). For 'dharma of practice', in contrast to the above 'without remainder', it should say 'dharma of the assembly', which is suspected to be a scribal error; or 'practice' may run through both the assembly and the individual, and here it is based on the practice of the assembly.

2.44

In the *Mātṛkā*, it first restates the name. The phrase 'as...' explains by analogy; the upper three lines illustrate 'remainder'. The line following 'principle' illustrates 'saṃgha'. Compared to the first division, that is called 'beheading' because it cannot be saved. The phrase 'therefore...' cites the Vinaya to assist in revealing it. 'Forcibly giving' means rescuing early; other offenses are not like this, but follow their own repentance.

2.45

In [the comparison between] monks and nuns: the six differences are playing with oneself, touching, two coarse [speeches], and two dwellings; the seven similarities are matchmaking, two slanders, and four admonitions—this is stated in terms of the monks' precepts in comparison to nuns. If comparing nuns to monks, there are ten differences: first, speaking of a person; second, four solitudes; third, ordaining a thief woman; fourth, releasing a suspension; fifth, accepting food from a man with a lustful mind; sixth, urging someone to accept; seventh, concealing each other and violating admonition; eighth, urging someone to live together in evil and violating admonition; ninth, abandoning the correct [path] over minor anger and violating admonition; tenth, being fond of disputes, slandering the saṃgha, and violating admonition. (Look into the nuns' Prātimokṣa to compare them.) The reference below to extensive [explanations] refers to the 'Chapter on Separate Practices'.

2.46

In the number of offenses, citing the treatise: the fifty-two offenses are because the thirteen fundamentals each have three preparatory stages; duṣkṛta is the distant, lower sthūlātyaya is the intermediate, and middling sthūlātyaya is the proximate. The character *zhi* (胝) is pronounced *zhu* and *ni* combined.

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四分律行事鈔資持記 — Classical Chinese