金剛般若論會釋 3.52

3.52

The text of Subhūti's reply is divided into two: first, individually refuting name and form; second, from 'if the worlds' downward, collectively refuting the two marks of name and form. The former also has two parts: first, individually refuting the form-body, clarifying that the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) is non-existent, revealing the emptiness of the apprehended (grāhya), and teaching the contemplation of the Buddha as markless; from 'World-Honoured One! The three thousand [worlds] spoken of by the Tathāgata' downward, individually refuting the name-body, clarifying that the subjective aspect (darśanabhāga) is non-existent, revealing the emptiness of the grasper (grāhaka), and teaching the contemplation of the unarisen. Although the name-body also extends to the apprehended, here it is contrasted with the form-body, which is exclusively the apprehended; because the four aggregates have the nature of seeing, they are spoken of as subsumed under the grasper. The grasped marks and seeings are precisely the grasper and the apprehended, and the two graspings of other-dependent nature (paratantra) are precisely the objective and subjective aspects; thus, explaining it in accordance with the context is universally applicable. Why is the form-body refuted first? There are two reasons: First, to remove the prior doubt regarding the purity of the postures of moving and dwelling—though the tathatā realized by the Buddha is devoid of coming and going, how could the marks of the Buddha's form-body be devoid of going and coming? Therefore, the Buddha first refutes the form-body as non-existent, establishing that in reality there is no coming or going. Second, because the mark [of form] is coarse while seeing is subtle; the objective aspect is refuted first, and once the objective aspect has been refuted, seeing has nothing on which to rely and is therefore easily refuted; hence form is refuted first. Within form there are five [points]: 1. Direct answer; 2. Retroactive interrogation; 3. Inverse explanation; 4. Repeated interrogation; 5. Citing the Buddha's prior statement to conform to and establish [the point]. In the text of the treatise there are two parts: first, marking the headings and subordinating them to the sūtra; next, directly explaining the sūtra's meaning. Within explaining the sūtra's meaning, first it explains the individual refutation of name and form, and next it explains the collective refutation of name and form. Within the individual refutation, it first refutes form, which again has two parts: first, indicating that it is identical to what came before; next, explaining the distinct meaning. Within explaining the distinct meaning, it first cites the sūtra as belonging to the expedient means of pulverization into fine particles; next, it cites the sūtra as belonging to the expedient means of non-seeing. Answering that the atoms are many also has two meanings: First, stating that the World-Honoured One's revealing that the atoms are many intends to establish the prior expedient means of fine pulverization. Therefore, the treatise determines that these words 'extremely many' answer to being the expedient means of fine pulverization; this is Subhūti relating the Buddha's expedient means of fine pulverization, not his own statement. Second, the Buddha asks whether the atoms are many with the intention of refuting the atoms as non-atoms, giving rise to the subsequent expedient means of non-seeing. Having these two meanings, he therefore answers that the atoms are many. Next, the retroactive interrogation asks: Why was it said earlier that they are 'extremely many'? Third, the inverse explanation reveals that the atoms are non-existent; therefore, the treatise determines that from this point downward is the expedient means of non-seeing. When the treatise questions what meaning there is in this inverse explanation, it says: when the Buddha asked whether the atoms were many, one should only have directly answered 'extremely many'; why give the inverse explanation that if the atoms were truly existent, the Buddha would not have spoken the prior meaning—what is the intention of this statement? The treatise itself explains: if the collection of atoms were existent in the ultimate truth, the Buddha would not have previously said in the stage of practicing faith that the atoms are non-atoms. Because the Buddha previously said that atoms are precisely non-atoms, we know that in now asking whether they are many, he still intends to reveal that they are not atoms.