俱舍論記 15.160

15.160

「或有欲令至合成五種」者，釋第三句解五業義。或有欲令不定受業復有二種：一異熟定時不定。於現、生、後三時之中，不定有四：或於二時不定，二合有三。或於三時不定，三合為一。二異熟及時俱不定，此亦有四：或於二時異熟及時俱不定，二合有三。或於三時異熟及時俱不定，三合為一。夫時難定，若於時定，異熟必定，故無時定異熟不定。并定業三，合成五種。問：四業、五業為同為異？解云有同有異。若三定業，及不定中異熟不定時不定，兩說皆同。若不定中，異熟定時不定，五業說有，四業即無。此即異也。故五業家於不定中開為二種。問：何故四業家於不定中無異熟定時不定耶？解云：四業約時辨定不定，時與異熟無別體性。若於熟定亦於時定，即是定攝，故於不定無有異熟定時不定者。又四業家解不定云：非定受故立不定名。以此故知，不定中所感異熟，或受、不受。五業家言：於不定中有異熟定時不定。故知兩說不同。又下文評取四業所說為善，明知與五差別不同。問：若四業家無異熟定時不定者，何故正理論師破例八業家云「謂如熟定時不定業，時不定故。既共許為順不定受（云云）。彼論既言共許不定，明知亦有異熟定時不定者。」解云：彼言共許，五業家共許，或八業家共許。又解：云四業、五業，義皆相似，開合為異。五業家於不定中開兩種，一異熟定時不定、二異熟不定時不定。雖約異熟開為兩種，若時義邊俱是不定。故於不定雖開二種，其義不殊。若作斯解，四業家於不定中亦有兩種。凡言造業於時難定，若於時定異熟必定，以時離異熟無別體故、以時依彼異熟果故。自有業於異熟定時不定，以異熟果自有體故、以異熟果不依時故。由斯理故，於時不定中可說兩種。又下文解現業中云「於異熟定位不定者，此業必能招現法果。」又《正理論》正義家破八業家云「謂如熟定時不定業，時不定故既共許為順不定受（云云）。」彼論既言共許，明知正義家同共許也。又《正理論》但破八業家時定熟不定，不破八業家及五業家熟定時不定，以此故知四業、五業開合為異。四業家云非定受故立不定名者，或非定受異熟，故立不定名，此約異熟或受不受名不定。或於三時中非定於此時受異熟，故立不定名，此約受異熟時三時不定名不定。故不相違。下文評取四業不言五業者，以義同故，但言四業即是五業，故不別說。雖有兩解，後解為勝。時依異熟，可言時定異熟亦定。異熟不依時立，不可說言於異熟定時亦定。又准諸論，於不定中皆有兩種，更無異說。

Regarding 'Or some wish to hold, up to combining to make five kinds': this explains the third line, explaining the meaning of five karmas. Some wish to hold that karma to be experienced indeterminately has further two kinds: 1. Maturation is determinate, but time is indeterminate. Among the three times of present, next birth, and subsequent, indeterminacy has four [variations]: either indeterminate across two times, with three combinations of pairs; or indeterminate across three times, with one combination of the three. 2. Both maturation and time are indeterminate. This also has four [variations]: either both maturation and time are indeterminate across two times, with three combinations of pairs; or both maturation and time are indeterminate across three times, with one combination of the three. Now, time is difficult to determine; if it is determinate in time, its maturation is necessarily determinate, so there is no case where time is determinate while maturation is indeterminate. Together with the three determinate karmas, these combine to make five kinds. Question: Are the four karmas and five karmas identical or different? The explanation says that there are points of identity and difference. For the three determinate karmas, and the one where both maturation and time are indeterminate among the indeterminate ones, both explanations are the same. But among the indeterminate ones, where maturation is determinate and time is indeterminate, the five karmas assert its existence, whereas the four karmas do not. This is the difference. Therefore, the proponents of the five karmas open up two kinds within the indeterminate. Question: Why do the proponents of the four karmas have no 'maturation determinate, time indeterminate' within the indeterminate? The explanation says: The four karmas distinguish determinacy and indeterminacy in terms of time; time and maturation have no separate intrinsic nature. If it is determinate with respect to maturation, it is also determinate with respect to time, which means it is subsumed under the determinate; therefore, among the indeterminate, there is none where maturation is determinate while time is indeterminate. Furthermore, the proponents of the four karmas explain 'indeterminate' by saying: 'Because it is not determinately experienced, the name indeterminate is established.' From this we know that the maturation incurred within the indeterminate may either be experienced or not experienced. The proponents of the five karmas say: within the indeterminate, there is karma whose maturation is determinate and time is indeterminate. Hence we know the two explanations are different. Furthermore, later in the text the assessment selects the assertion of the four karmas as correct, clearly showing that it differs from the five. Question: If the proponents of the four karmas do not have 'maturation determinate, time indeterminate', why does the master of the *Nyāyānusāra* refute the proponent of the eight karmas by drawing an analogy: 'As with karma whose maturation is determinate but time is indeterminate, because its time is indeterminate, it is already mutually accepted as conforming to indeterminate experience, and so forth'? Since that treatise says it is 'mutually accepted as indeterminate', clearly there is also 'maturation determinate, time indeterminate'. The explanation says: When that [treatise] says 'mutually accepted', it means mutually accepted by the proponents of the five karmas, or mutually accepted by the proponents of the eight karmas. Another explanation says: The meanings of the four karmas and the five karmas are similar, differing only in being expanded or combined. The proponents of the five karmas expand the indeterminate into two kinds: 1. maturation determinate, time indeterminate; 2. maturation indeterminate, time indeterminate. Although expanded into two kinds in terms of maturation, with respect to the meaning of time, both are indeterminate. Therefore, although expanded into two kinds within the indeterminate, their meaning is not different. If one adopts this explanation, the proponents of the four karmas also have two kinds within the indeterminate. Whenever the creation of karma is discussed, time is difficult to determine; if it is determinate in time, maturation is necessarily determinate, because time has no separate nature apart from maturation, and because time relies on that maturation fruit. There is naturally karma whose maturation is determinate but time is indeterminate, because the maturation fruit has its own nature and because the maturation fruit does not rely on time. By this principle, within indeterminacy of time, two kinds can be stated. Furthermore, later in the text, in explaining present karma, it says: 'For that which is determinate in maturation but indeterminate in position, this karma will definitely incur a result in the present life.' Furthermore, the orthodox party in the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes the proponents of the eight karmas, saying: 'As with karma whose maturation is determinate but time is indeterminate, because its time is indeterminate, it is already mutually accepted as conforming to indeterminate experience, and so forth.' Since that treatise says it is 'mutually accepted', clearly the orthodox party also mutually accepts it. Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* only refutes the eight-karma proponents' 'time determinate, maturation indeterminate', and does not refute the eight-karma and five-karma proponents' 'maturation determinate, time indeterminate'. From this we know that the four karmas and five karmas differ only in being expanded or combined. When the proponents of the four karmas say, 'Because it is not determinately experienced, the name indeterminate is established,' it means either: because the maturation is not determinately experienced, the name indeterminate is established—this designates indeterminacy in terms of whether the maturation is experienced or not; or: among the three times, it is not determinately experienced at this specific time, hence establishing the name indeterminate—this designates indeterminacy in terms of the time of experiencing maturation being indeterminate across the three times. Thus they do not conflict. When the text below assesses and accepts the four karmas without mentioning the five karmas, it is because their meaning is the same; simply stating the four karmas is the five karmas, so it is not separately stated. Although there are two explanations, the latter explanation is superior. Time relies on maturation, so one can say that if time is determinate, maturation is also determinate; maturation does not rely on time to be established, so one cannot say that if maturation is determinate, time is also determinate. Furthermore, according to all the treatises, there are two kinds within the indeterminate, and there is no other divergent view.