俱舍論記 2.150

2.150

「此無定准至不同礙色」者，答。如犢子部兩眼互見，非俱時見，處隔越故；速疾轉故，謂俱時見。如《婆沙》十三破云「若一眼見非二眼者，身諸分亦應不俱時覺觸。如身根兩臂相去雖遠，而得俱時覺觸，生一身識。兩眼亦爾，相去雖遠，何妨俱時見色生一眼識（已上論文）。」若依此宗，有時一眼見色，或時二眼見色。以見色分明故，知兩眼同見。頌中「言」或，顯不定也。二眼俱時，表異犢子。又如兩眼同觀一月，以手觸一名觸一眼，不被觸者名開一眼。此被觸眼，便於現前見二月等。以實觸眼與不觸眼，同觀一月非見二月，但被觸眼所引意識妄謂見二，非觸眼見。此證兩眼同見一月俱發一識。若不爾者，如閉一眼但觸一眼，即不見彼二月等事，故知同見一月。以此明知，非但兩眼互見，亦有或時二眼俱見。非所依別，能依之識分成二分。無色之法住無方故，不同礙色，根雖兩處依性一故。眼設一百千尚生一識，況唯有二。若依經部中上座計，大同犢子。故《正理》第七云「由此亦遮上座所說。彼作是言：二眼於境前後起用，見則分明。或復一眼有閉壞時，一眼雖開無相替代，彼所生識唯依一門，速疾轉故見不明了。」此說亦非，所執二眼剎那展轉相替代時，一眼常空不能見色，恒唯一眼能見色故。與一眼者見色，明、昧差別應無，故彼所言不能令喜。廣如彼破。

"There is no fixed rule for this […] not like obstructed forms" is the answer. As held by the Vātsīputrīya, the two eyes see alternately and do not see simultaneously, because their locations are separated; but because their activity is rapid, one thinks they see simultaneously. As the refutation in *Mahāvibhāṣā* 13 says: "If one eye sees and not two eyes, then the various parts of the body should also not experience touch simultaneously. Just as the two arms of the body organ, though far apart, can experience touch simultaneously and produce a single body consciousness, so it is with the two eyes: though far apart, what prevents them from seeing forms simultaneously and producing a single visual consciousness? (Thus far the text of the treatise)." According to this school, sometimes one eye sees forms, and sometimes two eyes see forms. Because visible forms are seen distinctly, one knows that both eyes see together. In the verse, the word 'or' shows that it is not fixed. The two eyes acting simultaneously marks the difference from the Vātsīputrīya. Furthermore, it is like both eyes viewing one moon together: touching one with a hand is called touching one eye, while the untouched one is called opening one eye. This touched eye then sees two moons and the like right before it. In reality, because the touched eye and the untouched eye view one moon together, they do not see two moons; it is merely that the mental consciousness induced by the touched eye falsely deems there to be two, not that the touched eye sees two. This proves that both eyes see one moon together and simultaneously give rise to a single consciousness. Were it not so, then if one closed one eye and touched only one eye, one would not see such things as two moons; therefore, we know that both see one moon together. From this it is clearly known that not only do the two eyes see alternately, but sometimes both eyes see simultaneously. It is not that because the supports are distinct, the consciousness relying upon them is divided into two parts. Because immaterial phenomena do not abide in spatial locations, they are not like forms possessing physical obstruction; though the organs occupy two places, their nature as support is singular. Even if there were a hundred thousand eyes, they would still produce only a single consciousness, much more so when there are only two. If based on the view of the Sthavira among the Sautrāntikas, it is largely the same as that of the Vātsīputrīya. Therefore the *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle 7, says: "By this is also refuted what the Sthavira said. He stated: 'The two eyes exercise their function upon the object successively; when seeing, it is distinct. Or again, when one eye is closed or damaged, although one eye is open there is no alternation, and the consciousness produced thereby relies solely on a single gate; because its activity is rapid, seeing is not distinct.' This statement is also incorrect. When the two eyes posited by him alternate moment by moment, one eye is always empty and unable to see forms, because it is consistently only one eye that can see forms. Thus, there should be no distinction in clarity or obscurity compared to the seeing of forms by someone with one eye; therefore his statement cannot bring satisfaction." It is fully refuted as detailed there.