俱舍論記 15.9

15.9

「從現得者至有情處故」者，釋從現得此別解脫。於三世中，謂從現世蘊、處、界發得，非從去、來。所以者何？由此律儀於現有情轉，及於現有情所依止處轉。於現有情轉者，謂從有情邊發戒，如邪欲等從守護有情得罪，若離邪欲等從守護有情發戒，隨其所應。於現有情所依止處轉者，有情所依處謂內身，有情所依止處謂外器。於現有情所依處者，於現有情內所依身發得此戒，如行殺等從所依處得罪，若離殺等從所依處發戒，隨其所應。於現有情所止處者，於現有情外所止器發得此戒，如掘地等從所止處得罪，若不掘地等從所止處發戒，隨其所應。去、來非是有情，亦非是有情所依止處，故不能發別解脫戒。故《正理》云「有情處者，謂諸有情及諸有情所依止處。現蘊、處、界，內者即是有情所依，外者名為有情所止，非過、未故。」問：若從現在有情處得，如盜現在窣堵波物。《婆沙》一百一十三評家云「如是說者，於佛處得。」准彼正義，於過去佛邊結罪，如何乃言於現有情處得？解云：評家理應望現守護者邊結罪，而言於佛結彼罪者，以施佛故、顯物重故，推在如來。又解：評家意說罪、福二門非皆齊等。若論發戒，現有情處得。若論結罪，無妨亦有於過去佛處得。

"Arising from the present […] because of the locus of sentient beings": this explains arising from the present regarding this pratimokṣa [discipline]. Among the three times, it means that it is generated and obtained from present skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus, not from the past or future. Why is that? Because this discipline operates on present sentient beings and operates on the bases on which present sentient beings rely and reside. Operating on present sentient beings means that the discipline is generated from the side of sentient beings; just as, from sexual misconduct and the like, guilt is incurred from guarded sentient beings, so if one abandons sexual misconduct and the like, the discipline is generated from guarded sentient beings, according to what is appropriate. Operating on the bases on which present sentient beings rely and reside: the basis upon which sentient beings rely refers to the internal body; the place in which sentient beings reside refers to the external container [world]. Regarding the basis upon which present sentient beings rely: this discipline is generated and obtained from the internal supporting body of present sentient beings; just as, by committing killing and the like, guilt is incurred from the supporting basis, so if one abandons killing and the like, the discipline is generated from the supporting basis, according to what is appropriate. Regarding the place in which present sentient beings reside: this discipline is generated and obtained from the external container where present sentient beings reside; just as, by digging the earth and the like, guilt is incurred from the place resided in, so if one does not dig the earth and the like, the discipline is generated from the place resided in, according to what is appropriate. The past and the future are not sentient beings, nor are they the bases on which sentient beings rely and reside; therefore they cannot give rise to the pratimokṣa discipline. Hence the Nyāyānusāra states: "The locus of sentient beings refers to sentient beings and the bases on which sentient beings rely and reside. Present skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus: internal ones are the bases on which sentient beings rely, external ones are called the places where sentient beings reside; because they are not past or future." Question: If it is obtained from the locus of present sentient beings, such as stealing the property of a present stūpa, the arbiter in the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred and thirteen, states: "Such an authority says: it is incurred from the locus of the Buddha." According to that authoritative tenet, guilt is established in relation to the past Buddha; how then can one say it is obtained from the locus of present sentient beings? Explanation: In principle, the arbiter should establish guilt from the side of the present guardian; but saying that guilt is established in relation to the Buddha is because it was donated to the Buddha and to show the gravity of the property, imputing it to the Tathāgata. Another explanation: The arbiter's intention is to say that the two gateways of guilt and merit are not entirely equal. If one speaks of generating discipline, it is obtained from the locus of present sentient beings. If one speaks of establishing guilt, there is no obstacle to its also being incurred from the locus of the past Buddha.