金剛般若論會釋 3.33

3.33

自下第二破外疑執，謂凡夫、二乘聞佛施設教法大利眾生，便謂佛有我度生想，故須明佛雖常度生而無我度眾生之想。世親此下子段第三疑云：「若是法平等無有高下者，云何如來名為度眾生？」為斷此疑故文生也。與前正覺文同為一段，相承展轉有疑生故。無著正覺法利分二，自利利他，證已方說，有差別故，實無違也。經文有三，初、問，次、遮，第三、徵釋。問中即依對治之義，說相攝持在前文也。第三段中，先、徵，次、釋。釋復有三，初、破凡夫疑佛有度他想，「如來說有我」下，次、覆破凡夫疑。前文有二，初、順釋，次、反解。論逐難解中，唯釋破外疑文有二，初、總指經數安立第一義，次、別釋文中亦三，初、解度他想疑，次、「若實無我」下，解有我想疑；三、「凡夫凡夫」下，解脫凡夫疑。初中但釋反解文，順釋易知。正破凡夫謂佛設教度眾生時有我度想，二乘知佛我無所想，不起此疑故。佛自說度眾生時，尚不見有眾生可度，云何得起我他度想？故言「實無眾生如來度者」。世親論云，「平等真法界，佛不度眾生，以名共彼陰，不離於法界」，如彼論釋，應知。次下反解，證佛無我度想。論釋云，「如來如爾涅槃而知」，此先成前「實無眾生如來度者」言，佛尚如所證而知故，雖度眾生，不見有實眾生可度。又云，「若有眾生如來度者，如來則為有我取」，此始依經反釋，若謂佛見有眾生可度，佛應還同凡夫，不如爾涅槃而知，若信佛如來如爾涅槃而知不同凡夫，亦須信佛不見有眾生可度故，無我度他想。世親論云，「取我度為過，以取彼法是，取度眾生故」。上一句總，次句釋中，一釋取眾生，一釋起度想，次下雙破凡夫執佛說有我想。什、魏二本似破說我，依餘經本及此論，皆云「如來說我取者，即非我取」。此疑依前起，若佛如爾涅槃而知，不見有眾生可度，亦應如爾涅槃知我相性空，何故佛說凡夫有我等相？故論云，「若實無我而言有我等取，為離此著故」，經言我取者，即為非取等，我取是我見。佛為破凡夫執我故，說凡夫無我，但有執我妄想，二乘遂執佛說凡夫有我想。為破此執故，佛說我想，即為非我想，但毛道凡夫生者以為有我。毛道之名，譯經人錯，梵云婆羅必栗託訖那。言婆羅者，目此二義，一目毛，二目愚，此經意取愚癡。必栗託訖那，此名異生，各乘異業受生故。前代譯經人，異生以愛生是凡夫，故名凡夫，取前愚義，目此凡夫故。新本云愚夫異生，真諦名嬰兒凡夫，此論名小兒凡夫，嬰兒、小兒並取愚義，言凡夫、二乘愚癡如嬰孩、小兒，不知我本體空，聞佛說凡夫有我想，即尋其名執有我想，為破此執，故言即非。然魏本云，毛道凡夫生者，彼著我愚凡，如畜生故，近取負毛之類，皆釋之也。或愚夫、異生如次，即是二乘、凡夫，此二同執故，即《唯識論》名凡、愚也。世親論偈釋此云，「不取取應知」，以彼不實義故，是故如來不於執取，然以佛不取者，即是凡愚於中執取，由此故名不取取也。次下第三又破說凡夫疑，若佛無我等想，亦應無凡聖想，何故佛說有我想者名凡夫耶？故佛破云，「即非凡夫」。此經既以破執為宗，恐諸學者尋名起疑，故佛隨說，即遂破之。此論但牒出經而不標解，世親論云，「如來說名非生者，不生聖人法，故言非生」，解云，無種姓故聖法不生，以有二乘、異生別故，此論牒經，重凡夫也。

From here down, the second [major section] refutes external doubtful attachments. Ordinary persons and followers of the Two Vehicles, hearing that the Buddha provides doctrinal teachings to greatly benefit sentient beings, immediately suppose that the Buddha has the thought, "I liberate sentient beings"; therefore, it must be clarified that although the Buddha constantly liberates sentient beings, he has no thought of "I liberate sentient beings". Vasubandhu raises the third doubt within this subsection below: "If this dharma is equal, without high or low, how is the Tathāgata named 'one who liberates sentient beings'?" It is to cut off this doubt that the text arises. It forms one section together with the preceding text on correct awakening, because doubts arise mutually in succession. Asaṅga divides the correct awakening and the benefit of dharmas into two: self-benefit and benefiting others—teaching only after having realized—so because there is a distinction, there is truly no contradiction. The sūtra text has three [parts]: first, the question; second, the prohibition; third, inquiry and explanation. In the question, it relies on the meaning of the antidote, stating that the characteristics are embraced in the preceding text. In the third section, first is the inquiry, second the explanation. The explanation again has three [parts]: first, refuting the ordinary person's doubt that the Buddha has the thought of liberating others; from "the Tathāgata says there is a self" onwards, next, overturning and refuting the ordinary person's doubt. The former text has two [parts]: first, direct explanation; second, inverse interpretation. In the treatise's point-by-point resolution of difficulties, in solely explaining the text that refutes external doubts, there are two [parts]: first, generally indicating the sūtra's words establishing ultimate truth; second, separately explaining the text, which also has three [parts]: first, explaining the doubt about the thought of liberating others; next, from "if there is truly no self" onwards, explaining the doubt about having a conception of self; third, from "ordinary persons, ordinary persons" onwards, explaining the doubt regarding ordinary persons. In the first, it only explains the inverse interpretation text, as the direct explanation is easy to understand. It directly refutes ordinary persons who think that when the Buddha provides teachings to liberate sentient beings, he has the thought "I liberate", whereas followers of the Two Vehicles know that the Buddha has no conception of self, and thus do not give rise to this doubt. When the Buddha himself speaks of liberating sentient beings, he does not even perceive any sentient beings to be liberated, so how could he give rise to the thought of "I liberate others"? Hence it says: "In truth, there are no sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates." Vasubandhu's treatise says: "In the equal, true realm of reality, / the Buddha does not liberate sentient beings; / because names together with those aggregates / are not separate from the realm of reality." This should be understood as explained in that treatise. Next below is the inverse interpretation, proving that the Buddha has no thought of "I liberate". The commentary in the treatise says: "The Tathāgata knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa." This first establishes the preceding statement that "in truth, there are no sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates", meaning that because the Buddha knows in conformity with what has been realized, although he liberates sentient beings, he does not perceive any real sentient beings to be liberated. It also says: "If there were sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates, the Tathāgata would have a grasping of self." This begins the inverse explanation based on the sūtra: if one claims that the Buddha perceives sentient beings to be liberated, the Buddha would conversely be the same as an ordinary person, not knowing in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa. If one believes that the Tathāgata knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa and is not like ordinary persons, one must also believe that the Buddha does not perceive sentient beings to be liberated; therefore, he has no thought of "I liberate others". Vasubandhu's treatise says: "Grasping 'I liberate' is an error, / because grasping that dharma is indeed / grasping the liberation of sentient beings." The first line is general; in the explanation of the second line, one explains grasping sentient beings, and the other explains giving rise to the thought of liberating. Next below, it doubly refutes ordinary persons' attachment to the Buddha's speaking of having a conception of self. Kumārajīva's and the Wei translations appear to refute speaking of a self; according to other sūtra editions and this treatise, all say: "What the Tathāgata speaks of as grasping a self is no grasping of self." This doubt arises from the preceding: if the Buddha knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa and does not perceive sentient beings to be liberated, he should also know in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa that the nature of the mark of self is empty, so why does the Buddha say that ordinary persons have marks such as a self? Therefore, the treatise says: "If there is truly no self and yet it is said that there is grasping of a self and so forth, it is in order to abandon this attachment"; the sūtra says that grasping a self is non-grasping, and so forth, grasping a self being the view of self. In order to refute ordinary persons' attachment to a self, the Buddha says that ordinary persons have no self, but merely have the deluded thought of grasping a self; the Two Vehicles then become attached to the idea that the Buddha says ordinary persons have the conception of a self. To refute this attachment, the Buddha says that the conception of self is no conception of self; it is only the hair-path ordinary beings who think there is a self. The name "hair-path" (máodào) was an error by the translator of the sūtra. In Sanskrit, it is bālapṛthagjana. "Bāla" designates two meanings: first, it designates "hair" (vāla); second, it designates "foolish" (bāla). The intended meaning of this sūtra is foolishness. "Pṛthagjana": this means "different births" (yìshēng), because they receive birth according to different karmas. Previous translators of the sūtra held that "different births" meant ordinary persons because they are born through craving, hence they named them "ordinary persons" (fánfū), taking the former meaning of foolishness to designate these ordinary persons. The new translation says "foolish ordinary beings" (yúfū yìshēng); Paramārtha names them "infant ordinary persons" (yīng'ér fánfū); this treatise names them "child ordinary persons" (xiǎo'ér fánfū). "Infant" and "child" both adopt the meaning of foolishness, meaning that ordinary persons and the Two Vehicles are foolish like infants and small children, not knowing that the fundamental substance of self is empty; hearing the Buddha say that ordinary persons have the conception of self, they immediately follow the name and cling to the existence of a conception of self. To refute this attachment, he therefore says "is not". However, the Wei translation says "hair-path ordinary beings" because those foolish ordinary persons attached to a self are like beasts, so it directly takes the category of those bearing hair—these are all explanations of it. Alternatively, "foolish persons" and "differently born" correspond respectively to the Two Vehicles and ordinary persons; since these two share the same attachment, they are named "ordinary and foolish" (fányú) in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra. Vasubandhu's treatise verse explains this, saying: "It should be understood as non-grasping grasping." Because that has an unreal meaning, the Tathāgata does not grasp at it; yet what the Buddha does not grasp at is what ordinary fools cling to and grasp within it; therefore, it is called "non-grasping grasping". Next below, the third [part] again refutes the doubt about speaking of ordinary persons: if the Buddha has no conception of self and so forth, he should also have no conception of ordinary or noble, so why does the Buddha say that those who have a conception of self are named ordinary persons? Therefore, the Buddha refutes it, saying: "are not ordinary persons". Since this sūtra takes the refutation of attachments as its central tenet, fearing that practitioners would follow names and give rise to doubts, the Buddha refutes them as soon as he speaks them. This treatise merely quotes the sūtra without providing an explicit explanation. Vasubandhu's treatise says: "What the Tathāgata calls 'non-born' means that they do not generate the dharmas of noble ones, hence it says 'non-born'." The explanation says: because they lack the spiritual disposition (gotra), the noble dharmas are not generated; because there is a distinction between the Two Vehicles and ordinary beings, this treatise quotes the sūtra and repeats "ordinary persons".