俱舍論疏 13.144

13.144

論「此為所依至手地為依」，明無表色依有二種：一為所依，即是能造無表大種；二但為依，即是造身餘色大種。前為轉因，如手轉輪；後為隨轉因，如地為輪依。問：表與無表大種不同，如前已釋，不勞重述。未知作俱無表與其後念作後無表，為同一大？為別大耶？又後念無表有多剎那，為同一大？為各別耶？有人釋此，三解不同。不評是非，還同未解。第一解云：造後諸無表，即用造初無表大種。乃至故《婆沙》一百三十二云「若成就現世大種，彼現在所造色耶？答：如是。設成就現所造色，彼現在大種耶？答：如是。以非現在大種無果故，亦非現在所造色無因故。自解云。以非現在大種無果故，所以必成現所造色。亦非現所造色無因故，必成就大種。以此故知，現無別大造，未來無表。」今詳引此論文為證不定。此論文據有對色說，不是無對色據。生因大種非是依因，依因非是造色義故。細麁之色非一因故，不可別有依因大故。既約造大後念，無表現在成就之時，不成現造大種。能造大種現在成就之時，不成未來所造色故。如何引此論文證初念無表與後無表同一大造？此釋雖不違理，誤引論文以為過也。第二釋云：一具四大造初念無表，即於此時別有一具四大造彼後念諸無表色。《正理》第二十解大種望所造色非俱有因中云「謂有成就所造色非四大種，或有成就能造大種非所造色。」自解云：以此文證，有成就能造非所造色，故知亦有現在大種無現在所造色懸造未來。今詳此釋違其理、教及所引文，亦非成證。言違理者，何因後念無量剎那同一大造，初念無表有何別因異大造耶？論但自云「細麁因別」，而無有文現、未別因。言違教者，《正理》正解此文中云「謂欲界所繫初念無表，與能生大種俱時而生（准此，即造初念無表大種所造無表俱時而生）。此大種生已，能為一切未來自相續無表生因（准此，即是此前能生初念無表大種，能為一切未來自相續無表色生因。無表生因即是造義）。此與初剎那無表俱滅已、第二念等無表生時，一切皆是前過去大所造。此過大種為後後念無表所依，能引發故。與後後念無表俱起身中大種但能為依。此大種若無，無表不轉故（准此，即是此前能生初念無表大種，更不說別有大種造未來色）。」言引論文不成證者，《正理論》云「成就能造非所造者，此望未來所造色說，非成就一切所造。」望法不同，以為句數。如何引此以為證耶？第三解云：一具四大造初無表，即於此時復起眾多大種懸造未來無表，剎那剎那四大別造。自問答云：一期無表其數極多，如何現在一剎那身容彼眾多能造四大？然自解云：異熟虛疎，相容無失。今詳此釋違其教、理，復無文證。言違教者，如前所引《正理論》文。言違理者，准俱舍師釋剎那云「如有動物度一極微名一剎那」。准此，日輪一日一夜周四天下，所度極微數無邊故，即是剎那不可勝數。若依日夜三十須臾，剎那有六百四十餘萬。以日計月、以月計年、以年計劫、剎那剎那無量無邊。一一剎那有七具四大，一一大種復有七微，即是於一剎那有二十八微。計其根色虛疎，尚不得容造一日一夜無表四大極微，如何得容百年八萬歲等？無文證者，凡所立義須引教、理，既違教無文，何成釋義？雖釋此義三解不同，不評是非何殊不解。今詳教理，造初念無表，與後念無表同一大造，理教分明，不可違拒。如前所述，此論以轉因聲同造因也。轉之言起，此色因過去能造大起，故是轉因。依現身大種故，故是隨轉因。如輪轉時因手而轉亦依地轉。《婆沙》一百三十三云「有色現在非現在大種所造，謂現在大種若色現在，過去大種所造。此復云何？謂現在表所起無表，過去大種所造，所以如前說。問：此無表色亦有現在所依大種，何故不說耶？答：彼是轉依，非造依故。此無表色有二種依：一是轉依，謂現在大種由彼力轉故；二是造依，謂過去大種由彼力造故。此中但說造依、不說轉依，是故不說能造五因皆過去故（解云：《婆沙》與此論及《正理》，名雖少異，其義同也）。」

The treatise says, "Because this is the support (āśraya)... [as the hand and the earth serve as supports]." This clarifies that the supports of non-informative form (avijñapti-rūpa) are of two kinds: first, that which acts as the "support" (āśraya), which is the primary elements (mahābhūta) capable of producing the non-informative [form]; second, that which acts merely as a "reliance" (ādhāra/āśraya), which is the primary elements producing the remaining forms of the body. The former is the rolling cause (pravartana-hetu), like the hand rolling a wheel; the latter is the following-along cause (anupravartana-hetu), like the earth acting as the wheel's reliance. Question: The primary elements of the informative (vijñapti) and non-informative differ, as has already been explained above and does not need to be repeated. It is not yet known: do the non-informative [form] co-occurring with the informative action (kriyāsaha-avijñapti) and the non-informative [form] subsequent to the action (pṛṣṭhabhavā-avijñapti) of its subsequent moments share the same primary elements, or are they from distinct primary elements? Furthermore, since the subsequent-moment non-informative forms have many moments, do they share the same primary elements, or are they each distinct? Someone explained this with three different interpretations. Without critiquing their correctness or error, it remains equivalent to not understanding. The first interpretation says: the production of subsequent non-informative forms uses precisely the primary elements that produced the initial non-informative [form]. Down to: therefore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 132, says: "If one possesses (samanvāgata) present primary elements, does one possess present derived form (bhautika-rūpa)? Answer: Yes. Supposing one possesses present derived form, does one possess present primary elements? Answer: Yes. Because it is not the case that present primary elements lack fruit, nor is it the case that present derived form lacks a cause." [The commentator's] own explanation says: Because it is not the case that present primary elements lack fruit, one must inevitably possess present derived form. Also, because it is not the case that present derived form lacks a cause, one must inevitably possess primary elements. From this it is known that there are no distinct present primary elements producing future non-informative forms. Now, examining this: citing this treatise passage as proof is inconclusive. This treatise passage is spoken in terms of resistant forms (sapratigha-rūpa), not non-resistant forms (apratigha-rūpa). The primary elements that are the productive cause (janaka-hetu) are not the reliance cause (niśraya-hetu), because the reliance cause does not mean producing form. Since subtle and gross forms do not have a single cause, there cannot be a distinct primary element as the reliance cause. Since in terms of producing the subsequent moments of the primary elements, when the present non-informative form is possessed, one does not possess present producing primary elements; and when the producing primary elements are presently possessed, one does not possess the future produced forms. How could one cite this treatise passage to prove that the initial moment of non-informative form and subsequent non-informative forms are produced by the same primary elements? Although this explanation does not contradict reason, it errs in citing the treatise passage, which is its flaw. The second interpretation says: one set of four primary elements produces the initial moment of non-informative form, and at that very time there is a separate set of four primary elements producing those subsequent-moment non-informative forms. The Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 20, in explaining that primary elements in relation to derived form are not co-existent causes (sahabhū-hetu), says: "That is, there are those who possess derived form but not the four primary elements, or there are those who possess producing primary elements but not the derived forms." [The commentator's] own explanation says: Using this passage as proof that there are those who possess the producers but not the produced forms, it is therefore known that there are also present primary elements without present derived forms that in advance produce the future [forms]. Now, examining this: this interpretation contradicts reason, scriptures, and the cited passage, nor does it establish proof. Saying it contradicts reason: by what cause are the subsequent moments—immeasurable in number—produced by the same primary elements, while the initial moment's non-informative form has some separate cause to be produced by distinct primary elements? The treatise itself only says "gross and subtle causes are distinct," and there is no text stating separate causes for present and future. Saying it contradicts scriptures: the Nyāyānusāra, when directly explaining this passage, says: "The initial moment of non-informative form bound to the desire realm arises simultaneously with its productive primary elements (based on this, the primary elements producing the initial moment of non-informative form and the produced non-informative form arise simultaneously). Once these primary elements have arisen, they can act as the productive cause for all future non-informative forms of their own continuity (based on this, it is precisely those aforementioned primary elements capable of producing the initial moment of non-informative form that can act as the productive cause for all future non-informative forms of their own continuity; the productive cause of non-informative form is precisely the meaning of 'producing'). When these, together with the non-informative form of the initial moment, have ceased, and the non-informative form of the second moment and so on arises, they are all produced by the previous, past primary elements. These past primary elements serve as the support (āśraya) for the subsequent-moment non-informative forms because they can induce them. The primary elements in the body that arise simultaneously with the subsequent-moment non-informative forms can only act as a reliance (ādhāra); if these primary elements did not exist, the non-informative forms would not occur (based on this, it is precisely those aforementioned primary elements capable of producing the initial moment of non-informative form, and there is no statement that separate primary elements produce future forms)." Saying that citing the treatise passage fails to establish proof: the Nyāyānusāra says, "'Possessing the producers but not the produced' is spoken in relation to future derived forms, not possessing all derived forms." Looking at dharmas differently constitutes the tetra-lemma. How can this be cited as proof? The third interpretation says: one set of four primary elements produces the initial non-informative form, and at that very time, many primary elements also arise in advance to produce future non-informative forms, with the four primary elements producing them distinctly moment by moment. [The commentator] poses a question and answer himself: The non-informative forms of a single lifetime are extremely numerous; how can a body of a single present moment accommodate those numerous producing four primary elements? Yet his own explanation says: Because the maturation [body] is porous and loose, accommodating each other is not a fault. Now, examining this: this interpretation contradicts scriptures and reason, and furthermore lacks textual evidence. Saying it contradicts scriptures: as in the passage from the Nyāyānusāra cited above. Saying it contradicts reason: according to the Kośa masters' explanation of a moment (kṣaṇa), "A kṣaṇa is the time it takes for a moving creature to cross one subtle atom." Based on this, in one day and one night the solar disc traverses the four continents, and because the number of subtle atoms traversed is boundless, the kṣaṇas are countless. If calculated according to the thirty muhūrtas of day and night, there are over 6.4 million kṣaṇas. Calculating days into months, months into years, years into kalpas, the moments are immeasurable and boundless. Each and every moment has seven sets of the four primary elements, and each primary element has seven atoms, which is twenty-eight atoms in a single moment. Calculating the porousness of physical sense-faculties, they still cannot accommodate the subtle atoms of the four primary elements producing the non-informative forms of a single day and night; how could they accommodate a hundred years or eighty thousand years? As for lacking textual evidence: whenever a thesis is established, it must cite scripture and reason; since it contradicts scripture and lacks text, how can it constitute a valid explanation? Although the explanations of this meaning yield three different interpretations, failing to judge their correctness is no different from having no explanation. Now, examining scripture and reason: the production of the initial moment of non-informative form and the subsequent moments of non-informative form are produced by the same primary elements; reason and scriptures are clear and cannot be opposed. As stated above, this treatise uses the term "rolling cause" (pravartana-hetu) synonymously with productive cause (janaka-hetu). "Rolling" means arising; because this form arises from the past producing primary elements, it is a rolling cause. Because it relies on the primary elements of the present body, it is a following-along cause. Just as when a wheel turns, it turns because of the hand and also turns relying on the earth. The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 133, says: "There is form that is present and not produced by present primary elements: namely, present primary elements [and] if form is present, it is produced by past primary elements. What is this again? Namely, non-informative form arisen from present informative action, which is produced by past primary elements; the reason is as stated before. Question: This non-informative form also has present primary elements as its support; why is that not stated? Answer: Because they are the occurrence support (pravṛtti-niśraya), not the productive support (utpatti-niśraya). This non-informative form has two kinds of supports: first, the occurrence support, namely the present primary elements by whose power it occurs; second, the productive support, namely the past primary elements by whose power it is produced. Here, only the productive support is mentioned, not the occurrence support; therefore, it is not mentioned, because all five producing causes are past (Explanation: although the terminology of the Vibhāṣā, this treatise, and the Nyāyānusāra differs slightly, their meaning is the same)."