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梵網經菩薩戒本疏 2.8

English (machine translation) 2.8

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English

2.8

Fifth, as for missing conditions: the common conditions are understandable. Among the specific conditions, first, if the first condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) having stolen one's own property, if one never knows that it is one's own property, a major preparatory offense is determined with respect to the mind; (2) if one later knows that it is one's own property, one incurs a minor preparatory offense. Next, if the second condition is missing, there are six offenses, because both missing [conditions] are included under this heading. First, with respect to the object, there are three: (1) one intends to steal a human's property, but the property of an animal or the like replaces it; one steals the property of the animal or the like, conceiving it to be the property of a human; having stolen it, whether one later knows or does not know, all are major offenses, because both are objects of offense; (2) ownerless property replaces it; having stolen it, if one never knows that it is ownerless, a major preparatory offense is determined with respect to the mind; (3) having stolen it, if one knows that it is ownerless, one incurs a minor preparatory offense. Second, as for the three [cases] of both being missing: (1) one intends to steal a human's property, and the property of an animal or the like replaces it—this is the missing object—and in addition one doubts whether it is a human's property or an animal's property—this is the missing mind; having stolen it, whether it is later resolved or not resolved, all are major offenses; (2) ownerless property replaces it, and one further generates doubt as to whether it is owned or ownerless; having stolen it, if one does not know, one incurs a major preparatory offense, because of the partial lack of the mind; (3) having stolen it with a doubting mind, if one later knows it is ownerless, one incurs a minor preparatory offense, because since the object is completely missing and the mind is involved in only one part, it is therefore minor. Among the three in each of the above two categories, two pārājikas, two major preparatory offenses, and two minor preparatory offenses are clear. Next, if the third condition is missing, there are two distinctions: conception and doubt. Within conception there are five clauses: (1) with respect to fundamental delusion: if fundamentally deluded, one conceives what has an owner to be ownerless; having taken it, one does not commit an offense, because all three minds are missing; (2) if one later knows it has an owner and does not return it, a major offense is determined; (3) with respect to shifting conception: that is, one intends to steal property that has an owner, but upon arriving at the object, one's conception shifts to its being ownerless; having taken it, if one does not know it has an owner, one incurs a preparatory offense, because one does not carry out the original thought, and because the intermediate and subsequent [minds] are missing, one minor offense is determined based on the preceding preparation; (4) if one later knows it has an owner and does not return it, it is also a major offense; (5) if, with respect to a human's property, one gives rise to the conception of it being an animal's property or the like, both fundamental delusion and shifting conception are major offenses. Second, within doubt there are also five clauses: (1) with respect to generating doubt about the original object of owned property: 'Does it have an owner, or does it lack an owner?'; having taken it, if it is never resolved, one incurs a major preparatory offense; (2) having taken it, if it is later resolved and one does not return it, one incurs a major offense; if one returns it, it is a minor offense, the same as the preceding clause; (3) one doubts about a different object of ownerless property: 'Is it ownerless, or does it have an owner?'; having taken it, if one does not know, one incurs a major preparatory offense; (4) having taken it, if it is later resolved, one incurs a minor preparatory offense; (5) if one mutually doubts between human and animal, both are major offenses. Question: What is called ownerless property? Answer: The Samantapāsādikā says: 'If a child commits evil deeds and the parents expel them, and later the parents die, this property is called ownerless; using it carries no offense.' The Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā says: 'Between two kingdoms are border villages; if there is property in the vacant land between them, this is called ownerless. If a kingdom is destroyed and the king flees, and the subsequent king has not yet been enthroned, if there is property therein, it is also called ownerless.' If one has the intention to take and use them, none of these constitute an offense. Next, if the fourth condition is missing: if there was fundamentally no intention to steal, there is entirely no offense. Next, if the fifth condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) although one has the intention to steal, one has not yet initiated preparatory action; if due to other circumstances [the owner] instead sends this property over and one conceives the mind to receive it, one incurs a preparatory offense; (2) if one's mind is resolved not to return it, one incurs a major offense. Next, if the sixth condition is missing, there are two: (1) if taken with an indeterminate mind, it is also a major offense; (2) if, out of great compassion and a wholesome mind, one takes it to rescue [someone from] severe suffering, there is no offense, as will be explained below under allowable exceptions. Next, if the seventh condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) walking to the place of the property, after generating the conception that it is one's own, one incurs a major offense; (2) arriving at the place of the property and generating doubt, one incurs a preparatory offense.

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