俱舍論記 1.200

1.200

「論曰至至意識身」者，識非一故，名各各了別。境非一故，名彼彼境界。問：五識對五境可名為各，意識遍緣云何名各？解云：且據法界名之為各。又解：緣十三界名各。若五識據非緣他境名各，非不被他緣自境。意識能緣十三界名各，非不能緣他境。又解：意識隨緣何法，即名為各。總取境相者，謂彼六識各於彼彼境不取別相，取境總相，故名識蘊。問：心與心所各有行解，取諸境相差別云何？解云：就行解中，一敘異解、二問答分別。一敘異解者，心對心所行解不同，略為四解。第一解云：夫於境中有二種相，一者總相，謂色、聲等；二者別相，謂違、順等。心、心所法對所緣境，心取總相不能取別，心所各自取境別相不能取總，以於一體無多解故。故《入阿毘達磨論》第二云「唯總分別色等境事說名為識。若能分別差別相者，即名受等諸心所法。識無彼用，但作所依。」第二解云：心王正取總相兼取別相，諸心所法各自取別相非能取總相。此家意說：心王力強能取總、別，心所力劣取別非總。第三解云：諸心所法各各正能取自別相兼取總相，心王但取總相非別。此家意說：王所作處，心所必隨，故心所法兼能取總；王非隨所，故非取別。第四解云：心、心所法一一皆能取總別相。然彼心王正取總相兼取別相，諸心所法各各正能取自別相，兼能取他別相及與總相。所以得知諸心、心所皆能取境總、別相者，如《婆沙》第三十四無慚納息中，解無慚行相云「有餘師說：此顯無慚行相。此行相對餘，應作四句。有無慚非無慚行相轉，謂無慚作，餘行相轉。有無慚行相轉非無慚，謂無慚相應法作，無慚行相轉。有無慚亦無慚行相轉，謂無慚作，無慚行相轉。有非無慚亦非無慚行相轉，謂若取此種類，應說無慚相應法作，餘行相轉。若不爾者，應說除前相。」解無愧等中亦有四句，不能具引。以此准知，皆取總、別。

"The commentary says ... up to the group of mental consciousnesses": Because consciousness is not singular, it is called "individual apprehension." Because objects are not singular, they are called "their respective objective domains." Question: The five consciousnesses correspond to five objective domains and may be called "individual," but how can mental consciousness, which universally cognizes, be called "individual"? The explanation is: For now, it is called "individual" based on the dharma-dhātu. Another explanation: It is called "individual" because it cognizes thirteen dhātus. The five consciousnesses are called "individual" based on not cognizing other objective domains, but it is not that their own objective domains cannot be cognized by others. The mental consciousness is called "individual" because it can cognize thirteen dhātus, but it is not that it cannot cognize other objective domains. Another explanation: Mental consciousness is called "individual" in accordance with whatever dharma it cognizes. "Grasping the general characteristic of an object" means that those six consciousnesses, with respect to their respective objects, do not grasp specific characteristics but grasp the general characteristic of the object; hence it is called the vijñāna-skandha. Question: Citta and the caittas each have cognitive modes; what is the difference in their grasping of the characteristics of objects? The explanation is: Concerning the cognitive mode, first, the differing interpretations are recounted; second, distinctions are made through questions and answers. First, recounting the differing interpretations: The cognitive modes of citta in contrast to caittas differ, and there are briefly four explanations. The first explanation says: In an object there are two kinds of characteristics: first, the general characteristic, namely form, sound, and so forth; second, the specific characteristic, namely adverse, agreeable, and so forth. With respect to the objective domain cognized by citta and caittas, citta grasps the general characteristic and cannot grasp the specific, while the caittas each grasp the specific characteristic of the object and cannot grasp the general, because in a single entity there cannot be multiple cognitions. Therefore, the second fascicle of the Abhidharmāvatāra says: "Only generally distinguishing the state of objects such as form is called consciousness. If one can distinguish specific characteristics, those are called the caittas such as sensation. Consciousness lacks that function and serves merely as the support." The second explanation says: The primary mind (citta-rāja) directly grasps the general characteristic and secondarily grasps the specific characteristic, while the various caittas each grasp the specific characteristic and cannot grasp the general characteristic. This master's intention means: The power of the primary mind is strong and can grasp both general and specific, while the power of the caittas is weak, grasping the specific but not the general. The third explanation says: The various caittas each directly can grasp their own specific characteristic and secondarily grasp the general characteristic, while the primary mind only grasps the general characteristic and not the specific. This master's intention means: Where the king acts, the caittas must follow; therefore, caittas can secondarily grasp the general; the king does not follow the caittas, so he does not grasp the specific. The fourth explanation says: Citta and caittas can each and every one grasp both general and specific characteristics. However, that primary mind directly grasps the general characteristic and secondarily grasps the specific characteristic, while the various caittas each directly grasp their own specific characteristic and secondarily can grasp other specific characteristics as well as the general characteristic. Why do we know that all cittas and caittas can grasp both the general and specific characteristics of an object? As in fascicle thirty-four of the Mahāvibhāṣā, in the section on non-shame (āhrīkya), explaining the cognitive aspect (ākāra) of non-shame, it says: "Other masters say: This reveals the cognitive aspect of non-shame. With respect to others, four positions should be formed for this cognitive aspect: There is non-shame that does not operate with the cognitive aspect of non-shame, namely non-shame acting while operating with another cognitive aspect. There is operating with the cognitive aspect of non-shame that is not non-shame, namely a dharma associated with non-shame acting while operating with the cognitive aspect of non-shame. There is non-shame that also operates with the cognitive aspect of non-shame, namely non-shame acting while operating with the cognitive aspect of non-shame. There is that which is neither non-shame nor operates with the cognitive aspect of non-shame; namely, if one takes this category, one should say dharmas associated with non-shame acting while operating with other cognitive aspects. If not so, one should state it excluding the preceding characteristics." In the explanation of non-embarrassment (anapatrāpya) and so forth there are also four positions, which cannot be cited in full. By this we may infer that they all grasp both general and specific.