俱舍論記 12.111

12.111

「又於一火至不應得成」者，上來破勝論縷衣地大訖，義便復破勝論火大。彼計一火光明界中隨所至處一段光明體唯是一，依多極微上起。還以離縷別有衣體，所以次破。於彼一火光明界中隨所至處體若是一，云何於中得有遠燒觸時痛少、近燒觸時痛多，遠照色時昧劣、近照色時明顯？此等不同有異差別，應不得成。既有不同有異差別，明非一體。極微眾多即無此過。又解：體若是一，云何於彼一火界中可得辨有遠近不同？謂此名遠、此名為近？燒、照有異，謂同燒多物，黃、黑有異。謂同照多物，明、昧有異，觸、色差別，謂於其中熱、觸差別，謂於其中色有差別。此等差別皆應不成。又解：於一火界遠、近二種不同，燒、照二種有異，觸、色二種差別。若是體一，此遠、近等皆應不成。

Regarding [the text from] “Moreover, in a single fire…” up to “…ought not to be possible”: having finished the refutation above of the earth element of thread and cloth in the Vaiśeṣika system, [the author] takes the opportunity to also refute the fire element of the Vaiśeṣikas. They hold that within the light-realm of a single fire, wherever it reaches, a single segment of light is entirely one in substance, arising based on many atoms. Because they also hold that apart from the threads there is a distinct substance of cloth, he refutes it next. If within the light-realm of that single fire, wherever it reaches, its substance is single, how could it be that when burning and touching at a distance the pain is slight, while when burning and touching close by the pain is great; or when illuminating visible form at a distance it is faint and weak, while when illuminating visible form close by it is bright and clear? Such differences and distinctions ought not to be possible. Since there are these differences and distinctions, it is clear that it is not a single substance. If atoms are manifold, then there is no such flaw. Another explanation: if the substance is single, how could one distinguish the difference between distance and proximity in that single fire-realm, saying “this is called distant, this is called near”? The difference between burning and illuminating means: in burning multiple things together, there is the difference of yellow and black; in illuminating multiple things together, there is the difference of bright and faint; the distinction between tangible and visible form means: in it there is the distinction of heat and tangible, in it there is the distinction of visible form. All such distinctions ought to be impossible. Another explanation: in a single fire-realm, there are the two differences of distance and proximity, the two variations of burning and illuminating, and the two distinctions of tangible and visible form. If the substance were single, these [differences such as] distance and proximity ought not to be possible.