俱舍論記 19.33
俱舍論記 19.33
- Language
- Classical Chinese
19.33
「謂自體上至不可得故」者,經部答。謂於色、心自體之上,煩惱種子異餘種故,名差別功能。即此功能,從前現行煩惱生,能生後現行煩惱。言證智者,次五識後意識相應智。又解:亦取定心相應智。又解:亦取五識相應智,俱現量證故。如念種子是前證智俱起念生,能生當念果功能差別,名為種子。此文應言如念種子是念生,而言是證智生者,前位智強故標智名,後位念勝故稱念號。又解:前心聚中智強故總名證智,後心聚中念強故總名為念。若作此解從強立名,以實而言各熏成種。又解:心、心所法能記前境通名為念,能證前境通名為智。故言如念種子是證智生,能生當念,功能差別。又如芽等中有前麥果等生,能生後莖等果,功能差別,說名種子。汝大眾部等,若執現行煩惱之外別有隨眠,是心不相應名煩惱種子者,應許念種非但功能生現行念,亦應別有不相應體名念種子,能引生後念。此念既不爾,彼煩惱云何然?念與煩惱流類相似,差別因緣不可得故。立量云:念種應是不相應,以從他生,能生他故,猶如隨眠。又立量云:隨眠應無有體,以從他生,能生他故,猶如念種。以大眾部等煩惱力強,無始久習熏成種子,別有體性心不相應。若念種子,勢力微弱,非無始習,雖熏成種,但有功能,無別體性。若經部師,煩惱種子及念種子,俱有功能,竝無別體。由此不同故,難大眾部等。
On “It refers to, upon the entity [...] cannot be found”: The Sautrāntikas answer. It refers to a distinctive capacity upon the entity of matter and mind, because defilement seeds are distinct from other seeds; it is called a “distinctive capacity” (sāmarthya-viśeṣa). This very capacity is generated from a preceding active defilement and can generate a subsequent active defilement. The phrase “direct knowledge” (saṃvedana-jñāna) refers to the knowledge associated with mental consciousness following immediately upon the five [sense] consciousnesses. Another explanation: It also includes knowledge associated with a mind in meditative concentration. Yet another explanation: It also includes knowledge associated with the five [sense] consciousnesses, since all are direct perceptual verification (pratyakṣa). For example, the seed of mindfulness is generated by the mindfulness that co-arises with the preceding direct knowledge, and its distinctive capacity to produce the future fruit of mindfulness is called a seed. This text should have said: “Just as the seed of mindfulness is generated by mindfulness”; yet it says that it is generated by direct knowledge because in the earlier state knowledge is predominant, so the name “knowledge” is marked, whereas in the later state mindfulness is superior, so the title “mindfulness” is designated. Another explanation: In the preceding mental assemblage, knowledge is predominant, so it is collectively termed direct knowledge; in the subsequent mental assemblage, mindfulness is predominant, so it is collectively termed mindfulness. If interpreted this way, the name is established based on the predominant factor, but in reality, each perfumes and forms a seed. Yet another explanation: Mind and mental factors that can remember a prior object are generally termed mindfulness, while those that can directly verify a prior object are generally termed knowledge. Hence it is said: “Just as the seed of mindfulness is generated by direct knowledge, a distinctive capacity capable of generating future mindfulness.” Furthermore, just as in a sprout and the like, generated from a preceding barley fruit or the like, there is a distinctive capacity capable of generating subsequent fruits such as stalks and the like, which is called a seed. If you Mahāsāṃghikas and others hold that apart from active defilements there are distinct anuśayas, which are mind-dissociated [factors] called defilement seeds, then you ought to admit that the seed of mindfulness is not merely a capacity to generate active mindfulness, but that there should also be a distinct dissociated entity called the seed of mindfulness capable of inducing subsequent mindfulness. If this is not so for mindfulness, why should it be so for defilement? Mindfulness and defilement belong to the same category, because a differentiated causal condition cannot be found. A formal inference (prayogavākya) is established: “The seed of mindfulness should be a dissociated [factor], because it is produced from another and can produce another, like an anuśaya.” Another inference is established: “An anuśaya should have no substantial entity, because it is produced from another and can produce another, like the seed of mindfulness.” Because according to the Mahāsāṃghikas and others, the power of defilements is strong, through long practice from beginningless time perfuming into seeds, they possess a distinct substantial entity that is mind-dissociated. As for the seed of mindfulness, its power is weak and not from beginningless practice; although perfumed into a seed, it is only a capacity and has no distinct substantial entity. For the Sautrāntikas, both defilement seeds and mindfulness seeds possess capacity and both lack a distinct substantial entity. Due to this difference, they challenge the Mahāsāṃghikas and others.
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- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation