俱舍論記 2.103

2.103

「論曰至恒名同分」者，此釋法同分。將解法同分，先明境同分相。夫言境同分者，若境與識定為所緣，定為所緣是不共義。六境各為自識所緣，名定所緣。問：法境一識緣，可說名為定。五境二識緣，如何望自定？解云：境定有二：或境於心定，如法對意；或心於境定，如五識對境。若法對意，即定是所緣；若五境對五識，即與定為所緣，於彼境上皆有定義，對其定處以辨同分。識於所緣境中，過、現已正生，未來當生法。生法簡不生法，此所緣境說名同分。此即總明境同分相。問：論其六境，根亦能取，何故此文言識非根？解云：意根過去，不能取境。五根現在，或取、不取，以不定故略而不說。又解：言識可以攝根，識取境時根亦取故。言識可以影根，無邊意識是無我觀緣一切法，於法界中無一法界不於其中。已生正生當生無邊意識，由定生故，恒名同分。「由諸聖者」下，別顯無我觀，可知。問：法界意識緣，即名同分。餘十七界亦為意識緣，何非同分？解云：夫十八界名同分、彼同分者，六根、六識據能取境名同分，但能取境皆名同分；不約為境名同分故，雖意識緣而非同分。若外六境約為境名同分，雖約為境辨同分，然據定說。六境二定，如先已說。法界名定，體即是定，唯為意識緣，不通餘五，意識緣定時即名同分。若五境名定，與定為所緣，故名為定。五各自緣，不緣餘法，故名為定。所以五識緣時方名同分。意識非定，雖緣五境不名同分。或可於六境中，法境正與意識為所緣，所以望意名同分。五境正與五識為所緣，所以望五名同分。雖亦兼意緣，以非正故非同分。又解：六境中，法定、五不定，恐雜亂故約定說。於六根、六識，五定、一不定，不多雜亂，故約用說。又解：分別法門，意存差別。若但意緣即名同分，無有一法而非同分，即無差別，故或約用以明、或約定以說、或約正以辨。故《婆沙》七十一云「問：餘十七界亦是意識所了別境，應皆是同分，便無彼同分。如何說有彼同分耶？答：餘十七界不依意識界立為同分及彼同分，但依各別根境相對。為眼對色、色對眼，乃至身對觸、觸對身。問：若爾，意界及意識界唯應對法界立同分、彼同分，是即緣餘十七界者應非同分。答：理應如是。然以意界及意識界通能了別一切法故，依自作用立為同分。如眼等根有見等用，必不立為彼同分故。

Regarding "The treatise says... is constantly called sabhāga": this explains the dharma [element as] sabhāga. Intending to explain the dharma-element as sabhāga, one first clarifies the characteristic of objective fields as sabhāga. In general, when speaking of an objective field as sabhāga: if an objective field definitively serves as an object of cognition for a consciousness, "definitively serving as an object of cognition" is an exclusive meaning. The six objective fields each serve as the object of cognition for their respective consciousness, which is called definitive object of cognition. Question: The dharma-field is the object of a single consciousness, so it can be called definitive. The five objective fields are objects of two consciousnesses; how can they be definitive with respect to their own [consciousness]? Explanation: Determinacy of an objective field is twofold: either the objective field is determinate with respect to the mind, like dharma relative to the mental [faculty]; or the mind is determinate with respect to the objective field, like the five consciousnesses relative to their objective fields. If dharma is relative to the mental [faculty], it is definitively the object of cognition; if the five objective fields are relative to the five consciousnesses, then they definitively serve as objects of cognition. On those objective fields there is in each case the meaning of determinacy; relative to that determinate place, sabhāga is distinguished. Among the objects of cognition of consciousness, there are those factors that have already arisen in the past, are presently arising in the present, and will arise in the future. Arising factors exclude non-arising factors; these objects of cognition are called sabhāga. This generally clarifies the characteristic of objective fields as sabhāga. Question: Discussing the six objective fields, the faculties are also able to apprehend them; why does this text speak of consciousness and not the faculties? Explanation: The mental faculty is past and cannot apprehend objects. The five faculties are present, and either apprehend or do not apprehend; being indeterminate, they are omitted and not stated. Another explanation: mentioning consciousness can subsume the faculties, because when consciousness apprehends an object, the faculty also apprehends it. Mentioning consciousness can reflect the faculties. The boundless mental consciousness is the contemplation of non-self that takes all phenomena as its object; within the dharma-element, there is not a single dharma-element that is not within it. The boundless mental consciousness that has arisen, is arising, or will arise, because it definitively arises, is constantly called sabhāga. Below, "Due to the noble ones..." specifically reveals the contemplation of non-self, which can be understood. Question: If the dharma-element being an object of the mental consciousness is called sabhāga, the other seventeen elements are also objects of the mental consciousness; why are they not called sabhāga? Explanation: Generally, when the eighteen elements are called sabhāga and tatsabhāga, the six faculties and six consciousnesses are called sabhāga on the basis of being able to apprehend objects—simply being able to apprehend objects means they are all called sabhāga; they are not called sabhāga on the basis of being objects, so although they are objects of the mental consciousness, they are not [thereby] sabhāga. As for the external six objective fields, they are called sabhāga on the basis of being objects. Although distinguished as sabhāga on the basis of being objects, they are nonetheless spoken of in terms of determinacy. The two determinacies of the six objective fields are as previously stated. The dharma-field is called determinate because its very nature is determinate: it is solely an object of the mental consciousness and does not extend to the other five; when the mental consciousness definitively takes it as an object, it is called sabhāga. As for the five objective fields being called determinate, they serve as objects for a determinate [consciousness] and are therefore called determinate; the five each take their own objects and do not take other phenomena, hence they are called determinate. Therefore, it is only when the five consciousnesses take them as objects that they are called sabhāga. The mental consciousness is not determinate [to them]; although it takes the five objective fields as objects, they are not [thereby] called sabhāga. Or it may be that among the six objective fields, the dharma-field primarily serves as the object of cognition for the mental consciousness, and therefore relative to the mental faculty it is called sabhāga; the five objective fields primarily serve as objects of cognition for the five consciousnesses, and therefore relative to the five they are called sabhāga. Although they are also secondarily objects of the mental consciousness, because it is not primary, they are not sabhāga. Another explanation: among the six objective fields, dharma is determinate and the five are indeterminate; fearing confusion, it is stated in terms of determinacy. Among the six faculties and six consciousnesses, five are determinate and one is indeterminate; there being not much confusion, it is stated in terms of function. Another explanation: when distinguishing doctrinal categories, the intention resides in distinctions. If merely being an object of the mental consciousness made them sabhāga, there would be no phenomenon that is not sabhāga, and there would be no distinction; hence it is clarified either in terms of function, or stated in terms of determinacy, or distinguished in terms of primacy. Hence Vibhāṣā 71 says: "Question: The remaining seventeen elements are also objects cognized by the mental consciousness, so they should all be sabhāga, and there would be no tatsabhāga. How can one say there is tatsabhāga? Answer: The remaining seventeen elements are not established as sabhāga and tatsabhāga based on the mental consciousness element, but are based merely on the mutual correlation between each respective faculty and its objective field, such as eye relative to form and form relative to eye, up to body relative to tangible and tangible relative to body. Question: If so, the mind-element and the mental consciousness element should only establish sabhāga and tatsabhāga relative to the dharma-element, which means that those taking the remaining seventeen elements as objects should not be sabhāga. Answer: In principle it should be so. However, because the mind-element and the mental consciousness element universally can cognize all phenomena, they are established as sabhāga based on their own activity, just as faculties such as the eye have functions such as seeing and are definitely not established as tatsabhāga."