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金剛般若論會釋 3.56

金剛般若論會釋 3.56

Language
Classical Chinese

3.56

自下大文第二,合破名色身,通能、所取,無相、無生,破能取心令不生,故名無生。文中有三,初、依前重徵;若世界下,第二、指出執體;如來說下,第三、正破。今言何以故者,乘前起責,何故前說微塵即非微塵,世界即非世界?次第二覆釋亦是指出執體,言若執微塵及名身界為實有,皆是妄想中一合妄想?故論釋云,於中為並說若世界、若微塵界,此二皆是一合妄想。何故不舉色身一合相者,色身破相麁相易知,界、塵破相細而難知,故重破之。若執此二為實有,此是二種一合妄想,非相字也。故新本云名一合執,真諦本名聚一執,即是《中邊論》八分別內聚中執一分別,亦是《地持》八妄想中積聚妄想。八妄想者,一、合妄想是貪,二、不合妄想是嗔,三、合不合俱相違妄想是癡,此三是彼煩惱。四、我妄想,謂執自為我;五、我所妄想,謂執眾生為我所,此二是宍煩惱。六、自性妄想,謂執諸法有自性,亦名自性分別;七、差別妄想,謂執法有大小、好惡等差別,亦名差別分別;八、積聚妄想,此於多物和合處起一執,此三是心煩惱。善現知名身聚及微塵聚以多物合成,前雖異破為無,恐初學人猶起一執,故重指云,若執名身界及塵界為實有,即是二種一合相故。論名二種摶取,謂一摶取及差別摶取。摶是一合,取是執相,然世界是名身界,不可破一為多故,但是一摶取;微塵是色身中差別故,執微塵有者,是差別摶取故。論云,以取微塵聚集故,善現言,破此二執故,先指此二執皆是八妄想中一合妄想。第三引佛前說,正破一合相故。論云,即非摶取者,名安立第一義,謂安立一合相為第一義。是名一合相者,依俗諦假說為一合相。

From here below is the second major section, collectively refuting the name-and-form body, penetrating the grasper and the apprehended, signlessness and the unarisen; it refutes the grasping mind so that it does not arise, hence it is called 'unarisen'. In the text there are three parts: first, repeating the interrogation based on what preceded; from 'if the worlds' downward is the second part, pointing out the substance of the grasping; from 'what the Tathāgata spoke' downward is the third part, directly refuting. Now, saying 'for what reason' takes up what preceded to pose the challenge: why was it said earlier that atoms are precisely not atoms, and worlds are precisely not worlds? Next, the second part, the reciprocal explanation, also points out the substance of the grasping, stating that if one grasps atoms and the realm of the name-body as truly existent, these are both the composite false conception among false conceptions. Therefore, the treatise explains: among them, it speaks together of both the world and the realm of atoms, as these two are both composite false conceptions. Why does it not bring up the composite mark of the form-body? The refuted mark of the form-body is coarse and easily known, whereas the refuted marks of realms and atoms are subtle and difficult to know; hence they are refuted again. If one grasps these two as truly existent, these are two kinds of composite false conception, not the character for 'mark' (相). Therefore, the new translation calls it 'composite grasping' (piṇḍa-graha), and Paramārtha's translation calls it 'grasping unity in a collection'; this is precisely the discrimination of grasping unity within a collection among the eight discriminations of the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, and it is also the aggregate false conception among the eight false conceptions in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (*Bodhisattva-dhāraṇī-śāstra). As for the eight false conceptions: 1. The false conception of union is greed; 2. The false conception of non-union is anger; 3. The false conception contrary to both union and non-union is delusion—these three are afflictions of that [kind]. 4. The false conception of self means grasping oneself as a self; 5. The false conception of what belongs to self means grasping sentient beings as what belongs to oneself—these two are afflictions of the physical body. 6. The false conception of intrinsic nature means grasping phenomena as having an intrinsic nature, also called discrimination of intrinsic nature; 7. The false conception of distinctions means grasping phenomena as having distinctions such as large and small, good and bad, also called discrimination of distinctions; 8. The aggregate false conception: this gives rise to a grasping of unity in that which is a confluence of many things—these three are afflictions of the mind. Subhūti knew that the collection of the name-body and the collection of atoms are formed from a confluence of many things; although they were previously refuted as non-existent under different aspects, fearing that beginners might still give rise to a grasping of unity, he therefore pointed it out again, saying that if one grasps the realm of the name-body and the realm of atoms as truly existent, they are precisely two kinds of composite marks. The treatise names them two kinds of grasping in a lump, namely grasping in a single lump and grasping in differentiated lumps. 'Lump' is a composite whole; 'grasping' is the mark of attachment. However, because the world is the realm of the name-body and one cannot break down unity into multiplicity, it is merely grasping in a single lump; atoms are distinctions within the form-body, so grasping atoms as existent is grasping in differentiated lumps. Therefore, the treatise says: because of grasping a collection of atoms. Subhūti states: to refute these two graspings, he first points out that both of these two graspings are the composite false conception among the eight false conceptions. Third, citing the Buddha's prior statement directly refutes the composite mark. Therefore, the treatise says: 'is precisely not grasping in a lump' is called establishing the ultimate truth, meaning establishing that the composite mark is [empty in] the ultimate truth; 'is called a composite mark' is provisionally spoken of as a composite mark based on conventional truth.

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