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金剛般若論會釋 3.56

English (machine translation) 3.56

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English

3.56

From here below is the second major section, collectively refuting the name-and-form body, penetrating the grasper and the apprehended, signlessness and the unarisen; it refutes the grasping mind so that it does not arise, hence it is called 'unarisen'. In the text there are three parts: first, repeating the interrogation based on what preceded; from 'if the worlds' downward is the second part, pointing out the substance of the grasping; from 'what the Tathāgata spoke' downward is the third part, directly refuting. Now, saying 'for what reason' takes up what preceded to pose the challenge: why was it said earlier that atoms are precisely not atoms, and worlds are precisely not worlds? Next, the second part, the reciprocal explanation, also points out the substance of the grasping, stating that if one grasps atoms and the realm of the name-body as truly existent, these are both the composite false conception among false conceptions. Therefore, the treatise explains: among them, it speaks together of both the world and the realm of atoms, as these two are both composite false conceptions. Why does it not bring up the composite mark of the form-body? The refuted mark of the form-body is coarse and easily known, whereas the refuted marks of realms and atoms are subtle and difficult to know; hence they are refuted again. If one grasps these two as truly existent, these are two kinds of composite false conception, not the character for 'mark' (相). Therefore, the new translation calls it 'composite grasping' (piṇḍa-graha), and Paramārtha's translation calls it 'grasping unity in a collection'; this is precisely the discrimination of grasping unity within a collection among the eight discriminations of the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, and it is also the aggregate false conception among the eight false conceptions in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (*Bodhisattva-dhāraṇī-śāstra). As for the eight false conceptions: 1. The false conception of union is greed; 2. The false conception of non-union is anger; 3. The false conception contrary to both union and non-union is delusion—these three are afflictions of that [kind]. 4. The false conception of self means grasping oneself as a self; 5. The false conception of what belongs to self means grasping sentient beings as what belongs to oneself—these two are afflictions of the physical body. 6. The false conception of intrinsic nature means grasping phenomena as having an intrinsic nature, also called discrimination of intrinsic nature; 7. The false conception of distinctions means grasping phenomena as having distinctions such as large and small, good and bad, also called discrimination of distinctions; 8. The aggregate false conception: this gives rise to a grasping of unity in that which is a confluence of many things—these three are afflictions of the mind. Subhūti knew that the collection of the name-body and the collection of atoms are formed from a confluence of many things; although they were previously refuted as non-existent under different aspects, fearing that beginners might still give rise to a grasping of unity, he therefore pointed it out again, saying that if one grasps the realm of the name-body and the realm of atoms as truly existent, they are precisely two kinds of composite marks. The treatise names them two kinds of grasping in a lump, namely grasping in a single lump and grasping in differentiated lumps. 'Lump' is a composite whole; 'grasping' is the mark of attachment. However, because the world is the realm of the name-body and one cannot break down unity into multiplicity, it is merely grasping in a single lump; atoms are distinctions within the form-body, so grasping atoms as existent is grasping in differentiated lumps. Therefore, the treatise says: because of grasping a collection of atoms. Subhūti states: to refute these two graspings, he first points out that both of these two graspings are the composite false conception among the eight false conceptions. Third, citing the Buddha's prior statement directly refutes the composite mark. Therefore, the treatise says: 'is precisely not grasping in a lump' is called establishing the ultimate truth, meaning establishing that the composite mark is [empty in] the ultimate truth; 'is called a composite mark' is provisionally spoken of as a composite mark based on conventional truth.

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