俱舍論記 13.130

13.130

「頌曰至手地為依」者，答。唯欲界繫初剎那後第二剎那已去，所有無表從過去大種生。此過大種是其能造，具生等五，為親所依，後念無表所以得起。第二念已去現身大種望同時無表，非是能造，亦非得有生等五因，但為疎依無表得起。過去大種為親轉因，轉之言起，由彼起故；現身大種為疎隨轉因，隨彼無表轉故，隨轉即因，名隨轉因。或無表隨大轉，隨轉之因，名隨轉因。如輪行於地，手為能轉依，喻過大種；地為隨轉依，喻現大種。問：何故不言色後念無表，而言欲後念無表？解云：色界隨心轉戒必同時四大種造。又彼界中無散無表。故《婆沙》一百二十二云「此中所說決定義者，欲界必無隨轉無表，色界必無依表發無表。問：何故爾耶？有一解云：復有說者，欲界生得能發業心殷重猛利，故所發表能發無表。色界生得能發業心非殷重猛利，故所發表不能發無表。又一解云：復有說者，若生欲界，無定心故，不定心勝，故所發表能發無表。若生色界，有定心故，不定心劣，故所發表不能發無表。」廣如彼釋。問：後念無表亦有依現大種而生，何故此文言過大生？解云：此文略故，且約後念現行已去，故言過去大造。若具分別，三世不定。故《婆沙》一百三十二云「諸有對造色及隨心轉色隨在何世，即彼世大種造。若表所起諸無表色，復有三類造時不等，謂初剎那如有對等，各為同世大種所造。若第二剎那，若在過、現，俱為過去大種所造；若在未來，通為現、未大種所造。後諸剎那，過、現如前。若在未來，通為三世大種所造。問：造未來世別解脫戒，戒既未得，云何造耶？」解云：造諸無表，其義不定。或有得而不造，如未來隨心轉戒。或有造而不得，如未來別解脫戒。或有亦得亦造，如初念別解脫戒等。或有不得不造，謂除前相。問：初念大種造後諸無表，為即用彼造初念無表大種？為別起大種造後無表？第一解云：造後諸無表，即用造初念無表大種。若爾，豈不一具四大造多色耶？解云：一四大種可不能造多有對色，造無礙色多亦無過。問：若造多者，所造無表同四大造，展轉相望應俱有因。解云：以無礙故，可言造多。由時別故、非互果故，非俱有因。若作此解，現在一四大種造彼現、未無表、以無有現大無現造色故。故《婆沙》一百三十二云「若成就現在大種，彼現在所造色耶？答：如是。設成就現在所造色，彼現在大種耶？答：如是。以非現在大種無果故，亦非現在所造色無因故。」解云：以非現在大種無果故，所以必成現所造色。亦非現在所造色無因故，所以必成現在大種。以此故知現無別大造未來無表。又解云：一具四大造初念無表，即於此時別有一具四大造彼後念諸無表色。故《正理》第二十解大種望所造色非俱有因中云「謂有成就諸所造色非四大種，或有成就能造大種非所造色（以此文證有成能造非所造色，故知亦有現大無現造色懸造未來）。」若作前解通後證云：言有成能造非所造色者，此據初念造後無表，初念定成彼能造大，故言有成就能造大種。爾時雖造未來無表，由未來故，故言非所造色。若作後解通前證云：言以非現在大種無果故，亦非現在所造色無因故者，從多分說故、據造有對故。若言通無表者，論說亦非現在所造色無因故。豈有第二念現在所造無表有同時能造大種？以此故知據有對說。若作前解釋此文言：言亦非現在所造色無因故者，現因有二：一親因、二疎因。若望現在有對色及初念無表，同時大種即為親因。若望第二念已去，現行無表身中大種即為疎因。又解云：一具四大造初念無表，即於此時復別起眾多四大懸造未來無表，剎那剎那四大別造。問：若於初念起多大種念念別造，一期無表其數極多，如何現在一剎那身容彼眾多能造四大種？解云：異熟虛疎，相容無失。引證釋通，如第二家說，不能更述。問：現身大種但能為依者，為是造身等大為依？為別起一類大種為依？解云：即是造身等大為疎依也，非生等五。問答廣如無表中說。問：若過去大種名轉因，現在大種名隨轉因，何故《婆沙》一百三十三云「有色現在非現在大種所造，謂現在大種。若色現在過去大種所造，此復云何？謂現在表所起無表，過去大種所造。所以如前。問：此無表色亦有現在所依大種，何故不說耶？答：彼是轉依，非造依故。此無表色有二種依：一是轉依，謂現在大種由彼力轉故。二是造依，謂過去大種由彼力造故。此中但說造依、不說轉依，是故不說能造五因皆過去故。」解云：此論云過去大種名轉因者，是親轉因。《婆沙》言現在大種名轉依者，是疎轉依。轉謂相續轉，與此論隨轉，名異義同。

Regarding '[The verse says:] … [a hand and the ground serve as support]': this is the reply. Exclusively for that which is bound to the desire realm, from the second moment onward following the initial moment, all unmanifest [matter] arises from past primary elements. These past primary elements are their producers, possessing the five [causes] such as production, and serve as the direct support, which is why the unmanifest [matter] of subsequent moments can arise. The primary elements of the present body from the second moment onward, in relation to the simultaneous unmanifest [matter], are not the producers, nor do they possess the five causes such as production; they only serve as a remote support by which the unmanifest [matter] can arise. The past primary elements serve as the direct cause of setting into motion—'setting into motion' means arising, because it arises through them; the present body's primary elements serve as the remote cause of conforming motion, because they set into motion conforming to that unmanifest [matter]—conforming motion itself is the cause, hence called 'the cause of conforming motion'. Or, the unmanifest [matter] moves conforming to the primary elements, and the cause of this conforming motion is called the 'cause of conforming motion'. Just as when a wheel rolls upon the ground: the hand serves as the support that sets it into motion, analogous to the past primary elements; the ground serves as the support of conforming motion, analogous to the present primary elements. Question: Why does it not speak of the unmanifest [matter] of subsequent moments of the form [realm], but rather speaks of the unmanifest [matter] of subsequent moments of desire? The explanation says: The discipline that conforms to the mind in the form realm is necessarily produced by the four primary elements of the same moment. Furthermore, in that realm there is no unmanifest [matter] of a distracted [mind]. Thus the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 122, says: 'The definitive principle stated here is that the desire realm definitely has no unmanifest [matter] conforming [to the mind], and the form realm definitely has no unmanifest [matter] initiated in dependence on a manifest [action]. Question: Why is this so? One explanation says: Other masters say that the mind that naturally initiates action in the desire realm is earnest and vehement, and therefore the manifest [action] initiated can initiate an unmanifest [action]. The mind that naturally initiates action in the form realm is not earnest and vehement, and therefore the manifest [action] initiated cannot initiate an unmanifest [action]. Another explanation says: Other masters say that if one is born in the desire realm, because there is no concentrated mind, the unconcentrated mind is superior, and therefore the manifest [action] initiated can initiate an unmanifest [action]. If one is born in the form realm, because there is a concentrated mind, the unconcentrated mind is inferior, and therefore the manifest [action] initiated cannot initiate an unmanifest [action].' As explained extensively there. Question: Unmanifest [matter] of subsequent moments also arises in dependence on present primary elements; why does this text state that it is produced by past primary elements? The explanation says: Because this text is abridged, it refers primarily to that which already exists as present functioning in subsequent moments, hence it says it is produced by past primary elements. If one distinguishes fully, [its relation across] the three periods of time is not fixed. Thus the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 132, says: 'All derivative matter that is obstructive, and matter that conforms to the mind, whichever time period it belongs to, it is produced by the primary elements of that same time period. As for the various types of unmanifest matter initiated by a manifest [action], there are three categories whose times of production are not identical: namely, in the initial moment, like obstructive [matter] and so forth, each is produced by the primary elements of the same time period. In the second moment, if in the past or present, both are produced by past primary elements; if in the future, it is produced commonly by present or future primary elements. In subsequent moments, the past and present are as before. If in the future, it is produced commonly by the primary elements of the three periods of time. Question: As for producing the prātimokṣa discipline of the future, since the discipline has not yet been attained, how can it be produced?' The explanation says: Regarding the production of various unmanifest [matters], its meaning is not fixed. In some cases it is attained but not produced, like future discipline conforming to the mind. In some cases it is produced but not attained, like future prātimokṣa discipline. In some cases it is both attained and produced, like the initial moment of prātimokṣa discipline and the like. In some cases it is neither attained nor produced, namely other than the aforementioned characteristics. Question: Do the primary elements of the initial moment produce the subsequent unmanifest [matters] by means of those very primary elements that produced the unmanifest [matter] of the initial moment, or do separate primary elements arise to produce the subsequent unmanifest [matter]? The first explanation says: To produce the subsequent unmanifest [matters], one precisely uses the primary elements that produced the initial moment's unmanifest [matter]. If so, would not a single set of the four great elements produce multiple [types of] matter? The explanation says: A single set of the four primary elements cannot produce multiple obstructive matters, but there is no fault in producing multiple non-obstructive matters. Question: If they produce multiple ones, since the produced unmanifest [matters] are produced by the same four primary elements, mutually viewed they ought to be simultaneous causes (sahabhū-hetu). The explanation says: Because they are non-obstructive, one may speak of producing multiple [matters]. Because their times are distinct and they are not mutually effects, they are not simultaneous causes. If one adopts this explanation, the single set of four primary elements in the present produces those present and future unmanifest [matters], because there are no present primary elements without present derivative matter. Thus the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 132, says: 'If one possesses present primary elements, does one possess present derivative matter? Answer: Yes. If one possesses present derivative matter, does one possess present primary elements? Answer: Yes. Because it is not the case that present primary elements lack effects, nor is it the case that present derivative matter lacks causes.' The explanation says: Because it is not the case that present primary elements lack effects, one necessarily possesses present derivative matter. Also, because it is not the case that present derivative matter lacks causes, one necessarily possesses present primary elements. Therefore one knows that in the present there are no separate primary elements producing future unmanifest [matter]. Another explanation says: One set of the four primary elements produces the unmanifest [matter] of the initial moment, and precisely at this time there is another separate set of the four primary elements that produces those various unmanifest matters of subsequent moments. Thus *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle 20, explaining that primary elements in relation to derivative matter are not simultaneous causes, says: 'Namely, there are those who possess various derivative matters but not the four primary elements, or there are those who possess producing primary elements but not derivative matter (using this text as proof that there is possession of producing [elements] without derivative matter, thus one knows that there are also present primary elements without present derivative matter, which produce the future in advance).' If one adopts the former explanation to reconcile this later proof, one says: Stating that there is possession of producing [elements] without derivative matter refers to the initial moment producing subsequent unmanifest [matter]; in the initial moment one definitely possesses those producing primary elements, hence it says one possesses producing primary elements. At that time, although they produce future unmanifest [matter], because it is future, it says 'not derivative matter'. If one adopts the latter explanation to reconcile the former proof, one says: The statement 'because it is not the case that present primary elements lack effects, nor is it the case that present derivative matter lacks causes' is spoken from the perspective of the majority, and based on producing obstructive [matter]. If one claims it extends to unmanifest [matter], the treatise says 'nor is it the case that present derivative matter lacks causes'—how could the present derivative unmanifest [matter] of the second moment have simultaneous producing primary elements? Therefore one knows this is stated based on obstructive [matter]. If one adopts the former explanation to interpret this text, one says: Stating 'nor is it the case that present derivative matter lacks causes' means that present causes are twofold: first, direct causes; second, remote causes. In relation to present obstructive matter and the unmanifest [matter] of the initial moment, simultaneous primary elements are precisely direct causes. In relation to the functioning unmanifest [matter] from the second moment onward, the primary elements in the body are precisely remote causes. Another explanation says: One set of the four primary elements produces the unmanifest [matter] of the initial moment, and precisely at this time there further arise many separate four primary elements to produce future unmanifest [matter] in advance, moment by moment with separate four primary elements producing them. Question: If in the initial moment many primary elements arise to produce [them] separately moment by moment, the unmanifest [matter] of a single lifespan being extremely numerous, how could the body of a single present moment contain those many producing four primary elements? The explanation says: Vipāka is porous and sparse; they contain one another without fault. Citing proofs and resolving objections are as stated by the second school and need not be related again. Question: When the present body's primary elements can only serve as support, is it the primary elements producing the body and so forth that serve as support, or do they arise as a distinct category of primary elements to serve as support? The explanation says: It is precisely the primary elements producing the body and so forth that serve as remote support, not the five [causes] such as production. The questions and answers are as explained at length in [the discussion of] unmanifest [matter]. Question: If past primary elements are called the cause of setting into motion and present primary elements are called the cause of conforming motion, why does the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 133, say: 'There is matter that is present, not produced by present primary elements, namely present primary elements. If matter is present and produced by past primary elements, what is this again? Namely, present unmanifest [matter] initiated by a manifest [action] is produced by past primary elements. The reason is as before. Question: This unmanifest matter also has present primary elements as support; why is this not mentioned? Answer: That is a support for setting into motion, not a support for production. This unmanifest matter has two kinds of support: first is the support for setting into motion, namely present primary elements, because it moves through their power; second is the support for production, namely past primary elements, because it is produced through their power. Here it speaks only of the support for production and does not speak of the support for setting into motion; therefore it is not mentioned, because all five producing causes are past.' The explanation says: When this treatise says that past primary elements are called the cause of setting into motion, it means the direct cause of setting into motion. When the *Vibhāṣā* says that present primary elements are called the support for setting into motion, it means the remote support for setting into motion. 'Setting into motion' refers to continuing into motion, which differs in name from 'conforming motion' in this treatise, but is identical in meaning.