梵網經菩薩戒本疏 1.46

1.46

Fifth, regarding the lack of conditions: the lack of common conditions can be known. Among the particular ones, if the first condition is lacking, there are three meanings: First, one incurs a heavy defilement (duṣkṛta), meaning when one kills oneself with an evil mind. Second, one incurs a light defilement, meaning when, out of a wholesome mind that detests the body, one kills oneself, running contrary to the bodhisattva practice. Thus the sūtra states: 'One speaks of the body as impermanent, but does not praise detestation of and aversion to the body.' Here there is delusion, whereas previously there was anger; the remaining six conditions are all present. Third, one gains merit and accomplishes observance, meaning sacrificing one's body for the sake of the Dharma or renouncing one's life for sentient beings, like Prince Sattva and others. If one did not renounce it, on the contrary, one would incur an offense. Here, not only are the three poisons absent, but it is also conjoined with wisdom; hence it accomplishes observance. This is also the lacking of both the first and the sixth conditions. Next, if the second condition is lacking, there are two distinctions: First, if the various destinies are mistaken for one another, in all cases one incurs a major [offense], because the seven conditions are not lacking. Second, if an inanimate object substitutes for it, there are two offenses: (1) If one ultimately does not know that it is inanimate, considering the mind, one should incur a heavy preparatory [offense]. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: stepping on a melon rind at night, thinking one killed a toad, upon dying one falls into an evil destiny. This is incurring a heavy preparatory [offense] solely because the object is lacking. (2) If one subsequently learns that it was inanimate, which goes against one's previous unhindered intention, one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense]. Therefore, lacking that condition, one incurs these three offenses. If, regarding the above three situations, one also gives rise to doubt, one likewise incurs three wrongs: that is, if in the first situation one wished to kill an animal, a human substituted for it, and one gave rise to doubt about it—whether it was an animal or a human—and cut short its life, although the object has changed and the mind has shifted, because a life is equally harmed, both are major [offenses]. If in the second situation one wished to kill a sentient being, a desk substituted for it, and afterward gave rise to doubt—whether it was a sentient being or a desk—and after harming it one never resolved it to the end of one's life, because the mind is slightly lacking, one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense]. If in the last situation one wished to kill a sentient being, a desk substituted for it, afterward one gave rise to doubt, and after harming it one learned it was a desk, one incurs a light preparatory [offense]. Question: What is the difference between lacking the mind in this [doubt] and in the later situation, as well as lacking the object in this and in the earlier situation? Answer: Here, doubt arises toward a different object, so it is not the same as the first, because the latter gave rise to the original thought. The doubt corresponds to the different object, so it is not the same as the last, because the latter gave rise to doubt toward the original object. Question: Why is it that in lacking both, there is only doubt and not thought? Answer: Because with thought there is no lacking of both. For example, if one wishes to kill a sentient being, a desk substitutes for it: this is lacking the object; giving rise to the thought of a desk toward it is lacking the mind. If one harms it, there is no offense; therefore, with thought there is no lacking of both. In doubt, one deviates from one's original expectation, so the object is lacking; one harbors hesitation, so the mind is lacking. Therefore, single and dual lackings are three each, making six in total. Next, lacking the third condition has two distinctions: thought and doubt. Within thought, there are four: First, if one originally mistook a sentient being for a desk, after harming it there is no offense, because all three minds are lacking. Second, if one originally wished to kill a sentient being, but upon arriving at the object, turned and formed the thought of a desk, and after harming it did not realize [it was alive], one incurs a preparatory offense; because one did not fulfill the original intention, and because the middle and subsequent [minds] are lacking, based on the preliminary preparation, one is adjudicated a single light offense. Third, if after harming it one clearly realized [it was alive] and gave rise to the thought of a living being, one is adjudicated a heavy preparatory [offense], because while the middle was lacking, the prior and subsequent were present. Fourth, if toward a human one gave rise to the thought of an animal, etc., whether through original delusion or a shifted thought, both are major [offenses]. Within doubt, there are two: First, when doubt arises toward the original object, there are three: (1) doubting whether the living being is a desk and never resolving it to the end of one's life: a light preparatory [offense]; (2) subsequently resolving it and fulfilling [the thought of] a living being: a heavy preparatory [offense]; (3) doubting whether it is a human or an animal, whether resolved or unresolved afterward: both are major [offenses]. Second, when giving rise to doubt toward a different object, there are also three: (1) whether it is a desk or a living being, never resolving it to the end of one's life: a heavy preparatory [offense]; (2) resolving it afterward: a light preparatory [offense]; (3) doubting whether it is an animal or a human: both are major [offenses]. Next, lacking the fourth condition has two [cases]: first, entirely no offense; second, although lacking a killing mind, one strikes or beats, etc., and thus incurs a light defilement. Next, lacking the fifth condition, one incurs a heavy preparatory offense, because although one did not implement the preparatory action, one possessed the killing mind. Next, lacking the sixth condition has two [cases]: first, killing with an indeterminate mind still incurs a major [offense]; second, killing not out of greed for skin or meat, nor out of anger to avenge a grudge, nor out of delusion for sacrificial offerings, but solely out of great compassion to rescue them from extreme suffering, not avoiding one's own suffering—hence there is no offense. This is distinguished according to the Yogācāra. Next, lacking the seventh condition has two [cases]: first, if one ultimately does not know, there is no offense, but considering the mind, one incurs a heavy preparatory [offense]; second, if one knows, there is no offense, but one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense].