菩薩戒本疏 1.60

1.60

制意釋名者，菩薩應推直於人、引曲向己，而今反揚自辱人，違本心之甚，故制斷之。讚揚己德、毀辱他失，是所防過。從所防為名，故云「讚毀戒」。具緣成犯中事者，有二：一、所毀人，二、所毀事。所毀人中，一云：若毀上中二境犯重，毀下境輕。此戒兼制。一云：上中二境有菩薩戒者方重，惱妨深故。若無戒及下境有戒無戒悉輕，惱妨淺故。後釋應准律部律說，毀大比丘方結提罪，故知大乘中毀同法菩薩方結重。今謂前說過戒別標四眾，此毀他戒總云毀他，不別標舉。准律簡別，理恐不然。所毀事者，准律有七，謂：一、姓家生，二、行業卑，三、伎術工巧亦卑，四、汝是犯過，五、多結使，六、盲人，七、禿瞎。於此七中隨用一事，毀皆犯重。想者，倒不倒疑，准前釋之。欲樂者，揚我抑彼，欲求利敬之意樂也。煩惱者，於三毒中，或單，或二，或具三也。然成究竟，要由貪心。故《菩薩地》云：「為欲貪求利養恭敬，自讚毀他，是名第一他勝處法。」方便究竟者，若自作，若教人，前人領解，讚毀言時，便結犯也。律云：毀呰有三：一、面罵，二、喻罵，三、自比罵。面罵者，言汝是旃陀羅家生等。喻罵者，汝似旃陀羅種等。自比罵者，我非旃陀羅種等。此三種罵，若了了皆提，若不了皆吉。准此菩薩，了了皆重，不了皆輕。又要具讚，毀方結重。若毀而不讚，讚而不毀，唯犯輕垢。或先讚後毀，或先毀後讚，俱令運讚毀心，備二結重。若先讚後毀，讚時方便輕，毀時成本重。先毀後讚亦爾。如尼八事，一一作時，方便故蘭。具八事時，方結夷罪。若單欲讚，或單欲毀，雖前後具二，別結兩輕，不成重也。如斷心數取四錢，不成重也。結犯輕重者，若就境論，毀聖、毀凡、毀道、毀俗、毀人、毀畜，業隨前境，不無輕重。若就心言，數數現行，都無慚愧，深生愛樂，見是功德，是上品，即失戒也。不具足四，是中下品，犯而不失。學處同異者，聲聞犯提，菩薩犯夷。依《善生經》，於在家菩薩，不制為重。若依此經，無別簡故，七眾皆重。文中「口自讚毀他」者，謂口自發言，讚自德，毀他失。「亦教人自讚毀他」者，此有二：一、教前人讚彼自得，毀他人失；二、教前人讚我自得，毀他人失。二俱應犯。「毀他業」者，正唯口業。文云「自讚毀」，故身表意緣，毀讚相隱，故非重也。「常代眾生受加毀」者，菩薩作心，含垢如海，受辱如地。然《菩薩地》云不清雪惡聲犯罪者，避彼前人譏謗得罪，非謂菩薩過推人也。問：菩薩自無惡事，前人實無好事，何得引惡推好？答：此有兩義：一、前人無道，毀菩薩時，菩薩作念：如有的箭中，無則無所中。由有我身故，眾生興惡；無我身，則無由起。起惡由我，惡在我也。是則惡事自向己也。又作是念：由前人毀我故，我得修戒而防。若無前人，我善何緣而生？生善由彼，善在彼也。是則好事與他人也。二、彼惡我善，是我見耳。若論實理，彼我同體。菩薩應從實理，不隨妄見。故得引惡向己，推善與人。「令他受毀辱者，是菩薩波羅夷罪」者，是結罪名。《菩薩地》云：「若諸菩薩安住菩薩淨戒律儀，於他人所有染愛心，有瞋恚心，自讚毀他，是名有犯，有所違越，是染違犯。無違犯者：若為摧伏諸惡外道，若為住持如來聖教，若欲方便調彼伏彼，或欲令其未淨信者發生淨信，己淨信者倍復增長。」

Explaining the intent of the regulation and the name: A bodhisattva should attribute what is upright to others and take what is crooked upon himself; yet now to turn instead to promoting oneself and humiliating others goes extremely contrary to one's fundamental resolve, hence it is regulated and prohibited. Praising one's own virtues and disparaging others' shortcomings are the faults to be guarded against; taking its name from what is guarded against, it is called the 'precept against praising and disparaging'. Concerning the objective factors in the fulfillment of the offense among the requisite conditions, there are two: first, the person disparaged; second, the matter disparaged. Regarding the person disparaged: one says that if one disparages persons of superior or middling status, it is a grave offense, and disparaging an inferior status is light; this precept concurrently regulates both. Another says: only if persons of superior or middling status possess the bodhisattva precepts is it grave, because the affliction and hindrance are profound; if they lack precepts, and whether an inferior status has precepts or lacks precepts, all are light, because the affliction and hindrance are shallow. The latter explanation should be based on the vinaya division: the vinaya states that only disparaging a senior bhikṣu constitutes a prāyaścittika offense; therefore, one knows that in the Mahāyāna, only disparaging a bodhisattva of the same Dharma constitutes a grave offense. Now I state: the previous precept on speaking of faults specifically designated the four assemblies, whereas this precept on disparaging others generally says 'disparaging others' without specific designation. To make distinctions based on the vinaya is, in principle, likely not so. Regarding the matters disparaged, according to the vinaya there are seven: first, clan of birth; second, lowliness of trade or livelihood; third, lowliness of arts and craftsmanship; fourth, 'you have committed offenses'; fifth, many fetters; sixth, blind person; seventh, bald or one-eyed. Disparaging using any one among these seven matters constitutes a grave offense. Concerning perception: inverted, non-inverted, or doubtful, explained in accordance with the preceding. Concerning desire and pleasure: the wish and pleasure of exalting oneself and depressing the other, desiring to seek gain and respect. Concerning afflictions: among the three poisons, either single, two, or possessing all three. However, the achievement of culmination must depend upon a mind of greed. Thus the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: 'Desiring and coveting gain, offerings, and respect, praising oneself and disparaging others—this is called the first defeat.' Concerning the preparatory stage and culmination: whether doing it oneself or teaching another, when the other person understands the words of praise and disparagement, the offense is thereupon constituted. The vinaya says: there are three kinds of disparagement: first, reviling to the face; second, reviling by metaphor; third, reviling by self-comparison. Reviling to the face means saying, 'You are born into a caṇḍāla family,' and so forth. Reviling by metaphor means, 'You are like the caṇḍāla caste,' and so forth. Reviling by self-comparison means, 'I am not of the caṇḍāla caste,' and so forth. For these three kinds of revilement, if clearly understood, all are prāyaścittika; if not understood, all are duṣkṛta. Based on this, for a bodhisattva, if clearly understood, all are grave; if not understood, all are light. Furthermore, both praise and disparagement must be present before a grave offense is constituted. If disparaging without praising, or praising without disparaging, one commits only a light duṣkṛta offense. Or if one first praises and then disparages, or first disparages and then praises, in both cases one exercises the mind of praise and disparagement, and fulfilling both constitutes the grave offense. If one first praises and then disparages, at the time of praising the preparatory stage is light (sthūlātyaya), and at the time of disparaging the fundamental grave offense is completed. The same applies to first disparaging and then praising. Like the eight matters of a nun: while committing each one, the preparatory stage is a sthūlātyaya; only when the eight matters are complete is the parājika offense constituted. If one solely intends to praise, or solely intends to disparage, although possessing both before and after, they are separately judged as two light offenses and do not constitute a grave offense. Just as taking four coins with discontinuous intention does not constitute a grave offense. Concerning the judgment of gravity: if discussed in terms of the objective sphere, disparaging a noble one, disparaging an ordinary person, disparaging the monastic life, disparaging the secular life, disparaging humans, or disparaging animals—karma follows the preceding objective spheres and is not without differences in gravity. If spoken of in terms of the mind: manifesting it repeatedly, with no shame or remorse at all, deeply delighting in it, and regarding it as a merit—this is the highest grade, which immediately causes the loss of the precepts. Not possessing all four is of the middling or lowest grade; one commits an offense but does not lose [the precepts]. Concerning similarities and differences among the śikṣāpadas: the śrāvaka commits a prāyaścittika, whereas the bodhisattva commits a parājika. According to the Sujātasūtra, for a lay bodhisattva it is not regulated as grave. According to this sūtra, because there is no specific distinction, it is grave for all seven assemblies. In the text, 'himself praising and disparaging others with his mouth' means uttering speech from his own mouth, praising his own virtues and disparaging others' shortcomings. 'Also teaching others to praise themselves and disparage others' has two aspects: first, teaching the other person to praise his own achievements and disparage another person's shortcomings; second, teaching the other person to praise my own achievements and disparage another person's shortcomings. Both should constitute an offense. 'Karma of disparaging others' strictly refers only to verbal karma. The text says 'himself praising and disparaging'; therefore bodily indications and mental conditions, being obscure in their aspects of disparagement and praise, are not grave offenses. 'Constantly suffering added insult in place of sentient beings': the bodhisattva forms the mindset of containing defilements like the ocean and enduring humiliation like the earth. However, when the Bodhisattvabhūmi states that not clearing away an evil reputation constitutes an offense, it is to avoid the other person incurring the fault of slander, not meaning that the bodhisattva shifts faults onto others. Question: The bodhisattva himself has no bad deeds, and the other person truly has no good deeds; how can he take on the bad and attribute the good? Answer: This has two meanings: first, when the other person lacks virtue and reviles the bodhisattva, the bodhisattva reflects: 'Just as an arrow hits where there is a target, where there is none, there is nothing hit. Because my body exists, sentient beings give rise to evil; if my body did not exist, it would have no cause to arise. The arising of evil is due to me; the evil lies with me.' This is 'turning bad things toward oneself'. Furthermore, he reflects: 'Because the other person reviles me, I am able to cultivate precepts and guard myself. If not for the other person, by what condition would my goodness arise? The arising of goodness is due to him; the goodness lies with him.' This is 'giving good things to others'. Second, 'that is evil and I am good' is merely my own view. If we speak of the true principle, he and I share the same essence. The bodhisattva should follow the true principle and not follow delusive views. Therefore, he is able to take the bad upon himself and attribute the good to others. 'Causing others to suffer disparagement and insult is a bodhisattva parājika offense' is the statement assigning the name of the offense. The Bodhisattvabhūmi says: 'If bodhisattvas abiding in the pure moral discipline of the bodhisattva, possessing a mind of tainted attachment or a mind of anger toward others, praise themselves and disparage others, this is called an offense, an infringement, a tainted transgression. As for those without transgression: if it is to subdue evil non-Buddhists, or to uphold the noble teaching of the Tathāgata, or if desiring skillfully to tame and subdue them, or desiring to cause those without pure faith to generate pure faith, and those who already have pure faith to redouble and increase it.'