四分律行事鈔資持記 2.488

2.488

In the second, specific explanation, the first text earlier cited the Samantapāsādikā. It only shows touching without awareness. Below, it has one form propositions: 1. aware touching unaware (as below in the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya, grasping hair with the hand is a saṃghāvaśeṣa); 2. unaware touching aware (in the Daśādhyāya-vinaya, nails and the like are all thullaccaya; based on the Transactions Manual, it is also a saṃghāvaśeṣa); 3. both aware (constituting a saṃghāvaśeṣa is obvious); 4. both unaware (committing a thullaccaya, which is the Samantapāsādikā above). Next, citing the Daśādhyāya-vinaya, it first clarifies mutual impairment. Although both are aware of the object, because of disease and impairment the pleasure is light, and the offense is also reduced. The 'body faculty' is named a faculty in contrast to sensory objects, which encompasses all bodily parts. From 'if by means of' downward, it relates solely to that which can touch. The text lists five marks: the upper three are unaware, and the lower two are diseased and impaired. 'Bones without flesh': in the world there are diseased impairments, or burning fingers leaving remaining bones, which are their marks. From 'if' downward, it judges the above Daśādhyāya-vinaya based on our own school. 'Prātimokṣa' refers to the Prātimokṣa of this Vinaya; it says: 'If grasping hands, hair, or any part of the body, it is a saṃghāvaśeṣa' (omitted in the Edited Prātimokṣa). Since aware touching unaware constitutes a saṃghāvaśeṣa, unaware touching aware must logically be the same offense. Therefore the Precept Commentary says: 'In the Samantapāsādikā: hair touching hair, nails touching nails, all incur a thullaccaya, because both lack awareness; if they touch mutually, logically it constitutes a saṃghāvaśeṣa, identical to the Prātimokṣa.' Then we know clearly that it does not follow the Daśādhyāya-vinaya.