俱舍論記 13.35

13.35

「又若待因至亦不待因」者，釋第五句，應無無因故。汝若固執要待客因薪等方滅，應諸有為一切法滅，無不皆待客因而滅。立量云，覺、焰等滅應待客因，有為攝故，猶如薪等。以生例滅，如有為法生皆待客因無無因者，有為法滅理亦應然。皆待客因無無因者，若諸法滅必待客因，便違現量。然世現見，覺、焰、音聲不待客因剎那自滅。心、心所法能覺察故，總名為覺。即自結言：故薪等滅亦不待客因。立量云：薪等滅時不待客因，有剎那故，如覺、焰等。

[On the passage] "Furthermore, if it depended on a cause […] also does not depend on a cause": This explains the fifth line: "there would be none without cause". If you stubbornly insist that firewood and so forth perish only by depending on an incidental cause, then of conditioned phenomena, the perishing of all phenomena would without exception depend on incidental causes. The inference is: The perishing of consciousness, flames, and so forth should depend on incidental causes, because they are subsumed under conditioned phenomena, just like firewood and so forth. Analogizing perishing to arising: just as the arising of conditioned phenomena all depends on incidental causes and there are none without cause, the perishing of conditioned phenomena should logically also be the same, all depending on incidental causes and none being without cause. But if the perishing of phenomena must depend on incidental causes, this would contradict direct perception. Yet it is seen directly in the world that consciousness, flames, and sound perish of themselves moment by moment without depending on incidental causes. Mind and mental factors are collectively named "consciousness" (buddhi) because they are capable of perceiving. Thus he concludes himself by saying: Therefore the perishing of firewood and so forth also does not depend on incidental causes. The inference is: When firewood and so forth perish, they do not depend on incidental causes, because they have moments, just like consciousness, flames, and so forth.