俱舍論記 19.85

19.85

「論曰至以為我倒」者，釋初兩句。總有兩說，此是初師。於五見中，從於三見立四倒體。謂邊見中，唯取常見以為常倒，不取斷見。諸見取中，唯取苦下計樂、淨者為樂、淨倒，非餘見取。有漏法中，非真樂、淨妄計樂、淨，故得說為非勝計勝。有身見中，唯取我見以為我倒，非我所見。應知四倒唯於有漏麁果處起，見苦所斷。見取雖亦通餘三諦，非增勝故不立為倒。故《婆沙》一百四云「有作是說：四顛倒於五見中，三見各一分以為自性。謂有身見中，我見是我顛倒自性，非我所見。邊執見中，常見是常顛倒自性，非斷見。見取中，見苦所斷執樂淨見是樂淨顛倒自性，非餘見取。」又《正理》四十七，一說亦同此論初師。此論、《婆沙》、《正理》皆約五見出體，故言三見各一分。有說：我倒攝身見全者，此是第二說。常、樂、淨倒同前說，我倒異說，故別敘也。故《婆沙》一百四云「問：五見中幾見為自性？答：此以見苦所斷二見半為自性。謂有身見見取全，及邊執見中常見。二見半非顛倒自性，謂邪見、戒禁取全，及邊執見中斷見。」又《正理》四十七云「然《毘婆沙》決定義者，約部分別十二見中，唯二見半是顛倒體，謂有身見、苦見取全，邊執見中取計常分。斷、常二見行相乖違，故可說言二體各別。此論、《婆沙》、《正理》皆約五部十二見出體，故言身見、見取全，邊見一分。此論兩說雖無評文，《婆沙》、《正理》意以此論後師為正，《婆沙》不言有說、《正理》復言決定義故。

"In the treatise it says […] is taken to be the inversion of self": this explains the first two lines [of the verse]. Overall there are two explanations, and this is the first teacher's. Among the five views, the intrinsic nature of the four inversions is established from three of the views: within the extreme view (antagrāha-dṛṣṭi), one takes only eternalism as the inversion of permanence, not annihilationism. Within the clingings to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), one takes only those under [the truth of] suffering that impute pleasure and purity as the inversions of pleasure and purity, not the remaining clingings to views. In sāsrava phenomena, what is not truly pleasure or purity is falsely imputed to be pleasure or purity; therefore they are said to be 'imputing the unexcelled to be unexcelled.' Within the view of individuality (satkāyadṛṣṭi), one takes only the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) as the inversion of self, not the view of what belongs to self (ātmīyadṛṣṭi). One should know that the four inversions arise only with respect to coarse sāsrava results, and are abandoned by the vision of suffering. Although clinging to views also extends across the remaining three truths, because it is not preeminent it is not established as an inversion. Therefore the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 104, says: "Some say: The four inversions have as their intrinsic natures one part each of three views among the five views. Namely, within the view of individuality, the view of self is the intrinsic nature of the inversion of self, not the view of what belongs to self. Within the extreme-grasping view, the view of permanence is the intrinsic nature of the inversion of permanence, not the view of annihilation. Within clinging to views, the views abandoned by the vision of suffering that grasp at pleasure and purity are the intrinsic natures of the inversions of pleasure and purity, not the remaining clingings to views." Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 47, records an explanation that is also identical to that of the first teacher of this treatise. This treatise, the Mahāvibhāṣā, and the Nyāyānusāra all extract the intrinsic natures with reference to the five views, and so they say 'one part each of the three views.' "Some say: the inversion of self subsumes the view of individuality in its entirety": this is the second explanation. The inversions of permanence, pleasure, and purity are the same as in the preceding explanation, while the inversion of self is an alternative explanation, and so it is stated separately. Therefore the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 104, says: "Question: How many views among the five views constitute the intrinsic nature [of the inversions]? Answer: These take as their intrinsic nature two and a half views abandoned by the vision of suffering. Namely, the whole of the view of individuality and clinging to views, and the view of permanence within the extreme-grasping view. Two and a half views are not the intrinsic nature of the inversions: namely, false views (mithyādṛṣṭi) and clinging to precepts and vows (śīlavrataparāmarśa) in their entirety, and the view of annihilation within the extreme-grasping view." Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 47, says: "However, as for the definitive position of the Vibhāṣā, analyzing them according to category among the twelve views, only two and a half views are the essence of the inversions: namely, the whole of the view of individuality and the view of clinging [to views under] suffering, and the part grasping at permanence within the extreme-grasping view. Because the aspects (ākāra) of the two views of annihilation and permanence run contrary to each other, one can say that their two essences are distinct." This treatise, the Mahāvibhāṣā, and the Nyāyānusāra all extract the intrinsic natures with reference to the twelve views of the five categories; hence they state that the view of individuality and clinging to views are taken entirely, and one part of the extreme view. Although there is no evaluative judgment between the two explanations in this treatise, the intent of the Mahāvibhāṣā and the Nyāyānusāra is to take the latter teacher of this treatise as correct, because the Mahāvibhāṣā does not say 'some say,' and the Nyāyānusāra furthermore says it is the 'definitive position.'"