俱舍論記 15.29

15.29

「以一切佛至無減前過」者，總發家答。以三世佛別解律儀，從一切有情境處總發得戒。設彼有情今猶在者，後佛從彼亦得總發別解律儀，故後尸羅無減前過。境雖有減，戒體無虧。故《婆沙》一百二十，正義家答此問云「應作是說：律儀境界雖有多少，而律儀體前、後無異，謂從一切有情境處總發得故。」廣如彼說。問：總發、別發兩說不同，為約七支？為約二十一種？解云：先引《婆沙》，後方辨釋。如《婆沙》一百二十云「若以相續剎那分別，有無量律儀。今總說七種，謂離斷生命，乃至離雜語。此中有說：彼七支，一一於一切有情處得，而所得是一。彼說：於一有情所犯一支戒時，於一切有情處，此一支戒斷、餘六猶轉。此則善通世尊所說：若犯學處，非苾芻、非沙門、非釋種子。有說：此七支戒，一一於一切有情處得，而所得各異。如有情數量，所得戒亦爾。彼說：於一有情所，犯一支戒時，即此一有情處一支戒斷、餘六猶轉，餘有情處七支皆轉。問：若爾，云何通世尊所說若犯學處非苾芻等。答：依勝義苾芻言非苾芻，以不能趣彼故。有餘師說：別解脫律儀隨因差別成二十一。此中有說：二十一種，一一於一切有情處得，而所得不異。彼說：由貪煩惱故，總於一有情所犯一支戒時，於一切有情處，無貪所生一支戒斷，餘二十種如先猶轉。此則善通世尊所說：若犯學處，非苾芻等。有說：此二十一種，一一於一切有情處得，而所得各異。如有情數量，所得戒亦爾。彼說：由貪煩惱，於一有情所犯一支戒時，即此一有情處，無貪所生一支戒斷、餘二十種如先猶轉，餘有情處二十一種具足皆轉。問：若爾，云何通世尊所說若犯學處非苾芻等。答：依勝義苾芻言非苾芻，如前說。迦濕彌羅國諸論師言：雖犯律儀而律儀不斷，如法悔除還名持戒，無有頓受別捨得故。未悔除位具得二名，若已悔除但名持戒（已上論文）。」解云：婆沙總有五說。第一師於諸有情無貪等三總發七支，隨犯別捨。第二師於諸有情各發七支，別犯別捨。第三師於諸有情總發二十一支，隨犯別捨。第四師於諸有情各發二十一支，別犯別捨。第五師雖言頓受，不言別發。或同初師、或同第三師說，必無別捨。詳茲五說，若論捨戒相，前四師並非正義，皆說犯戒別捨戒故。第五師正義宗，明犯戒不別捨故。若論得戒，第二、第四師是不正義，說別發故。第一師說於諸有情總發七支，此即三善根共發七支。第三師於諸有情總發二十一支，此即由三善根因差別故各發七支，故二十一支。問：於二說中何者為正？解云：初師為正，於《婆沙》中最初說故。復言有說，第三師即言有餘師說。又心、心所共發七支，理亦為勝。有何道理同一聚法說三善根各異發七支？諸論說者，敘餘師義。又解：第三師為正。何必初言有說即是正義？《婆沙》又有初言有說而非正義，亦有有餘師說而是正義。但說義正，何論初、後？有說：餘師。又諸論中皆說三善根各發七支故。《正理》三十九云「謂諸有情隨無貪等為因差別生別類支，二類支各一無表，總於一切有情處得。又諸論解四說中，皆說三善根別發色業。共發七支即無文證。以此故知二十一者為正。又解：兩說雖數不同，於諸有情俱言總發，評家正義並不相違。又諸論中無別立、破，隨其所樂皆可為正。或諸論言七支者敘初師義，或諸論云二十一支者敘第三師義。應知此論捨戒同第五師，若論得戒或同初師、或同第三師，於前三解皆無有妨。

"Because all Buddhas […] there is no fault of decreasing from preceding [Buddhas]" is the answer of the master who maintains general activation. Because the prātimokṣa vows of the Buddhas of the three times are activated and obtained comprehensively in reference to all sentient beings as their objective domain. Supposing those sentient beings were still present now, the subsequent Buddhas would also generally activate and obtain the prātimokṣa vows from them; therefore, the subsequent śīla has no fault of decreasing from preceding [Buddhas]. Although the objective domain has decreased, the essence of the vows is not deficient. Therefore, in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 120, the master of the orthodox view answers this question, saying: "It should be stated thus: Although the objective domain of the vow may be more or less, the essence of the vow is not different between earlier and later, because it is generally activated and obtained from all sentient beings as its objective domain." This is fully explained as in that text. Question: The two explanations—general activation and distinct activation—are different; is this in terms of the seven limbs, or in terms of the twenty-one varieties? The explanation says: First we cite the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and afterwards analyze and explain it. As the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 120, says: "If distinguished by continuity and moments, there are immeasurable vows. Now we speak generally of seven kinds: that is, abstaining from taking life, up to abstaining from frivolous speech. Here, some say: Each of those seven limbs is obtained with respect to all sentient beings, and what is obtained is one [single whole]. They say: When one violates one limb of the vows in reference to one sentient being, this one limb of the vows is severed with respect to all sentient beings, while the remaining six still continue. This then properly accords with what the World-Honoured One said: 'If one violates a training rule, one is not a bhikṣu, not a śramaṇa, not a Śākyan son.' Some say: Each of these seven limbs of vows is obtained with respect to all sentient beings, and what is obtained is distinct for each. As is the number of sentient beings, so too are the vows obtained. They say: When one violates one limb of the vows in reference to one sentient being, then only with respect to this one sentient being is this one limb of the vows severed, while the remaining six still continue, and with respect to all other sentient beings, all seven limbs continue. Question: If so, how does this accord with what the World-Honoured One said: 'If one violates a training rule, one is not a bhikṣu', and so forth? Answer: Saying 'he is not a bhikṣu' is based on the ultimate bhikṣu, because he cannot proceed toward that [state]. Other masters say: The prātimokṣa vows become twenty-one according to the differences in causes. Here, some say: Each of the twenty-one kinds is obtained with respect to all sentient beings, and what is obtained is not differentiated. They say: Due to the defilement of greed, when one violates one limb of the vows generally in reference to one sentient being, the one limb of the vows born of non-greed is severed with respect to all sentient beings, while the remaining twenty kinds still continue as before. This then properly accords with what the World-Honoured One said: 'If one violates a training rule, one is not a bhikṣu', and so forth. Some say: Each of these twenty-one kinds is obtained with respect to all sentient beings, and what is obtained is distinct for each. As is the number of sentient beings, so too are the vows obtained. They say: Due to the defilement of greed, when one violates one limb of the vows in reference to one sentient being, then only with respect to this one sentient being is the one limb of the vows born of non-greed severed, while the remaining twenty kinds still continue as before, and with respect to all other sentient beings, all twenty-one kinds continue completely. Question: If so, how does this accord with what the World-Honoured One said: 'If one violates a training rule, one is not a bhikṣu', and so forth? Answer: Saying 'he is not a bhikṣu' is based on the ultimate bhikṣu, as said before. The masters of the Kaśmīra country say: Although one violates the vow, the vow is not severed; if one repents and eliminates [the offense] according to the Dharma, one is again called 'one who upholds the vows', because there is no sudden reception followed by distinct relinquishment. In the state where one has not yet repented and eliminated [it], one possesses both designations; if one has already repented and eliminated [it], one is called only 'one who upholds the vows' (the above is the śāstra text)." The explanation says: The *Mahāvibhāṣā* has five explanations in total. The first master holds that from the three [wholesome roots] such as non-greed, the seven limbs are generally activated toward sentient beings, and are distinctly relinquished following a violation. The second master holds that the seven limbs are activated toward sentient beings individually, and are distinctly violated and distinctly relinquished. The third master holds that twenty-one limbs are generally activated toward sentient beings, and are distinctly relinquished following a violation. The fourth master holds that twenty-one limbs are activated toward sentient beings individually, and are distinctly violated and distinctly relinquished. Although the fifth master speaks of sudden reception, he does not speak of distinct activation. His view either agrees with the first master's or with the third master's, and definitely maintains that there is no distinct relinquishment. Examining these five explanations: if one discusses the marks of relinquishing the vows, the first four masters are all not the orthodox view, because they all say that violating the vows distinctly relinquishes the vows. The fifth master represents the orthodox school, because he clarifies that violating the vows does not distinctly relinquish them. If one discusses obtaining the vows, the second and fourth masters are not the orthodox view, because they speak of distinct activation. The first master says that the seven limbs are generally activated toward sentient beings; this is the three wholesome roots jointly activating the seven limbs. The third master says that twenty-one limbs are generally activated toward sentient beings; this means that due to the differences in the causes of the three wholesome roots, each activates seven limbs, thus making twenty-one limbs. Question: Between these two explanations, which is the orthodox one? The explanation says: The first master is orthodox, because it is spoken first in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Moreover, it says "some say", whereas for the third master it says "other masters say". Furthermore, the mind and mental factors jointly activating the seven limbs is also logically superior. What reason could there be for the three wholesome roots in the same single collection of dharmas to activate seven limbs differently from one another? What is spoken in the treatises is recounting the views of other masters. Another explanation says: The third master is orthodox. Why must the initial statement "some say" necessarily be the orthodox view? In the *Mahāvibhāṣā* there are also cases where the initial "some say" is not the orthodox view, and there are also cases where "other masters say" is the orthodox view. As long as the doctrine is orthodox, what does it matter whether it is earlier or later? There are those who say: other masters. Furthermore, across the treatises it is uniformly stated that the three wholesome roots each activate seven limbs. *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle 39, says: "Sentient beings, according to the distinction of causes such as non-greed, produce limbs of different kinds; for the two kinds of limbs there is one avijñapti each, generally obtained with respect to all sentient beings." Furthermore, in the treatises' explanations of the four views, they all say that the three wholesome roots distinctly activate physical karma. There is no textual evidence for jointly activating seven limbs. By this we know that the twenty-one is the orthodox view. Yet another explanation says: Although the two explanations differ in number, they both speak of general activation toward sentient beings, and neither contradicts the orthodox view of the redactors. Furthermore, there is no distinct establishment or refutation in the treatises; either may be considered orthodox according to one's preference. Alternatively, when treatises speak of seven limbs, they recount the first master's view; when treatises speak of twenty-one limbs, they recount the third master's view. One should know that this treatise agrees with the fifth master on relinquishing vows; regarding obtaining vows, it may agree with either the first master or the third master; neither hinders the preceding three explanations.