俱舍論記 19.77

19.77

「復有何相至迷苦諦故」者，此即第二無別相難。汝宗戒禁通苦道斷，復有何相別戒禁取可說彼為見道所斷？諸緣見道所斷法生，彼亦應名迷苦諦，故應見苦斷。《正理》救云「然於非道計為道中，若違見強道，則見道所斷（解云：彼論意說，非道計道諸戒禁取，有兩類故。若果處起者見苦斷；若非果處起緣親迷道為所緣者，違見道強則見道斷）。」俱舍師破云：兩種戒禁俱緣有漏、俱非道計道，何故一於果處起、一非果處起？義既是齊，應俱果起。若俱果起，相還無別，違道徒言。

[On the passage], "Furthermore, what distinctive mark is there ... because they are confused about the truth of suffering": This is the second objection, that of lacking distinctive marks. Since according to your school, rules and vows are abandoned across both suffering and the path, what distinctive mark differentiates the clinging to rules and vows such that it can be said to be abandoned upon seeing the path? All [views] that arise taking phenomena abandoned upon seeing the path as their object should also be called 'confused about the truth of suffering', and therefore should be abandoned upon seeing suffering. The Nyāyānusāra defends: "However, among [cases of] calculating what is not the path to be the path, if it strongly contradicts the view of the path, it is abandoned upon seeing the path. (Explanation: The intention of that treatise is that the clingings to rules and vows that calculate what is not the path to be the path are of two kinds: if they arise with respect to effects, they are abandoned upon seeing suffering; if they do not arise with respect to effects but take the direct confusion about the path as their objective referent, strongly contradicting the seeing of the path, they are abandoned upon seeing the path)." The Kośa master refutes this, saying: Both kinds of rules and vows equally take sāsrava as their object and equally calculate what is not the path to be the path; why does one arise with respect to effects while the other does not arise with respect to effects? Since their meaning is equal, both should arise with respect to effects. If both arise with respect to effects, their marks are still not distinct, and [speaking of] contradicting the path is empty talk.