俱舍論記 1.201

1.201

二問答分別者，就中，一會釋論文、二對行相明差別、三會釋行相名、四辨得一行名、五明得能緣名、六三性分別。言會釋論文者，問：若初家說心、心所法各唯一解不起多者，無慚四句云何釋通？解云：此據行解互相隨順，故作此說，非謂一體起多行解。或餘師義，不必須通。問：若後三說，於一體上有多解者，《入阿毘達磨》云何釋通？解云：彼論所說據正非兼。或餘師義，不必須通。問：若後三說於一體上有多解者，既有多解，如何不有體多過耶？解云：兼行雖多，性相隨順，正行唯一，故體非多。二對行相明差別者，問：行解、行相差別云何？解云：言行解者，謂心、心所行解不同。於諸境中取總、別相，即是心、心所法作用差別。此之行解，於所緣境或起正解、或起邪解。如上四說，即行名解，故名行解。言行相者，謂心、心所其體清淨，但對前境不由作意，法爾任運影像顯現，如清池明鏡眾像皆現。三會釋行相名者，問：如前所引無慚四句所說行相，彼論應言行解，何故乃言行相？又若義同即無差別，何故相對辨差別耶？解云：若言行解，唯是心等作用差別。若言行相，有其二種：一影像名行相、二行解名行相。前為相對辨差別，故作用名行解。影像與行相名，據義不同實有差別，論行相名兼通行解。無慚四句言行相者、即是行解相故名為行相。更有餘文，准此通釋。如是名為二種差別。四辨得一行名者，問：行解、行相，據何名為同一行相？解云：據行相同，名一行相。心、心所法其體明淨，隨對何境法爾相現同有此相，名同一行相。故《入阿毘達磨》第二云「如眼識等依眼等生，帶色等義影像而現，能了自境（已上論文）。」由此准知，但約行相名為一行。問：心等行解，有說亦同，如何不名同一行相？解云：行解異說不同，理非決定。行相同說，故約此明。又解：心等行解，有說同家，亦得名為同一行相，此言行相即行名相。五明得能緣名者，問：行解、行相，為約何者說名能緣？解云：據行相說，非據行解。謂彼心等對境之時，有影像現。據此義邊，名為能緣，境名所緣。以心、心所緣境之時，非如燈焰舒光至境，亦非如鉗押取彼物，據影現義，名能、所緣。問：清池、明鏡亦有像現，應說彼類亦是能緣。解云：雖有像現而無行解，非如心等，亦不說能緣。問：若爾，應約行解名為能緣，何故約彼有影像現說名能緣？解云：行解或正或邪，於境不定；行相理定，故約此明。又解：正約行相名為能緣，理實而言亦兼行解。又解：但約行解名為能緣，以是用故。又解：約行解名為能緣，理實而言亦兼行相。又解：俱正約彼行相、行解名為能緣，以此二種必定有故。六三性分別者，問：行解、行相與心、心所，性皆同不，解云：行解、行相既不離體，應知三性皆與體同。問：如善心、心所法緣不善色時有影像現，如何行相同彼體耶？解云：雖所緣色是其不善，以此影像不離能緣，故亦是善。如鏡中火，似火非真。影像亦爾，似彼不善而非不善。如善既爾，不善、無記准善應知。若依大乘，此行相當相分，此相分是境攝，隨變色等即色等中攝。若依正量部，心、心所法亦直緣前境，無別行相現心等上，不同說一切有部；不變相分，復不同大乘。

Second, distinguishing through questions and answers: Within this, first, reconciling the treatise texts; second, clarifying differences relative to the cognitive aspect; third, reconciling the name "cognitive aspect" (ākāra); fourth, determining the attainment of the name "single cognitive aspect" (ekākāra); fifth, clarifying the attainment of the name "cognizing subject" (ālambaka); sixth, distinction according to the three natures. Regarding reconciling the treatise texts: Question: If the first master says that citta and caittas each have only a single cognition and do not give rise to multiple ones, how can the four positions on non-shame be reconciled? The explanation is: This is stated on the basis of cognitive modes harmonizing with one another; it does not mean that a single entity gives rise to multiple cognitive modes. Or it is the opinion of other masters, and does not necessarily need to be reconciled. Question: If, as the latter three say, there are multiple cognitions in a single entity, how does one reconcile the Abhidharmāvatāra? The explanation is: What that treatise states is based on the primary, not the secondary. Or it is the opinion of other masters, and does not necessarily need to be reconciled. Question: If, as the latter three say, there are multiple cognitions in a single entity, since there are multiple cognitions, how is there not the fault of having multiple entities? The explanation is: Although secondary activities are multiple, their nature and characteristics harmonize, and the primary activity is only one; therefore, the entities are not multiple. Second, clarifying differences relative to the cognitive aspect: Question: What is the difference between cognitive mode (xingjie) and cognitive aspect (ākāra)? The explanation is: "Cognitive mode" means that the cognitive modes of citta and caittas are different. Grasping general and specific characteristics among objects is precisely the difference in function of citta and caittas. These cognitive modes give rise to either correct cognition or erroneous cognition regarding the objective domain. As in the four explanations above, activity is called cognition; hence it is called cognitive mode. "Cognitive aspect" means that the essence of citta and caittas is pure; merely facing an objective domain before them, not through intentional mental application, an image naturally and spontaneously manifests, just as all forms appear in a clear pool or a bright mirror. Third, reconciling the name "cognitive aspect": Question: As for the cognitive aspect stated in the four positions on non-shame cited above, that treatise should have said "cognitive mode"; why did it say "cognitive aspect"? Furthermore, if the meanings are identical and there is no difference, why contrast them to distinguish the difference? The explanation is: If one says "cognitive mode," it is solely the difference in the function of citta and the like. If one says "cognitive aspect," there are two kinds: first, an image is called a cognitive aspect; second, a cognitive mode is called a cognitive aspect. Previously, to distinguish them by contrast, function was called cognitive mode. The terms "image" and "cognitive aspect" actually differ based on their differing senses, but the term "cognitive aspect" in the treatises applies to cognitive mode as well. When the four positions on non-shame say "cognitive aspect," it is the aspect of the cognitive mode, so it is called cognitive aspect. There are further texts, which should be understood and reconciled according to this. Such are the two kinds of differences. Fourth, determining the attainment of the name "single cognitive aspect": Question: Between cognitive mode and cognitive aspect, on the basis of which is it called "the same single cognitive aspect"? The explanation is: It is called a single cognitive aspect based on the sameness of the cognitive aspect. The essence of citta and caittas is bright and pure; whichever object they confront, this aspect naturally appears, and they jointly possess this aspect, so it is called a single cognitive aspect. Therefore, the second fascicle of the Abhidharmāvatāra says: "Just as the eye-consciousness and the like arise supported by the eye and the like, appearing with the image bearing the objective meaning of form and the like, they are able to apprehend their own objective domains (above is the treatise text)." From this we may infer that it is called a single aspect solely with reference to the cognitive aspect. Question: Regarding the cognitive mode of citta and the like, some say they are also the same; why is it not called a single cognitive aspect? The explanation is: The different theories on cognitive modes are not uniform, and their principle is not settled. The cognitive aspect is stated uniformly, so it is clarified with reference to this. Another explanation: According to the proponent who says the cognitive modes of citta and the like are the same, it can also be called a single cognitive aspect; here, "cognitive aspect" means the aspect of the activity. Fifth, clarifying the attainment of the name "cognizing subject": Question: Between cognitive mode and cognitive aspect, with reference to which is it called the cognizing subject? The explanation is: It is stated based on the cognitive aspect, not on the cognitive mode. That is, when citta and the like confront an object, an image manifests. On the basis of this sense, it is called the cognizing subject, and the object is called the cognized object. For when citta and caittas cognize an object, it is not like a lamp flame extending its light to reach the object, nor is it like pincers seizing an item; on the basis of the sense of the appearance of an image, they are called the cognizing subject and the cognized object. Question: Clear pools and bright mirrors also have images appear; it should be said that they are also cognizing subjects. The explanation is: Although images appear, they lack cognitive modes, unlike citta and the like, and so are not called cognizing subjects. Question: If so, it should be called the cognizing subject based on cognitive mode; why is it called the cognizing subject based on the appearance of an image? The explanation is: Cognitive modes are either correct or erroneous, being unfixed with respect to the object; the cognitive aspect is fixed in principle, so it is clarified based on this. Another explanation: Primarily, it is called the cognizing subject based on the cognitive aspect, but in truth it also includes the cognitive mode. Another explanation: It is called the cognizing subject solely based on the cognitive mode, because it is a function. Another explanation: It is called the cognizing subject based on the cognitive mode, but in truth it also includes the cognitive aspect. Another explanation: It is directly called the cognizing subject based on both the cognitive aspect and the cognitive mode, because these two are definitely present. Sixth, distinction according to the three natures: Question: Are the cognitive mode and cognitive aspect identical in nature with citta and the caittas? The explanation is: Since cognitive mode and cognitive aspect are not separate from the entity, one should know that in all three natures they are identical with the entity. Question: When wholesome citta and caittas cognize unwholesome form, an image appears; how is the cognitive aspect identical with that entity? The explanation is: Although the cognized form is unwholesome, because this image is not separate from the cognizing subject, it is also wholesome. Just as fire in a mirror resembles fire but is not real, the image is also like this: it resembles that unwholesome dharma but is not unwholesome. Since it is so for the wholesome, the unwholesome and the indeterminate should be understood by analogy with the wholesome. If according to the Mahāyāna, this cognitive aspect corresponds to the objective aspect (nimittabhāga); this objective aspect is subsumed under the object, and as it transforms into form and the like, it is subsumed under form and the like. If according to the Sāṃmitīya, citta and caittas directly cognize the object before them, without a distinct cognitive aspect appearing upon citta and the like, which differs from the Sarvāstivāda; nor do they transform an objective aspect, which further differs from the Mahāyāna.