俱舍論記 13.216

13.216

「若表不由至無記表業」者，論主顯前毘婆沙師通經有過。若表不由隨轉心力成善等者，汝前通邪見發業經，即不應言彼經但據前因等起非據剎那。若作此通，一即名中有濫、二即似許剎那。但據前因等起，此即名中有濫。謂等起有二：一因等起、二剎那等起。因等起望後，剎那等起是前，故名前因等起。前因等起復有二種：一近因等起、二遠因等起。近因等起能發表，遠因等起不能發表。既言前因等起不能發表，近、遠二因俱名前因，名中簡法不盡，即濫近因等起。非據剎那，此即似許剎那表成善等。汝若不許約剎那等起表成善等，何故說言非據剎那？若據剎那，亦許說剎那耶？若言亦許，有違宗過。此論前文雖無正說非據剎那，今後難中准義加也。或可前文雖無此說，餘論通經說具有故。故《婆沙》一百一十七云「答：依因等起作如是說，非剎那等起。是故無過（已上論文）。」故欲界中定無有覆無記表業，准義為結。前無正文，或可是餘處文。又解：若表不由隨轉心力成善等者，但由轉心於欲界中令有有覆無記表業，以身、邊見能為轉故。則不應言彼經但據前因等起非據剎那，則不應言故欲界中定無有覆無記表業。

"If informative action does not... indeterminate informative action": the author of the treatise shows that the previous Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the sūtra is faulty. If an informative action does not become wholesome and so forth by the force of the concurrent motivating mind, then in your previous interpretation of the sūtra about wrong view initiating action, you should not have said that that sūtra relies merely upon the prior causal origination and not upon the momentary [origination]. If you make this interpretation, first, there is ambiguity in the terminology; second, it seems to concede the momentary [origination]. Relying merely upon the prior causal origination: this contains ambiguity in the terminology. That is, there are two kinds of origination: first, causal origination; second, momentary origination. Since causal origination precedes the subsequent momentary origination, it is called prior causal origination. The prior causal origination again has two types: proximate causal origination and remote causal origination. Proximate causal origination can initiate informative action, while remote causal origination cannot initiate informative action. Now since you say that prior causal origination cannot initiate informative action, and both proximate and remote causes are called prior causes, the terminology does not completely distinguish the phenomena and becomes ambiguous with proximate causal origination. 'Not relying upon the momentary': this seems to concede that the momentary [origination] makes informative action wholesome and so forth. If you do not concede that an informative action becomes wholesome and so forth in terms of momentary origination, why do you say 'not relying upon the momentary'? If it relies upon the momentary, do you also concede that one speaks in terms of the momentary? If you say it is also conceded, there is the fault of contradicting your own tenet. Although the earlier text of this treatise did not explicitly say 'not relying upon the momentary', in the present objection it is added according to the implicit meaning. Or perhaps, though this treatise's earlier text lacks this phrasing, other treatises possess it in full when resolving the sūtra. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 117, says: "Answer: It makes this statement in reliance upon causal origination, not momentary origination. Therefore there is no fault (end of treatise citation)." 'Therefore in the desire realm there is definitely no defiled-indeterminate informative action' is a conclusion based on implicit meaning. It was not in the prior text directly, or perhaps it is text from elsewhere. Another interpretation: if an informative action does not become wholesome and so forth by the force of the concurrent motivating mind, but merely by the motivating mind allows for defiled-indeterminate informative actions in the desire realm because the views of self and extremes can act as motivators, then one should not say that that sūtra relies merely upon the prior causal origination and not upon the momentary, nor should one say that therefore in the desire realm there is definitely no defiled-indeterminate informative action.