金剛般若論會釋 3.52

3.52

善現答中文分為二，初、別破名色；二、相若世界下，第二合破名色二相。前中亦二，初、別破色身，明相分非有，顯所取空，教作無相觀佛；「世尊！如來說三千」下，別破名身，明見分非有，顯能取空，教作無生觀。名身雖亦通於所取，今對色身唯所取故，四蘊體見故，說能取收。所執相、見即能、所取，依他二取即相、見故，隨應釋皆可通。何故先破色身者，此有二意，一、為除前威儀行住淨中疑，佛所證如雖無來去，佛色身相豈無去來？故佛先破色身為無，成前實無來去。二、為相麁見細，先破相分，相分破已，見無依故，破之則易，故先破色。色中有五，一、直答，二、却徵，三、反釋，四、重徵，五、引佛前說順成。論文有二，初、標名屬經，次、正釋經義。釋經義中，先、釋別破名色，次、解合破名色。別中先破色，於中復二，初、指同前，次、解別義。解別義中，先、牒經屬細末方便，次、牒經屬無見方便。答微塵多，還有二義，一、述世尊顯塵多，意成前細作方便。故論判此甚多之言，答是細作方便，此是善現述佛細作方便，非自說也。二、佛問塵多，意欲破塵為非微塵，生後無所見方便。有此兩意，故答塵多。次、却徵云，何故前言甚多？第三、反釋顯塵非有，故論判此已下是無所見方便。論責此反釋有何義者，云佛問塵多不，只應直答甚多，何反釋若塵實有佛則不說前義，此說有何意耶？論自釋云，若微塵聚第一義中是有者，佛前信行地中不應說微塵，非微塵。佛前說塵即非塵，故知今問塵多，還欲顯非微塵。

The text of Subhūti's reply is divided into two: first, individually refuting name and form; second, from 'if the worlds' downward, collectively refuting the two marks of name and form. The former also has two parts: first, individually refuting the form-body, clarifying that the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) is non-existent, revealing the emptiness of the apprehended (grāhya), and teaching the contemplation of the Buddha as markless; from 'World-Honoured One! The three thousand [worlds] spoken of by the Tathāgata' downward, individually refuting the name-body, clarifying that the subjective aspect (darśanabhāga) is non-existent, revealing the emptiness of the grasper (grāhaka), and teaching the contemplation of the unarisen. Although the name-body also extends to the apprehended, here it is contrasted with the form-body, which is exclusively the apprehended; because the four aggregates have the nature of seeing, they are spoken of as subsumed under the grasper. The grasped marks and seeings are precisely the grasper and the apprehended, and the two graspings of other-dependent nature (paratantra) are precisely the objective and subjective aspects; thus, explaining it in accordance with the context is universally applicable. Why is the form-body refuted first? There are two reasons: First, to remove the prior doubt regarding the purity of the postures of moving and dwelling—though the tathatā realized by the Buddha is devoid of coming and going, how could the marks of the Buddha's form-body be devoid of going and coming? Therefore, the Buddha first refutes the form-body as non-existent, establishing that in reality there is no coming or going. Second, because the mark [of form] is coarse while seeing is subtle; the objective aspect is refuted first, and once the objective aspect has been refuted, seeing has nothing on which to rely and is therefore easily refuted; hence form is refuted first. Within form there are five [points]: 1. Direct answer; 2. Retroactive interrogation; 3. Inverse explanation; 4. Repeated interrogation; 5. Citing the Buddha's prior statement to conform to and establish [the point]. In the text of the treatise there are two parts: first, marking the headings and subordinating them to the sūtra; next, directly explaining the sūtra's meaning. Within explaining the sūtra's meaning, first it explains the individual refutation of name and form, and next it explains the collective refutation of name and form. Within the individual refutation, it first refutes form, which again has two parts: first, indicating that it is identical to what came before; next, explaining the distinct meaning. Within explaining the distinct meaning, it first cites the sūtra as belonging to the expedient means of pulverization into fine particles; next, it cites the sūtra as belonging to the expedient means of non-seeing. Answering that the atoms are many also has two meanings: First, stating that the World-Honoured One's revealing that the atoms are many intends to establish the prior expedient means of fine pulverization. Therefore, the treatise determines that these words 'extremely many' answer to being the expedient means of fine pulverization; this is Subhūti relating the Buddha's expedient means of fine pulverization, not his own statement. Second, the Buddha asks whether the atoms are many with the intention of refuting the atoms as non-atoms, giving rise to the subsequent expedient means of non-seeing. Having these two meanings, he therefore answers that the atoms are many. Next, the retroactive interrogation asks: Why was it said earlier that they are 'extremely many'? Third, the inverse explanation reveals that the atoms are non-existent; therefore, the treatise determines that from this point downward is the expedient means of non-seeing. When the treatise questions what meaning there is in this inverse explanation, it says: when the Buddha asked whether the atoms were many, one should only have directly answered 'extremely many'; why give the inverse explanation that if the atoms were truly existent, the Buddha would not have spoken the prior meaning—what is the intention of this statement? The treatise itself explains: if the collection of atoms were existent in the ultimate truth, the Buddha would not have previously said in the stage of practicing faith that the atoms are non-atoms. Because the Buddha previously said that atoms are precisely non-atoms, we know that in now asking whether they are many, he still intends to reveal that they are not atoms.