金剛般若論會釋 3.33
English (machine translation) 3.33
- Language
- English
3.33
From here down, the second [major section] refutes external doubtful attachments. Ordinary persons and followers of the Two Vehicles, hearing that the Buddha provides doctrinal teachings to greatly benefit sentient beings, immediately suppose that the Buddha has the thought, "I liberate sentient beings"; therefore, it must be clarified that although the Buddha constantly liberates sentient beings, he has no thought of "I liberate sentient beings". Vasubandhu raises the third doubt within this subsection below: "If this dharma is equal, without high or low, how is the Tathāgata named 'one who liberates sentient beings'?" It is to cut off this doubt that the text arises. It forms one section together with the preceding text on correct awakening, because doubts arise mutually in succession. Asaṅga divides the correct awakening and the benefit of dharmas into two: self-benefit and benefiting others—teaching only after having realized—so because there is a distinction, there is truly no contradiction. The sūtra text has three [parts]: first, the question; second, the prohibition; third, inquiry and explanation. In the question, it relies on the meaning of the antidote, stating that the characteristics are embraced in the preceding text. In the third section, first is the inquiry, second the explanation. The explanation again has three [parts]: first, refuting the ordinary person's doubt that the Buddha has the thought of liberating others; from "the Tathāgata says there is a self" onwards, next, overturning and refuting the ordinary person's doubt. The former text has two [parts]: first, direct explanation; second, inverse interpretation. In the treatise's point-by-point resolution of difficulties, in solely explaining the text that refutes external doubts, there are two [parts]: first, generally indicating the sūtra's words establishing ultimate truth; second, separately explaining the text, which also has three [parts]: first, explaining the doubt about the thought of liberating others; next, from "if there is truly no self" onwards, explaining the doubt about having a conception of self; third, from "ordinary persons, ordinary persons" onwards, explaining the doubt regarding ordinary persons. In the first, it only explains the inverse interpretation text, as the direct explanation is easy to understand. It directly refutes ordinary persons who think that when the Buddha provides teachings to liberate sentient beings, he has the thought "I liberate", whereas followers of the Two Vehicles know that the Buddha has no conception of self, and thus do not give rise to this doubt. When the Buddha himself speaks of liberating sentient beings, he does not even perceive any sentient beings to be liberated, so how could he give rise to the thought of "I liberate others"? Hence it says: "In truth, there are no sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates." Vasubandhu's treatise says: "In the equal, true realm of reality, / the Buddha does not liberate sentient beings; / because names together with those aggregates / are not separate from the realm of reality." This should be understood as explained in that treatise. Next below is the inverse interpretation, proving that the Buddha has no thought of "I liberate". The commentary in the treatise says: "The Tathāgata knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa." This first establishes the preceding statement that "in truth, there are no sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates", meaning that because the Buddha knows in conformity with what has been realized, although he liberates sentient beings, he does not perceive any real sentient beings to be liberated. It also says: "If there were sentient beings whom the Tathāgata liberates, the Tathāgata would have a grasping of self." This begins the inverse explanation based on the sūtra: if one claims that the Buddha perceives sentient beings to be liberated, the Buddha would conversely be the same as an ordinary person, not knowing in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa. If one believes that the Tathāgata knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa and is not like ordinary persons, one must also believe that the Buddha does not perceive sentient beings to be liberated; therefore, he has no thought of "I liberate others". Vasubandhu's treatise says: "Grasping 'I liberate' is an error, / because grasping that dharma is indeed / grasping the liberation of sentient beings." The first line is general; in the explanation of the second line, one explains grasping sentient beings, and the other explains giving rise to the thought of liberating. Next below, it doubly refutes ordinary persons' attachment to the Buddha's speaking of having a conception of self. Kumārajīva's and the Wei translations appear to refute speaking of a self; according to other sūtra editions and this treatise, all say: "What the Tathāgata speaks of as grasping a self is no grasping of self." This doubt arises from the preceding: if the Buddha knows in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa and does not perceive sentient beings to be liberated, he should also know in conformity with suchness and nirvāṇa that the nature of the mark of self is empty, so why does the Buddha say that ordinary persons have marks such as a self? Therefore, the treatise says: "If there is truly no self and yet it is said that there is grasping of a self and so forth, it is in order to abandon this attachment"; the sūtra says that grasping a self is non-grasping, and so forth, grasping a self being the view of self. In order to refute ordinary persons' attachment to a self, the Buddha says that ordinary persons have no self, but merely have the deluded thought of grasping a self; the Two Vehicles then become attached to the idea that the Buddha says ordinary persons have the conception of a self. To refute this attachment, the Buddha says that the conception of self is no conception of self; it is only the hair-path ordinary beings who think there is a self. The name "hair-path" (máodào) was an error by the translator of the sūtra. In Sanskrit, it is bālapṛthagjana. "Bāla" designates two meanings: first, it designates "hair" (vāla); second, it designates "foolish" (bāla). The intended meaning of this sūtra is foolishness. "Pṛthagjana": this means "different births" (yìshēng), because they receive birth according to different karmas. Previous translators of the sūtra held that "different births" meant ordinary persons because they are born through craving, hence they named them "ordinary persons" (fánfū), taking the former meaning of foolishness to designate these ordinary persons. The new translation says "foolish ordinary beings" (yúfū yìshēng); Paramārtha names them "infant ordinary persons" (yīng'ér fánfū); this treatise names them "child ordinary persons" (xiǎo'ér fánfū). "Infant" and "child" both adopt the meaning of foolishness, meaning that ordinary persons and the Two Vehicles are foolish like infants and small children, not knowing that the fundamental substance of self is empty; hearing the Buddha say that ordinary persons have the conception of self, they immediately follow the name and cling to the existence of a conception of self. To refute this attachment, he therefore says "is not". However, the Wei translation says "hair-path ordinary beings" because those foolish ordinary persons attached to a self are like beasts, so it directly takes the category of those bearing hair—these are all explanations of it. Alternatively, "foolish persons" and "differently born" correspond respectively to the Two Vehicles and ordinary persons; since these two share the same attachment, they are named "ordinary and foolish" (fányú) in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra. Vasubandhu's treatise verse explains this, saying: "It should be understood as non-grasping grasping." Because that has an unreal meaning, the Tathāgata does not grasp at it; yet what the Buddha does not grasp at is what ordinary fools cling to and grasp within it; therefore, it is called "non-grasping grasping". Next below, the third [part] again refutes the doubt about speaking of ordinary persons: if the Buddha has no conception of self and so forth, he should also have no conception of ordinary or noble, so why does the Buddha say that those who have a conception of self are named ordinary persons? Therefore, the Buddha refutes it, saying: "are not ordinary persons". Since this sūtra takes the refutation of attachments as its central tenet, fearing that practitioners would follow names and give rise to doubts, the Buddha refutes them as soon as he speaks them. This treatise merely quotes the sūtra without providing an explicit explanation. Vasubandhu's treatise says: "What the Tathāgata calls 'non-born' means that they do not generate the dharmas of noble ones, hence it says 'non-born'." The explanation says: because they lack the spiritual disposition (gotra), the noble dharmas are not generated; because there is a distinction between the Two Vehicles and ordinary beings, this treatise quotes the sūtra and repeats "ordinary persons".
Linked texts (1)
- 金剛般若論會釋 — Classical Chinese