梵網經菩薩戒本疏 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

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Composed by the Śramaṇa Fazang of the Western Monastery of the State of Wei

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First Section: Second Precept Against Stealing

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In about to explain this precept, the ten gates are the same as before.

First, the intention of the proscription is briefly distinguished in ten kinds: 1. Because the path of karma is heavy: unreasonable theft and robbery obstruct the Path most deeply; bearing this heavy transgressional guilt, how could one be fit to enter the Path? 2. Because it destroys prohibitive laws: across ancient and present realms, there are none that do not universally proscribe stealing as a major offense; the Buddha's teachings for both monastic and lay, and the precepts of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, all proscribe it as major. 3. Because it produces deep vexation: wealth is the object of sentient beings' utmost greed and attachment; unreasonably encroaching and seizing it vexes others extremely, hence it is inappropriate. 4. Because it damages wealth and life: wealth is what sustains sentient beings' physical lives; if one steals their wealth, it is identical to taking their lives. Hence the verse in the thirteenth [fascicle] of the Dazhidulun says: 'All sentient beings / Rely on clothing and food to sustain their own lives; / If one robs or seizes them, / It is identical to robbing and seizing life.' 5. Because one loses those to be converted: all sentient beings dislike seeing a person who steals with their eyes, how much less receiving their conversion? 6. Because it destroys faithful minds: performing this extreme evil causes sentient beings who should believe not to believe, and those who have already believed are completely corrupted. 7. Because it defiles the Śākya clan: an evil reputation spreads abroad, and the whole world detests it; how could any pollution and encumbrance of the Śākya lineage exceed this? 8. Because it violates correct practice: it violates and harms the bodhisattva's practice of rescuing sentient beings with great loving-kindness and great compassion. 9. Because one loses the six pāramitās: presumptuously gathering the six pāramitās, stealing destroys giving (dāna), and the six pāramitās are all destroyed. 10. Because it contradicts the four means of embracing: one should embrace with wealth and only then confer the Dharma; now, instead, one steals, and the four means of embracing likewise perish. The intentions of the proscription are manifold; these ten are briefly distinguished, which should be understood by analogy.

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Second, the explanation of the name: the names are of various kinds: 1. Termed 'taking by robbery,' which refers to forceful intimidation and seizure. 2. Termed 'taking by intimidation,' which refers to bringing up an issue to cause fright, seeking to attain the giving of property. 3. Termed 'taking by theft,' which refers to avoiding the owner and privately stealing. 4. Termed 'taking what is not given,' which refers to the owner not giving and one using expedient means to take it. However, it is determined with four propositions: 1. Taking what is given is not stealing, which is understandable. 2. Taking what is given above is stealing, as when miscounting gives an excess and one knowingly accepts it in silence. 3. Taking what is not given is stealing, which is understandable. 4. Taking what is not given is not stealing, as in the notion of close friends or temporary use and the like. 5. Termed 'taking by stealing,' which refers to unreasonably damaging wealth, which is termed stealing. The first four names are restricted, while this one name is broad, because burning, burying, and so forth are also included within it; therefore, the first four names are set aside and only this single name is titled. Stealing is that which is guarded against, and the precept is that which guards; because it can guard against stealing, it is called the precept against stealing, taking its name from what it acts upon.

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Third, the sequence: among the ten courses of karma, first is killing and next is stealing; this follows that order. Furthermore, first harming the direct retribution and next damaging the dependent retribution also establishes the sequence.

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Fourth, fulfilling the conditions: the general conditions are of three kinds, as already explained before. The specific conditions are synthesized by consulting the two treatises, the Daśabhūmika and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The seven conditions are the same as before: 1. It is not one's own property: because stealing one's own property does not constitute a major [offense], and unowned property, although not one's own possession, does not constitute a major [offense]. Next, second: it must be clarified that it has an owner: although it actually has an owner, if one is confused and considers it unowned, it also does not constitute a major [offense]. Next, third: having the notion that it has an owner. Why does it not say 'knowledge' but says 'notion'? Because knowledge only discerns the object, whereas notion encompasses both delusion and awakening; the missing condition accords with this, hence there is 'notion.' Although one has the notion of an owner, if one does not produce an intent to steal, it also does not constitute a major [offense]. Next, fourth: clarifying that there is a mind of theft: although the mind thinks of theft, if one does not initiate expedient means, infringement and damage are not constituted as an offense, nor does it constitute a major [offense]. Next, fifth: initiating expedient means: although expedient means are initiated, if done out of great compassion to rescue from suffering, it may not constitute an offense. Next, sixth: there is a mind of the three poisons: or although active, if the property does not leave its place, because it is not yet constituted as an offense belonging to oneself. Next, seventh: executing the removal from its original place.

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Fifth, as for missing conditions: the common conditions are understandable. Among the specific conditions, first, if the first condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) having stolen one's own property, if one never knows that it is one's own property, a major preparatory offense is determined with respect to the mind; (2) if one later knows that it is one's own property, one incurs a minor preparatory offense. Next, if the second condition is missing, there are six offenses, because both missing [conditions] are included under this heading. First, with respect to the object, there are three: (1) one intends to steal a human's property, but the property of an animal or the like replaces it; one steals the property of the animal or the like, conceiving it to be the property of a human; having stolen it, whether one later knows or does not know, all are major offenses, because both are objects of offense; (2) ownerless property replaces it; having stolen it, if one never knows that it is ownerless, a major preparatory offense is determined with respect to the mind; (3) having stolen it, if one knows that it is ownerless, one incurs a minor preparatory offense. Second, as for the three [cases] of both being missing: (1) one intends to steal a human's property, and the property of an animal or the like replaces it—this is the missing object—and in addition one doubts whether it is a human's property or an animal's property—this is the missing mind; having stolen it, whether it is later resolved or not resolved, all are major offenses; (2) ownerless property replaces it, and one further generates doubt as to whether it is owned or ownerless; having stolen it, if one does not know, one incurs a major preparatory offense, because of the partial lack of the mind; (3) having stolen it with a doubting mind, if one later knows it is ownerless, one incurs a minor preparatory offense, because since the object is completely missing and the mind is involved in only one part, it is therefore minor. Among the three in each of the above two categories, two pārājikas, two major preparatory offenses, and two minor preparatory offenses are clear. Next, if the third condition is missing, there are two distinctions: conception and doubt. Within conception there are five clauses: (1) with respect to fundamental delusion: if fundamentally deluded, one conceives what has an owner to be ownerless; having taken it, one does not commit an offense, because all three minds are missing; (2) if one later knows it has an owner and does not return it, a major offense is determined; (3) with respect to shifting conception: that is, one intends to steal property that has an owner, but upon arriving at the object, one's conception shifts to its being ownerless; having taken it, if one does not know it has an owner, one incurs a preparatory offense, because one does not carry out the original thought, and because the intermediate and subsequent [minds] are missing, one minor offense is determined based on the preceding preparation; (4) if one later knows it has an owner and does not return it, it is also a major offense; (5) if, with respect to a human's property, one gives rise to the conception of it being an animal's property or the like, both fundamental delusion and shifting conception are major offenses. Second, within doubt there are also five clauses: (1) with respect to generating doubt about the original object of owned property: 'Does it have an owner, or does it lack an owner?'; having taken it, if it is never resolved, one incurs a major preparatory offense; (2) having taken it, if it is later resolved and one does not return it, one incurs a major offense; if one returns it, it is a minor offense, the same as the preceding clause; (3) one doubts about a different object of ownerless property: 'Is it ownerless, or does it have an owner?'; having taken it, if one does not know, one incurs a major preparatory offense; (4) having taken it, if it is later resolved, one incurs a minor preparatory offense; (5) if one mutually doubts between human and animal, both are major offenses. Question: What is called ownerless property? Answer: The Samantapāsādikā says: 'If a child commits evil deeds and the parents expel them, and later the parents die, this property is called ownerless; using it carries no offense.' The Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā says: 'Between two kingdoms are border villages; if there is property in the vacant land between them, this is called ownerless. If a kingdom is destroyed and the king flees, and the subsequent king has not yet been enthroned, if there is property therein, it is also called ownerless.' If one has the intention to take and use them, none of these constitute an offense. Next, if the fourth condition is missing: if there was fundamentally no intention to steal, there is entirely no offense. Next, if the fifth condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) although one has the intention to steal, one has not yet initiated preparatory action; if due to other circumstances [the owner] instead sends this property over and one conceives the mind to receive it, one incurs a preparatory offense; (2) if one's mind is resolved not to return it, one incurs a major offense. Next, if the sixth condition is missing, there are two: (1) if taken with an indeterminate mind, it is also a major offense; (2) if, out of great compassion and a wholesome mind, one takes it to rescue [someone from] severe suffering, there is no offense, as will be explained below under allowable exceptions. Next, if the seventh condition is missing, there are two offenses: (1) walking to the place of the property, after generating the conception that it is one's own, one incurs a major offense; (2) arriving at the place of the property and generating doubt, one incurs a preparatory offense.

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Sixth, as for the gravity of the types, there are four: first, clarifying the owner of the property; second, clarifying the substance of the property; third, clarifying the intention to steal; fourth, clarifying the method of stealing. In the first, the types of owners of property are two: (1) property of the Three Jewels, and (2) property of distinct classes. In the first, property of the Three Jewels, distinctions are made in six sections: (1) explaining the characteristics; (2) clarifying mutual use; (3) lending out; (4) receiving guests; (5) managers; (6) gravity.

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In the first [section], we first clarify the Buddha's property. Some say: stealing the Buddha's property does not incur a major offense, because the Buddha's property lacks the thought of 'mineness' and lacks afflicted harm, as in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] where a sthūlātyaya is incurred. If according to what the Sujāta Sūtra says, a major offense is determined in relation to the protecting guardian. Some say: all are major offenses, because if damaging an inferior status is still determined as a major offense, how much more so for the property of the venerable status, offerings of devas and humans—if unrighteously damaged or stolen, how could it incur a minor offense? Stūpas have guardian spirits; they are not without protecting guardians. Now according to this sūtra, the doctrine of the bodhisattva precepts holds that all are major offenses, because the Nirvāṇa Sūtra spoke in terms of the Hīnayāna. If one takes Buddha images, relics, and the like without the intention to steal, there is no offense. According to what the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā says: doing so with a pure mind of offering, one thinks to oneself: 'That person is also a disciple, and I am also a disciple.' In such a case, there is no offense. Furthermore, if one takes them with a stealing mind, one commits a major offense. Therefore, the Mātrīkā-śāstra says: stealing Buddha images or relics worth a full five [māṣakas] constitutes a major offense. Furthermore, these bodhisattva precepts do not depend on completing five [māṣakas]. Second, as for Dharma property: all are major offenses. If one steals sūtras or treatises, the Buddha said: calculated as priceless, both paper and ink are of major gravity. The Five Hundred Questions says: one must not blow dust off a sūtra with the mouth; dust on an image is likewise. If one burns an old sūtra, one incurs a major offense, like burning one's parents. If one does not know that there is an offense, one commits a minor offense. Based on this, if one borrows another's sūtras, treatises, commentaries, extracts, or the like, and does not return them, all are major offenses. If there is damage, and one secretly rolls it up and returns it to the other without letting the owner know, it is also a major offense. The Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna Sūtra says: stealing another's secret formula constitutes a major offense. Based on this, secretly reading and memorizing, or secretly copying, even if not damaging the original, because the formula has the value of property, all are determined as major offenses. Question: Since taking an image with a pure mind does not commit a major offense, taking a sūtra with a pure mind should also be without offense? Answer: They are not comparable. Because an image can be revered from afar, whereas the Dharma must be read intimately; reciting it presents a manifest contradiction, and is therefore determined as a major offense. If a sūtra was originally produced universally for everyone, taking it with a pure mind is also considered to be without offense. Furthermore, if an image was produced with a restrictive, non-universal intent, and taking it gives rise to distress, it should also be considered an offense. Third, Saṅgha property. There are two kinds: (1) broad, and (2) restricted. Within the first, there are two: (1) property of the permanent Saṅgha of the ten directions. This refers to the permanent grains, wheat, fruits, and the like of the Saṅgha's monasteries; their substance extends universally to the ten directions and cannot be divided for use, hence they are called 'permanent.' Stealing even a single hair's worth or more is universally a major offense. In the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra: stealing the fields, dwellings, orchards, groves, slaves, cattle, and the like of the Saṅgha—this is called the mark of breaking precepts, losing the status of a monk; it is a pārājika, not a śramaṇa. One must not dwell together with the Saṅgha that accords with the Dharma; one must be expelled. Furthermore, the Samantapāsādikā says: eating the Saṅgha's food without striking the bell constitutes stealing. Furthermore, even if the bell is struck but the doors are shut, it should also be considered an offense. (2) Property of the present Saṅgha of the ten directions. This refers to things such as offerings received by the Saṅgha and the property of a deceased monk; before the formal act is performed, they pertain universally to the Saṅgha of the ten directions and have the sense of taking shares, hence they are called 'the present [Saṅgha] of the ten directions.' Taking even a single hair's worth or more constitutes, with respect to each individual monk of the ten directions, one pārājika each. Second, as for the restricted, there are also two: (1) property of the Saṅgha, referring to precisely this property of a deceased monk or the like, after the formal act has been completed, becoming belonging to the present Saṅgha or the like, as well as when a donor brings property to give to the currently present Saṅgha, or for one week, two weeks, etc., and it has not yet been divided. (2) Property of an individual person, referring to the property of one monk, as well as the aforementioned property after it has been divided, etc.; all are major offenses. The Sujāta Sūtra says: stealing the property of a deceased monk, if the karmavācanā has not been performed, one incurs the offense from the Saṅgha of the ten directions; if the karmavācanā has been performed, one incurs the offense in relation to the present Saṅgha. If at the time of death, property is stolen following the deceased's assignment and transmission, an offense is determined according to the person to whom it was given.

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Second, explaining interchangeable use, there are two kinds: first, interchangeable use among the Three Jewels; second, interchangeable use within their respective categories. In the first kind, as in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya, where the overseer interchangeably used the property of the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha, the Buddha declared it a pārājika. Nowadays, there are those who supervise stūpas, images, scriptures, and so forth, who take the Saṃgha's provisions and grain, ride the Saṃgha's livestock, or employ the Saṃgha's pure attendants (kappiyakārakas)—even a single hair's breadth constitutes a grave offense. Furthermore, building Buddha halls and stūpas on the monastic residential grounds, or drawing well water from the stūpa precinct, are both grave offenses. Furthermore, according to the Ratnarāśi Sūtra, property of the Buddha and the Dharma must not be used interchangeably, because no one can act as owner of Buddha or Dharma property, nor is there any place to petition for permission. This is unlike Saṃgha property belonging to the universal Saṃgha of the four quarters, where mutual needs arise. The managing monk seeks the consensus of the Saṃgha, calls for consent (chanda), and casts voting sticks (śalākā); if there is concord, it may be used. If Saṃgha property is used to repair a Buddha stūpa, if obtained through the Saṃgha's concord according to the Dharma, it may be used; if there is no concord, laypeople should be encouraged to repair it. If there is property belonging to a Buddha stūpa, even down to a single coin, it was relinquished because of the donor's earnest reverence. Devas and humans should give rise to thoughts of the Buddha and the stūpa regarding this property, down to when it is blown by the wind and decays; it must not be traded for treasures to make offerings, because no one can set a price on the Tathāgata's stūpa property. If one follows this passage, Saṃgha property may, through concord, be used for the Buddha or Dharma, but Buddha or Dharma property can never be used by the Saṃgha. Moreover, setting out monastic seating inside a Buddha hall, or placing scriptures and images inside monastic quarters so as to obstruct the monks' usage, both constitute interchangeable use, because the ranks of the Three Jewels are distinct. If temporarily placed or not obstructing usage, in principle there is no offense. Furthermore, the Five Hundred Questions states: If a place was not originally a Buddha hall but an image was installed, and monks lodge together there according to the Dharma, if a partition is made there is no offense, because when the Buddha was in the world he also lodged in the same room with disciples. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda Commentary states: On land belonging to the Saṃgha of the four quarters, if the Saṃgha is not in concord, one may not build a Buddha stūpa or plant flowers and fruits for the Buddha. If allocated from within the Saṃgha, one is permitted to make offerings as one wishes. If flowers are abundantly limitless, one may make offerings with them as needed. If one goes through famine and starvation, and the orchards and fields of the Three Jewels cannot be distinguished, with no place to ask, if the Saṃgha is in concord it may dispose of them as it sees fit. If water belongs to a stūpa and utilizes the stūpa's labor and resources, the Saṃgha's use of it incurs a grave offense. If the labor and resources were provided by the Saṃgha, one should estimate the amount and not exceed the limit; exceeding it is adjudicated as a grave offense. If the donor universally gave to the Three Jewels, it may all be fully used without offense. Second, explaining interchangeable use within their respective categories: First, distinguishing Buddha property, there are six levels: 1. Property of the Buddha Jewel: It should be hung in a stūpa as an offering. Therefore the Sarvāstivāda Commentary states: 'When the Buddha was in the world, if a donor made an offering to the Buddha, it was used by the physical body. If they said they were making an offering to the Buddha Jewel, then the physical body could not use it; it should be placed in the Fox-Hair Stūpa, with the donor's intention of making an offering to the dharmakāya, because the dharmakāya endures forever.' 2. Property for the Buddha's personal use: namely, canopies, seats, and so forth in the Buddha hall, as well as the Buddha's robes, bowls, and so forth. Whatever has been used by the Buddha or an image may not be exchanged, because all devas and humans revere it as they do a stūpa, as stated earlier in the Ratnarāśi Sūtra. Furthermore, the Five Hundred Questions states: One must not sell silk from the Buddha's body to make robes for the Buddha. Furthermore, when pillars of a Buddha hall decayed and the donor replaced them, giving the old pillars to the Saṃgha, the Saṃgha could not use them. According to this text, the foundation soil, mud, wood, gold, and stone of a Buddha hall that previously served for a Buddha image or for his personal use must all be revered as offerings and cannot be diverted to other uses. 3. Property belonging to the Buddha: namely, donated to the Buddha and permitted to yield interest. The Daśabhāṇavāra Vinaya states: Regarding yielding interest on the property of a Buddha stūpa, the Buddha said it is permitted. The Five Hundred Questions states: Buddha property may be sold to make offerings with offering implements. Furthermore, according to the upper fascicle of the Latter Part of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: The Buddha told Ānanda: 'Regarding property donated while the Buddha is currently present, the community of monks should be informed. After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, property donated to the Buddha from all places of faithful conviction should be used to make Buddha images, to make Buddha robes and seven-jeweled banners and canopies, and to buy various fragrant oils and precious flowers to make offerings to the Buddha. Except for making offerings to the Buddha, it must not be used for anything else. If used, it incurs the offense of stealing from the Buddha.' Furthermore, the Five Hundred Questions states: Buddha property must not be moved to another monastery; doing so incurs expulsion (pārājika). If all the monks leave, if one petitions the Saṃgha and the Saṃgha permits taking it along, there is no offense. If a monk is capable of making Buddha images or copying scriptures, when he receives property he must not take it. If one obtains livestock or people belonging to the Buddha's household, one must not employ them; employing them incurs a great offense. 4. Property for making offerings to the Buddha: In addition, the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: If flowers offered to the Buddha are plentiful, it is permitted to sell them to buy fragrant lamp oil. If there is still a surplus, sell them and place [the proceeds] in the Buddha's inexhaustible wealth. It also says: 'That which contains relics is called a stūpa; that without relics is called a caitya. A caitya may have Buddha flower canopies and offering implements placed on it. If someone says: "The Buddha has already eradicated desire, anger, and delusion; what is the use of making offerings with this vihāra?", he incurs a vinaya-transgression offense (duṣkṛta), and the karmic retribution is severe.' It also says: On days of great assemblies such as the Buddha's birthday, one may take offerings to Buddha stūpas; superior ones to Buddha stūpas, inferior ones to caityas. Furthermore, the Five Hundred Questions states: If Buddha banners are numerous and one wishes to use them for other Buddhist activities, one may ask the donor; if the donor does not permit it, one may not. Furthermore, the Dazhidulun states: As when painting a Buddha image, one person destroys it because it is not well done and gains merit; another destroys it with an evil mind and incurs sin. 5. Offerings presented to the Buddha: The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya states: Regarding food offered to a Buddha stūpa, those who maintain the stūpa may eat it. The Samantapāsādikā states: Regarding cooked rice presented before the Buddha, monks attending the Buddha may eat it. If there is no monk, a layperson attending the Buddha may also eat it. According to this passage, dishes offered to the Buddha should be given to those who sweep and maintain the stūpa to eat. 6. Property restricted to a particular Buddha: such as originally making an image of Śākyamuni and later altering it to Amitābha. The Samantapāsādikā states: Wishing to make offerings to this image, one instead makes offerings to that image, incurring a minor offense. In accord with this, viewing the object, in principle the meaning extends: both violate the donor's intention, incurring the offense of interchangeable use. If it is changed to an image of a monk, a bodhisattva, or a deva, it should in principle be adjudicated as a grave offense. If the donor's intention was general, intended to attend upon the Buddha to make offerings, in principle there is also no offense. The Five Hundred Questions states: Using colors belonging to the Buddha to paint forms of birds and beasts incurs an offense, except when done before the Buddha for the purpose of making offerings. If one oversees Buddha property, one should distinguish well among the above six ranks, so as not to allow interchangeable use. Second, Dharma property also has six levels: 1. Property of the Dharma Jewel: It should be placed in a stūpa as an offering. The Sarvāstivāda Commentary states: 'If someone donates to the Dharma Jewel, it should be hung in a stūpa, and must not be used to make scriptures or given to those who expound the precepts, and so forth.' 2. Property for the Dharma's personal use: such as rollers, wrappers, cases, cloths, boxes, and wrappers of these kinds; in accord with the above, they must not be put to other uses. 3. Property given to the Dharma: The Sarvāstivāda Commentary states: 'If one simply says "given to the Dharma", divide it into two portions: one portion given to the scriptures, and one portion given to the reciters of the scriptures.' In accord with the above, it may also yield interest, and so forth. 4. Property for making offerings to the Dharma. 5. Offerings presented to the Dharma: Both should be understood in accord with the Buddha. 6. Within property restricted to a particular Dharma text: If originally made for the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and altered to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, in principle it should not be grave. If altered to copy a treatise or apocryphal scriptures compiled by humans, it is definitively judged to be grave. If originally donated for copying generally, in principle there is also no offense. Third, Saṃgha property has five kinds: 1. Property of the Saṃgha Jewel: The Sarvāstivāda Commentary states: 'If donated to the Saṃgha Jewel, neither ordinary monks nor noble monks may take a share, because it was given to the Saṃgha Jewel. This property should be returned to the donor. If there is no donor, it should be placed in a stūpa to make offerings to the ultimate-truth Saṃgha. If one says "given to the community of monks", both noble monks and ordinary monks may take a share, because the words do not refer [specifically to the Saṃgha Jewel].' According to this text, recipients of donations must understand this very well. 2. Perpetual Saṃgha property: The Mātṛkā Commentary states: Taking this property of the Saṃgha of the four quarters and, with a thieving intention, transferring it to another monastery incurs a minor offense, because it is still used for the Saṃgha and therefore does not constitute a grave offense. According to this, if one takes Saṃgha food, not giving it to another monastery, and goes outside the boundary to eat it without returning it, it constitutes a grave offense. Even if the bell was struck, one still cannot escape [the charge of] theft, because the location is fixed. Furthermore, the Five Hundred Questions states: If begging on behalf of the Saṃgha, if one petitions the Saṃgha and is permitted to take Saṃgha food on the road, [there is no offense]. If the Saṃgha does not permit it, or if one departs without petitioning, one must repay it; if not, it constitutes a grave offense. According to this text, if on an errand for the Saṃgha where there is nowhere along the road to beg for food, with the Saṃgha's concord one is permitted to obtain food, without necessarily ringing the bell. If at the Saṃgha's estates or mills, one may eat by ringing the bell, without needing the Saṃgha's concord. If one brings pure attendants, livestock, and so forth from another monastery to eat this monastery's property, in accord with the earlier Mātṛkā Commentary, it incurs a minor offense. If they perform service for this monastery, in principle there is also no offense. If privately used to the extent of a single hair's breadth or more, it is all grave. Furthermore, eating while violating the precepts even at the proper time, or eating outside the proper time even while observing complete precepts, both constitute an offense. If one is invited to eat in a room and complacently eats outside the proper time, it directly incurs this offense. 3. Property of the present Saṃgha of the ten directions: Diverting it into perpetual Saṃgha property is also a grave offense. Recently I have seen administrators harboring good intentions who expediently divert property donated to the present Saṃgha to supply perpetual Saṃgha use, thinking they are benefiting the Saṃgha; turning their backs on correctness, they commit a grave offense. Whether encroaching on the laity for the Saṃgha, encroaching on the Saṃgha for the laity, or dividing robes and property through an unlawful karmic act (adharmakarma)—all constitute stealing property of the present Saṃgha of the ten directions; furthermore, severing the distribution of minor and major shares contrary to the texts is all grave. May one reflect on this carefully! 4. Property of the community of monks: such as the property of a deceased monk; once the lawful karmic act is completed, it belongs to the present assembly. If unlawfully embezzled and sold, or unequally divided, or distributed to reward others individually without the Saṃgha's concord, and so forth, it is entirely grave. 5. Property restricted to the Saṃgha within a specific boundary: such as originally donated to this monastery, but the present monks divert it to another monastery, and so forth; or if the karmadāna holds the roster and assigns monks out of order; or if an individual obtains the roster and privately receives [offerings] alone. Because the donor's intention was to invite the Saṃgha in order, intentionally violating this incurs a grave offense. If one previously accepted an individual invitation, one subsequently violates the precepts.

2.12

Third, explaining lending out: In the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya, regarding property of stūpas and the Saṃgha, when lending out for interest to one another, clearly write down and record that it was lent at such a time and returned at such a time. When administrators transfer duties, they must read the record within the Saṃgha, proclaim it clearly, and entrust it to their successors; those who violate this are adjudicated an offense. In the Daśabhāṇavāra Vinaya, interest gained from lending stūpa property is returned to the stūpa's inexhaustible wealth. In the Samantapāsādikā, it is permitted to borrow Saṃgha property to build private rooms. The Sujāta Sūtra states: When sick persons borrow property of the Three Jewels, they must repay it tenfold. For other monks who are not sick, it does not seem to be permitted. All the above are neither precious property of the Buddha and so forth, nor property used personally by the Buddha and Dharma, because those allow no concept of diversion or exchange. The Five Hundred Questions states: If a person borrows Buddha property and they yield interest on each other's funds for private use, it is equivalent to destroying the dharmakāya. If oxen or slaves are donated to the Buddha, one must not use them or sell and exchange them. If military weapons are donated, they must also not be accepted.

2.13

Fourth, on the rules for receiving and entertaining guests: According to the text below, when a Mahāyāna Dharma master comes, one should welcome him, pay homage, and provide him with yellow gold, delicacies of a hundred flavors, and so forth. The Daśādhyāya-vinaya states: 'Because this person takes my place, one must provide for him.' It does not state what property should be used for the offering. By inference, it should be the property of the present saṃgha, because it can be used by consensus. The Mahīśāsaka-vinaya states: 'If a layperson enters the monastery and the saṃgha does not give him food, he will conceive resentment.' The Buddha said: 'You should hold good [food] and give it to him.' Furthermore, when food was served to him in an inferior vessel, he also felt resentment. The Buddha said: 'Give it to him in a good vessel.' According to this, [such laypersons] must be evil people looking for faults in the saṃgha, who do not know the path of karma. If they are among the two assemblies of laypeople or discerning, upright gentlemen who understand that saṃgha property is difficult to digest, one should not give it to them. Therefore the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra states: 'Whatever is the food of the saṃgha must not be given thoughtlessly to any layperson, nor may one say, "This is my property," and give food apart from the saṃgha.' However, toward those who bring harm or benefit to the saṃgha, giving is permitted. Thus the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya states: 'One should give to those who harm and those who benefit. As for those who harm: robbers come to the monastery demanding various kinds of food and drink. If one does not give it to them, they might burn down or plunder the interior of the monastery; although it should not be given, out of fear that they will do harm, one gives it according to need, whether much or little. As for those who benefit: if they repair the monastic quarters, are skilled artisans, or manage and arrange the affairs and property of the saṃgha, one should give them the forenoon meal, the afternoon meal, body oil, unseasonal juice, and so forth. If they are kings or persons of great authority, one should give them food and drink. These are called those who benefit.' The Daśādhyāya-vinaya states: 'When providing firewood, fire, and candles for kings and ministers, one may spend nineteen coins without needing to inform the saṃgha. If more is needed, one should inform the saṃgha before giving.' Moreover, there was a vile, low person who demanded food from the monk in charge of food. The monk said: 'I prepared this food for the sake of the saṃgha, not for you.' [The person] then seized a monk, severed his hands and feet, and cut his waist in half. The monks reported this to the Buddha, and the Buddha said: 'Where there is such a terrifying circumstance, if they beg, give a little; or if they beg, give half; or if they beg for all, give all. Do not, on account of this, suffer great ruin and affliction.' The Daśādhyāya-vinaya also states: 'When a hired laborer is engaged for a full day but suddenly encounters an adverse condition so that the contract cannot be fulfilled as agreed, the Buddha ordered that he be paid in proportion to his labor.' The Samantapāsādikā states: 'As for the rules on receiving pure persons (ārāmika), if they take turns in duty shifts, clothing and food should be given to those on duty; those off duty who are not employed for a long period must not be provided with clothing and food.' In light of the above passages, other cases not discussed may be inferred accordingly. Question: The sources cited here are mostly Hīnayāna; how can they be applied to the bodhisattva precepts of natural morality? Answer: The bodhisattva's precepts of natural morality are shared practices [with the śrāvaka], as clearly stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha; therefore they may be applied. Question: Since a bodhisattva protects saṃgha property and does not give it to the poor and weak, does this not violate and harm his fundamental great compassion? Answer: This is itself compassion. Why? If one gives saṃgha property to others, both parties incur offenses and suffer torment for long kalpas; how could that be called great compassion? Therefore, one does not give it.

2.14

Fifth, on the persons who manage the property of the Three Jewels: The Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra, fascicle 32, states: 'The Buddha said: There are two kinds of persons capable of managing saṃgha affairs. What are the two? First, arhats endowed with the eight liberations; second, learners of the three fruits, such as srotāpannas—these are capable of managing saṃgha affairs and making offerings to the community of monks. As for all other monks whose precepts are incomplete and whose minds are not impartial, such persons should not be allowed to manage saṃgha affairs.' The upper fascicle of the Ratnarāśi Sūtra states: 'The Buddha told Kāśyapa: I permit two kinds of monks to manage community affairs. What are the two? First, those who can uphold the precepts; second, those who fear the future life as if it were adamantine (vajra). Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, those who understand karmic retribution; second, those who possess shame, conscience, and a repentant mind. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, arhats; second, those capable of cultivating the eight liberations. Kāśyapa! Monks of these two kinds I permit to manage affairs; they themselves will be free from blemish.' Since the sacred teaching is thus, it serves as an eternal admonition. Those who fear future retribution should wisely consider this for themselves.

2.15

Sixth, on the degree of gravity: In this category, regarding the object, all three ranks are grave because both prohibitive and natural offenses are fully present. Among them, distinguishing the three kinds of precious property, what is used by the Buddha and Dharma, and the permanent property of the saṃgha, in principle it should be the gravest. Fascicle 32 of the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra states: 'If someone personally consumes or takes outside and gives away to acquaintances, relatives, or laypeople the permanent saṃgha property of the four directions, the property of the present saṃgha, the property donated with deep faith and solemnity by faithful dānapatis, or various items such as flowers and fruits and all needed supplies, this offense is graver than the retribution suffered in the Avīci Hell.' Furthermore, in the Fangdeng jing, the Bodhisattva Kusumasancaya says: 'Even for the five heinous sins and the four parājikas, I can rescue [the offender]; but one who steals saṃgha property I cannot rescue.' The Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra states: 'The sin of stealing saṃgha property is equivalent to the five heinous sins.' The Guanfo sanmei jing states: 'Using saṃgha property incurs a sin exceeding that of killing eighty-four thousand parents.' Furthermore, as recorded in the Record of Lingyan Monastery: at that time a visiting monk died suddenly and arrived in hell, where he saw Avalokiteśvara open a stone casket for him and bring out the record of offenses; because he had taken firewood from the saṃgha's trees and used it privately for dyeing, he suffered grave retribution in every case. Nor is it that taking only a little exempts one from repayment. Thus, in the time of Kāśyapa Buddha, a monk walking through a field saw that the grain was very fine, took seven grains of grain, and put them in his mouth; upon rebirth he fell among cattle, repaying it with his own body. In the Dazhidulun, because a monk stole five or six grains of chestnut, he underwent five hundred lifetimes in the form of an ox; having later cultivated the path and attained arhatship, he still chewed his cud like an ox—this was the 'cud-chewing monk' (gavāṃpati). These serve as profound admonitions; please reflect upon them carefully.

2.16

Second, in explaining specific categories of property, there are two parts: first, explaining the distinctions among owners; second, distinguishing light and grave karma. In the former, there are ten: 1. Custodians: As the Samantapāsādikā states, if a monk guards property for the Three Jewels or another person, and if he watches over and protects it carefully, securely locking the storeroom doors, yet a thief steals it through an aperture or takes it by force and intimidation, beyond what the custodian could prevent, the property-keeper should not be demanded to compensate. If demanded, [the demander] commits a grave offense. If the keeper was remiss, negligent, and not diligent, and it was stolen by a thief, the monk guarding the property must compensate for it; if he does not compensate, an offense is adjudicated. The Daśādhyāya-vinaya states: 'If one receives entrusted property, watches it well, and it is lost, one need not compensate; if one does not watch it well and it is lost, one must compensate. Furthermore, if broken by accident with good intent, one need not compensate; if broken intentionally with evil intent, one must compensate.' Nowadays, when someone kindly washes a bowl for another and breaks it by mistake, demanding double its value incurs a grave offense for whatever is received. 2. Property given by thieves: This should not be accepted. If a thief steals in order to give, that is a condition for theft; if one begs from him, that is instructing another to steal. Hence in both cases it must not be accepted. Therefore the Śīlapaṭala of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'If one knows property was obtained by theft, not taking it is without offense.' By logical extension: if he has reformed his faults and then gives, by calculation it should be accepted; out of a mind of compassion pitying him, it should also be accepted. One simply must not beg from him, for fear he might steal again and bring it to give. According to the Hīnayāna precepts, as long as the owner gives it, all is accepted. Thus the Daśādhyāya-vinaya states: 'When a thief brings stolen goods and either gives them with a good mind, or gives them out of fear because he is pursued by others, one may take this property. Do not beg from the thief; take what is given voluntarily. Having taken it, dye it an improper color and wear it. If there is a person who recognizes it and demands it back, return it to him.' 3. Seizing property from a thief: There are two cases: first, for oneself; second, for another. In the former, there are four propositions: First, if one has not yet formed the thought of relinquishment and the thief has not yet formed the thought of acquisition, the seizure is not complete; taking it does not constitute a grave offense. Thus the Mahīśāsaka-vinaya states: 'A monk was stripped by thieves; he fought back and recovered his robes and property, and having doubts, he asked the Buddha. The Buddha said: "There is no offense."' Under the Mahāyāna precepts, it should constitute a minor defilement (duṣkṛta), because it accords with stinginess and greed and contradicts compassion and wisdom. Second, if one's own mind has not relinquished it, but the thief has already formed the thought of acquisition, seizing it also constitutes a grave offense. Because the thief has formed the thought of acquisition, the property already belongs to the thief, the thief's karmic act is completed, and seizing it makes oneself a thief. Hence the vinaya says: 'A thief seizing property from a thief.' Thus the Sarvāstivāda-vibhāṣā states: 'Having previously lost property, if one has not relinquished it in one's mind and takes this property back, calculating the money, it constitutes a grave offense.' Third, if one's own mind has already relinquished it, but the thief has not formed the thought of acquisition, taking it also constitutes a grave offense, because it contradicts one's original thought. That is, having already formed the thought of relinquishment, the property is no longer one's own; how could one be permitted to take it? Thus the Sarvāstivāda-vibhāṣā states: 'If one's mind previously relinquished it, even if it was originally one's own property, one must not take it; taking it, by calculation, constitutes a grave offense.' According to this, if before realizing one lost an item, a thief has already stolen it and is using or wearing it outside, and later one sees one's original property and seizes it, one commits a grave offense. Fourth, if oneself has already relinquished it and the thief has already acquired it, it constitutes a grave offense without doubt. According to this, if after losing property one later discovers the place where it is buried or hidden, one must also not fix one's mind upon it, thoughtlessly take it, or inform others; if the thief thereby dies, one commits two parājikas. Furthermore, the Vinaya states: 'If lost property is seized by officials and returned to the monk, taking it is without offense.' Second, seizing for another: There are two cases: First, if one gives rise to anger toward the thief and greed toward the property, seizing it from the thief on behalf of one's own relatives or acquaintances, it is judged identically to the four propositions above. Second, if one gives rise to a mind of loving-kindness to protect the property of the Three Jewels or others, seizing it is without offense. This is the same as below; the exceptions will be explained later. 4. Stealing another's property: If one has already relinquished property and given it to someone, and later takes it back, one commits a grave offense. Therefore the treatise says: 'Taking back what has already been given also constitutes the offense of theft.' 5. Stealing government property: The vinaya states: 'Monks are not subject to taxation, unlike laypeople.' If the government taxes property belonging to laypeople and a monk falsely claims it for them, he commits a grave offense. According to this, nowadays, when someone exerts influence on officials so that what should be taxed is not taxed, in principle this constitutes a grave offense. The Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya states: 'If the government taxes a monk's property and he uses expedient means to exempt himself, he does not commit a grave offense, because: first, I did not make an agreement; second, it is unjust to tax me.' The Satyakanirgrantha Sūtra states: 'Not paying the king's taxes is not theft.' By logical extension, this must refer to secretly ordaining to cultivate the path, whose merit aids the ruler of the state, hence it is not theft. Question: Since firewood in the mountains belongs to the king, why is taking it not an offense of theft? Answer: The king's intention originally relinquished it, intending it to supply the common people; therefore, whenever one takes it to use, one becomes its owner. If there are buried treasures in the mountains, because the king has not relinquished them, taking them incurs an offense. 6. Stealing property of an insane person: Fascicle 7 of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'May one take robes from an insane person? Sometimes one may, sometimes one may not. How may one? If the whereabouts of his parents and guardians are unknown, and he brings and gives the property himself, the monk may take it. How may one not take it? If his parents and guardians can be known, even if he gives it with his own hand, it must not be taken.' 7. Stealing property of animals: The Sarvāstivāda-vibhāṣā states: 'Taking the leftovers eaten by all birds and beasts incurs a duṣkṛta offense.' According to this precept, it incurs a grave offense. Digging up a mouse's cache in a field and the like is also grave. 8. Stealing property of spirits: The Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya states: 'Stealing property of tīrthika stūpas or shrine property of spirits incurs a grave offense.' The text of this bodhisattva precept states: 'even the property of ghosts and spirits,' and so forth. By logical extension: if one wishes to beg from a ghost or spirit and to know whether it gives it or not, one should cast divining lots to determine whether it relinquishes or withholds it. 9. Stealing property of pretas, and 10. Stealing property of devas: Both may be understood by analogy.

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梵網經菩薩戒本疏 — Classical Chinese