梵網經菩薩戒本疏 1.46

1.46

第五、闕緣者，闕通緣，可知。別中若闕初緣，有三義：一、應得重輕垢，謂以惡心自殺己身故。二、應得輕輕垢，謂以善心厭身自殺，違菩薩行。故經云：「說身無常，而不讚說厭離於身。」此中有癡，前有瞋故，餘六緣皆具也。三、得福成持，謂為法滅身，為生捨命，如薩埵王子等。若不捨，反得罪。此中非直無三毒，亦與智和合，故成持也。亦即闕初及第六二緣。次闕第二緣，有二差別：一、若諸趣相差，俱得重，以七緣不闕故。二、若非情來替，有二罪：一、畢竟不知是非情，約心應得重方便。如《唯識論》云：夜踏瓜皮，謂殺蝦蟇，死入惡道。此但為闕境，得重方便。二、若次後知是非情，違前暢思，得中方便。故闕彼緣，得此三罪。若於上三位兼起疑心，亦得三非。謂若於初位欲殺畜，人來替，於上生疑，為畜為人而斷命者，此雖境改心移，以命同害，亦俱重也。若於次位欲殺生，机來替，後生疑，為生為机，害已終身不決，以少闕心，得中方便。若於後位欲殺生，机替，後生疑，害後知机，得輕方便。問：此中闕心與後位，及闕境與前位，各何別耶？答：此於異境起疑，故不同初，以彼起本想故。疑當異境，故不同後，以彼於本境起疑故。問：何故雙闕，唯疑非想？答：以想無雙闕。如欲殺生，机來替，此是闕境；於上起机想，此闕心。若害無罪，是故想無雙闕。疑中乖本期，故闕境；懷猶預，故闕心。是故單雙二闕各三，合為六也。次闕第三緣，有想、疑二別。想中有四：一、若本迷生為机，害已無罪，以三心俱闕故。二、若本欲殺生，臨至境，轉作机想，害已不知，得方便罪，以不暢本思故，闕中後故，約前方便，結一輕罪。三、若害已了知，起壽心，結重方便，以闕中間，具前後故。四、若於人起畜等想，本迷轉想，俱重也。疑中二：一、於本境疑起，有三：一、疑生為机，終身不決，輕方便；二、後決暢壽，重方便；三、疑為人為畜，後決不決，俱重。二、於異境起疑，亦三：一、為机為生，終身不決，重方便；二、後決，輕方便；三、疑為畜為人，俱重也。次闕第四緣，有二：一、全不犯；二、雖無殺心，而有打等，故得輕垢也。次闕第五緣，得重方便罪，以雖不興方便，而有殺心故。次闕第六緣，有二：一、以無記心殺，還得重；二、不貪皮肉故殺，亦不瞋酬怨故殺，不癡祠祀故殺，但以大悲救彼極苦，不避自苦，故亦無犯。此依《瑜伽》辨。次闕第七緣，有二：一、畢竟不知不犯，約心得重方便；二、知不犯，得中方便。

Fifth, regarding the lack of conditions: the lack of common conditions can be known. Among the particular ones, if the first condition is lacking, there are three meanings: First, one incurs a heavy defilement (duṣkṛta), meaning when one kills oneself with an evil mind. Second, one incurs a light defilement, meaning when, out of a wholesome mind that detests the body, one kills oneself, running contrary to the bodhisattva practice. Thus the sūtra states: 'One speaks of the body as impermanent, but does not praise detestation of and aversion to the body.' Here there is delusion, whereas previously there was anger; the remaining six conditions are all present. Third, one gains merit and accomplishes observance, meaning sacrificing one's body for the sake of the Dharma or renouncing one's life for sentient beings, like Prince Sattva and others. If one did not renounce it, on the contrary, one would incur an offense. Here, not only are the three poisons absent, but it is also conjoined with wisdom; hence it accomplishes observance. This is also the lacking of both the first and the sixth conditions. Next, if the second condition is lacking, there are two distinctions: First, if the various destinies are mistaken for one another, in all cases one incurs a major [offense], because the seven conditions are not lacking. Second, if an inanimate object substitutes for it, there are two offenses: (1) If one ultimately does not know that it is inanimate, considering the mind, one should incur a heavy preparatory [offense]. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: stepping on a melon rind at night, thinking one killed a toad, upon dying one falls into an evil destiny. This is incurring a heavy preparatory [offense] solely because the object is lacking. (2) If one subsequently learns that it was inanimate, which goes against one's previous unhindered intention, one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense]. Therefore, lacking that condition, one incurs these three offenses. If, regarding the above three situations, one also gives rise to doubt, one likewise incurs three wrongs: that is, if in the first situation one wished to kill an animal, a human substituted for it, and one gave rise to doubt about it—whether it was an animal or a human—and cut short its life, although the object has changed and the mind has shifted, because a life is equally harmed, both are major [offenses]. If in the second situation one wished to kill a sentient being, a desk substituted for it, and afterward gave rise to doubt—whether it was a sentient being or a desk—and after harming it one never resolved it to the end of one's life, because the mind is slightly lacking, one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense]. If in the last situation one wished to kill a sentient being, a desk substituted for it, afterward one gave rise to doubt, and after harming it one learned it was a desk, one incurs a light preparatory [offense]. Question: What is the difference between lacking the mind in this [doubt] and in the later situation, as well as lacking the object in this and in the earlier situation? Answer: Here, doubt arises toward a different object, so it is not the same as the first, because the latter gave rise to the original thought. The doubt corresponds to the different object, so it is not the same as the last, because the latter gave rise to doubt toward the original object. Question: Why is it that in lacking both, there is only doubt and not thought? Answer: Because with thought there is no lacking of both. For example, if one wishes to kill a sentient being, a desk substitutes for it: this is lacking the object; giving rise to the thought of a desk toward it is lacking the mind. If one harms it, there is no offense; therefore, with thought there is no lacking of both. In doubt, one deviates from one's original expectation, so the object is lacking; one harbors hesitation, so the mind is lacking. Therefore, single and dual lackings are three each, making six in total. Next, lacking the third condition has two distinctions: thought and doubt. Within thought, there are four: First, if one originally mistook a sentient being for a desk, after harming it there is no offense, because all three minds are lacking. Second, if one originally wished to kill a sentient being, but upon arriving at the object, turned and formed the thought of a desk, and after harming it did not realize [it was alive], one incurs a preparatory offense; because one did not fulfill the original intention, and because the middle and subsequent [minds] are lacking, based on the preliminary preparation, one is adjudicated a single light offense. Third, if after harming it one clearly realized [it was alive] and gave rise to the thought of a living being, one is adjudicated a heavy preparatory [offense], because while the middle was lacking, the prior and subsequent were present. Fourth, if toward a human one gave rise to the thought of an animal, etc., whether through original delusion or a shifted thought, both are major [offenses]. Within doubt, there are two: First, when doubt arises toward the original object, there are three: (1) doubting whether the living being is a desk and never resolving it to the end of one's life: a light preparatory [offense]; (2) subsequently resolving it and fulfilling [the thought of] a living being: a heavy preparatory [offense]; (3) doubting whether it is a human or an animal, whether resolved or unresolved afterward: both are major [offenses]. Second, when giving rise to doubt toward a different object, there are also three: (1) whether it is a desk or a living being, never resolving it to the end of one's life: a heavy preparatory [offense]; (2) resolving it afterward: a light preparatory [offense]; (3) doubting whether it is an animal or a human: both are major [offenses]. Next, lacking the fourth condition has two [cases]: first, entirely no offense; second, although lacking a killing mind, one strikes or beats, etc., and thus incurs a light defilement. Next, lacking the fifth condition, one incurs a heavy preparatory offense, because although one did not implement the preparatory action, one possessed the killing mind. Next, lacking the sixth condition has two [cases]: first, killing with an indeterminate mind still incurs a major [offense]; second, killing not out of greed for skin or meat, nor out of anger to avenge a grudge, nor out of delusion for sacrificial offerings, but solely out of great compassion to rescue them from extreme suffering, not avoiding one's own suffering—hence there is no offense. This is distinguished according to the Yogācāra. Next, lacking the seventh condition has two [cases]: first, if one ultimately does not know, there is no offense, but considering the mind, one incurs a heavy preparatory [offense]; second, if one knows, there is no offense, but one incurs an intermediate preparatory [offense].