四分律行事鈔資持記 2.485

2.485

In explaining touch, first is a general heading. Regarding 'mutually touching', the Vinaya says: 'whether grasping, rubbing, heavily rubbing, pulling or pushing, rubbing against the grain or rubbing with the grain, lifting or lowering, grasping or pressing, or other preparatory means, and so forth.' 'Three kinds': from the first up to the words, both being without clothing is the first; from 'if mutually' downward, one having and one lacking is the second; from 'both having' downward, both having clothing is the third. (Distinguished according to the commentary.) Within the first, there are again two, as marked in the text itself. First, a bhikṣu touches a woman. The preparatory stage is initiated by oneself; the offense is clarified in terms of touch. The first sentence marks and distinguishes it. From 'without clothing' downward, it lists the four objects. From 'merely' downward, it judges the offense. Second, a woman touches a bhikṣu. Being molested by her, the offense is discussed in terms of pleasure. The first two sentences mark and distinguish it. Because of being touched by another, it is not determined by prior intention, hence it says 'not necessarily with a mind of lust'; based on subsequently receiving pleasure, that is indeed a mind of lust. From 'and' downward, it judges the offense, again in two parts: first, regarding moving the body and receiving pleasure; first judging a saṃghāvaśeṣa, because it combines both body and mind; from 'this' downward, pointing out that the above judgment has textual authority. That the Vinaya is not explicit is because it lacks a sentence judging an offense for moving the body and receiving pleasure; the text says: 'defiled by a mind of desire, moving the body without receiving pleasure, or receiving pleasure without moving the body, etc., are all thullaccayas.' (Because this latter sentence involves a defiled mind, it is a thullaccaya, unlike the text below where originally having no defilement incurs only a duṣkṛta.) Based on the Daśādhyāya-vinaya: it says, 'If a woman with a mind of desire rubs and touches an unclothed bhikṣu, and the bhikṣu has a mind of desire, moves his body, and receives subtle smoothness, it is a saṃghāvaśeṣa.' This text is clear, so it is now taken as the standard for determination. From 'if not' downward, next regarding not moving and receiving pleasure: it is again divided into three distinctions: the upper part, based on the presence or absence of a preexisting intention, distinguishes between duṣkṛta and thullaccaya; the lower part, moving and committing a saṃghāvaśeṣa, is identical to the above judgment. That this Vinaya [stipulates] a duṣkṛta is because the text says: 'If a woman pays homage and presses his feet, and he feels pleasure without moving his body, it is a duṣkṛta.' As below, concluding the explanation. In the second, 'one having and one lacking': the presence or absence in one or the other makes two propositions. In the third, 'both having': it makes one proposition. Together with the former, they make four propositions in total. All are due to the weight of defiled pleasure, so the offenses are divided into descending grades.