俱舍論記 12.110

12.110

「謂若離縷至甚為靈異」者，論主以理釋前離縷無衣。衣異色，謂青、黃等色。異類，謂絲、毛等類。異業，謂障寒等業用。謂若離此縷上異色、離此縷上異類、離此縷上異業，此衣上異色、此衣上異類、此衣上異業不可得故。此中釋意：縷上見有異色、類、業，衣上即無異色、類、業。若衣上有異色、類、業，可證有衣；衣上既無異色、類、業，明知衣體亦無。約無色、類、業以破彼衣。若汝救言：於錦衣上異色、類、業，屬衣非縷，以此錦衣異色、類、業故。汝則應許實句中衣從異類起。所以者何？於錦衣上一一縷色各是青等，無種種異色。一一縷類各是絲等，無種種異類。一一縷業各障寒等業，別無種種異業。既無種種色、類、業縷，生種種色、類、業衣，是則縷衣相望各異。其縷生衣，異類能生。縷、衣二種俱實句攝，是則許實從異類起，如何前說實唯從同類生？此即以縷難衣，約色等三顯縷無異，非欲正聚色等為難。又解：即以一一縷上無種種色、類、業為難。既無種種色、類、業，生種種色、類、業衣，即是此衣從異類起。又解：勝論宗衣是實句，色是德句，類是同異句，業是業句。既色、類、業能生此衣，是即許實從異類起。於錦衣上，或於一分無異色等邊應不見衣，由彼異色等能顯錦衣故，於此一分中無異色等故。汝若固執於錦一分無異色等處亦名衣者，或即於彼無異色等錦一分中應見異色等，以執衣必有異色等相故。復調弄言：彼許有分全衣體唯是一，而有種種色、類、業殊，一異相違而得相有。審有如斯，甚為靈異。

Regarding [the text from] “That is, if apart from the threads…” up to “…most uncanny”: the author uses reason to explain the earlier [statement] that apart from the threads there is no cloth. A cloth's “different colors” refers to colors such as blue, yellow, and so forth. “Different kinds” refers to kinds such as silk, wool, and so forth. “Different actions” refers to functions and actions such as warding off cold. That is to say, if apart from these different colors on the threads, apart from these different kinds on the threads, and apart from these different actions on the threads, these different colors on the cloth, these different kinds on the cloth, and these different actions on the cloth cannot be apprehended. The intended meaning of the explanation here is: on the threads one sees different colors, kinds, and actions, but on the cloth there are no different colors, kinds, or actions. If there were different colors, kinds, and actions on the cloth, one could prove the existence of the cloth; since on the cloth there are no different colors, kinds, or actions, we clearly know that the substance of the cloth also does not exist. This refutes their cloth on the basis of the absence of [different] color, kind, and action. If you should rescue [your position] by saying: “The different colors, kinds, and actions on a brocade cloth belong to the cloth and not to the threads, because this brocade cloth has different colors, kinds, and actions,” then you must concede that a cloth in the category of substance (dravya) arises from different kinds [of causes]. Why is that? On the brocade cloth, each thread's color is individually blue, etc., lacking manifold different colors; each thread's kind is individually silk, etc., lacking manifold different kinds; each thread's action individually wards off cold, etc., without other manifold different actions. Since there are no threads of manifold colors, kinds, and actions, yet they produce a cloth of manifold colors, kinds, and actions, the threads and the cloth are different in relation to each other. The threads producing the cloth would be a production from different kinds. Both thread and cloth are subsumed under the category of substance; this would mean conceding that a substance arises from different kinds—so how could it have been stated previously that a substance is produced only from causes of the same kind? This challenges the cloth by means of the threads, using the triad of color and so forth to show that the threads have no diversity, rather than intending to take color and so forth themselves as the object of challenge. Another explanation: the challenge is made on the basis that on each thread there are no manifold colors, kinds, or actions; since they lack manifold colors, kinds, and actions yet produce a cloth with manifold colors, kinds, and actions, this cloth would arise from different kinds. Another explanation: in the Vaiśeṣika school, cloth is the category of substance (dravya), color is the category of quality (guṇa), kind is the category of generality and particularity (sāmānya-viśeṣa), and action is the category of action (karma). Since color, kind, and action produce this cloth, this concedes that a substance arises from different kinds [of categories]. On a brocade cloth, or on a side where a part lacks different colors, etc., one should not see the cloth, because those different colors, etc., make the brocade cloth manifest, and in this part there are no different colors, etc. If you obstinately hold that a part of the brocade lacking different colors, etc., is also called “cloth,” then right in that part of the brocade lacking different colors, etc., one should see different colors, etc., because of the adherence to the view that the cloth must have characteristics such as different colors. Furthermore, [the author] mocks [them], saying: they hold that the whole cloth is only a single entity, yet it has the distinctions of manifold colors, kinds, and actions; unity and difference are contradictory, yet they are able to co-exist. If it is truly like this, it is most uncanny!