俱舍論疏 19.109

19.109

論「復有何相至迷苦諦故」，此即第二無別相難。汝宗戒禁通苦、道斷，復有何相別戒禁取，可說彼為見道所斷？諸緣見道所斷法生，彼亦應名迷苦諦故，應見苦斷。《正理》救云「此難不然。以於苦諦見為無常等非彼對治故，非見苦諦無常等時能治非道計為道執，故彼道執非見苦斷。由此亦遮見集所斷，由見因等非彼治故。謂非於集見因等時，能治非道計為道執。要於道諦見道等時，方能治彼非道道執，故彼迷執應見道斷。」又云「然於非道計為道中，若違見道強，即見道所斷。」又云「非道計道有二類故，一緣戒禁等、二緣親迷道。緣戒禁等，違悟道信，力不如緣親迷道者。緣戒禁等者，行相極麁故、不遠隨遂故、意樂不堅故，少設劬勞即便斷滅。緣親迷道與此相違。由此應知，非道計道諸戒禁取有二類別，一見苦斷、二見道斷。」光師敘俱舍釋云：「兩種戒禁俱緣有漏，俱非道計道，何故一於果處起、一非果處起？義既是齊，應俱果起。若俱果起，相還無別。違道徒言。」今詳此釋重述前難，不成斥救。《正理》救意：同緣有漏非道計道，緣戒禁等違信道力劣，行相極麁、不遠隨遂、意樂不堅，見苦諦時即便先斷。緣親迷道者，與此相違，由此見道諦時方能斷。或此釋同緣苦諦非道計道是同，一見苦斷、一見道斷。所以今還將同緣苦諦，但非道計道為難，何成破斥？

[As for] the Śāstra's [statement]: "Furthermore, what distinctive characteristic [...] because of delusion regarding the truth of suffering": this is the second objection, of no distinctive characteristic. In your school, rules and vows are abandoned across [both] suffering and the path; what further distinctive characteristic differentiates attachment to rules and vows so that it can be said to be abandoned by seeing the path? All those that arise taking dharmas abandoned by seeing the path as their cognitive object should also be called deluded regarding the truth of suffering, and hence should be abandoned by seeing suffering. The Nyāyānusāra rescues [this, saying]: "This objection is incorrect. Because seeing the truth of suffering as impermanent and so forth is not their antidote; it is not the case that when seeing the truth of suffering as impermanent and so forth one is able to counter the clinging that conceives what is not the path to be the path; therefore, that clinging to the path is not abandoned by seeing suffering. By this, [being] abandoned by seeing the arising is also precluded, because seeing cause and so forth is not their antidote. That is to say, it is not the case that when seeing cause and so forth with respect to the arising, one is able to counter the clinging that conceives what is not the path to be the path. Only when seeing the path and so forth with respect to the truth of the path can one counter that clinging to a non-path as the path; therefore, that deluded clinging must be abandoned by seeing the path." It also says: "However, among conceiving what is not the path to be the path, if it strongly contradicts the seeing of the path, it is abandoned by seeing the path." It also says: "Because there are two classes of conceiving what is not the path to be the path: first, taking rules and vows and the like as cognitive objects; second, taking that which directly deludes regarding the path as cognitive object. In taking rules and vows and the like as cognitive objects, the power of contradicting faith in awakening to the path is not equal to that of taking what directly deludes regarding the path as cognitive object. For those taking rules and vows and the like as cognitive objects, because their mental aspect is extremely gross, because they do not accompany [the continuum] for long, and because their intentional inclination is not firm, with little exertion they are immediately eradicated. Taking what directly deludes regarding the path as cognitive object is the opposite of this. From this one should know: attachments to rules and vows that conceive what is not the path to be the path have two different classes: first, abandoned by seeing suffering; second, abandoned by seeing the path." Master Puguang, narrating an explanation of the Kośa, says: "Both kinds of rules and vows take the contaminated as cognitive object, and both conceive what is not the path to be the path; why does one arise at the locus of the effect while the other does not arise at the locus of the effect? Since the meaning is equal, both should arise at the effect. If both arise at the effect, their characteristics are still without distinction. 'Contradicting the path' is mere empty words." Now, examining this: this explanation restates the earlier objection and fails to refute the rescue. The intention of the Nyāyānusāra's rescue is: while equally taking the contaminated as cognitive object and conceiving what is not the path to be the path, [in the case of] taking rules and vows and the like as cognitive object, the power contradicting faith in the path is inferior, the mental aspect is extremely gross, it does not accompany [the continuum] for long, and the intentional inclination is not firm, so when seeing the truth of suffering it is immediately abandoned first. Taking what directly deludes regarding the path as cognitive object is the opposite of this; hence only when seeing the truth of the path can it be abandoned. Or [we may say] this explanation [shows that] both taking the truth of suffering as cognitive object and conceiving what is not the path to be the path are identical, yet one is abandoned by seeing suffering and one is abandoned by seeing the path. Therefore, now returning to [the premise of] equally taking the truth of suffering as cognitive object and merely conceiving what is not the path to be the path as an objection—how does that constitute a refutation?