俱舍論記 15.27

15.27

「若爾有情至於理為善」者，論主復難。若隨有情別發得戒，未得涅槃死此生彼，可言有情前、後性等戒無增、減。有諸有情般涅槃已，如前性類今時既無，有情少故別發緣闕，於彼律儀如何無減？故此後釋別發律儀於理不然。前所說因普於有情發善意樂，總發律儀，於理為善。雖非正問總發、別發，初家義當總發，第二家義當別發。

"If so, sentient beings […] it is tenable in principle" is the author's further objection. If the precept were obtained by being generated individually according to sentient beings, then as long as they have not attained nirvāṇa and die here to be born there, one could say that the former and subsequent natures of sentient beings are equal and the precept does not increase or decrease. But when sentient beings have entered parinirvāṇa, since their previous category of nature no longer exists at present, sentient beings are fewer and the conditions for individual generation are lacking; how could there be no decrease in that restraint? Therefore, this subsequent explanation of restraint being generated individually is not tenable in principle. The cause stated earlier—generating a wholesome intention toward sentient beings universally and thereby generating the restraint collectively—is tenable in principle. Although the direct question was not about collective or individual generation, the first school's meaning corresponds to collective generation, and the second school's meaning corresponds to individual generation.