俱舍論記 2.39

2.39

「若離境愛至鼻舌應無」者，論主又以理難。夫根愛者，擬用取境，由境有愛根愛方生，是知根愛由境愛起。夫離境愛於根定離，彼離香、味貪，應無有鼻、舌。若謂根生非由境愛，雖無香、味愛而有鼻、舌者，或應許彼雖無婬觸愛，而有男根愛，男根亦生。《正理論》第四非此解云「此中何因作如是執？若離境愛，根愛亦無。非根愛無，處愛亦離。根與依處隣近而生，境界不然，如何倒執？男根依處於彼不生，即顯男根於彼離愛。既許鼻、舌依處彼生，故知二根彼愛未離，故不應執彼離根愛、未離處愛。」彼論意說：境望根疎，依處望根親，何不以親為證，而倒以疎為證？非由境有無故根有無，但由依處有無故足顯根有無。若依俱舍師救，應問彼言：何故彼無男根依處？若謂為無婬觸，是即婬觸為本，故境證強，非彼依處。若謂醜陋於彼不生者，如來陰藏隱密端嚴入相好中，何容醜陋？又汝前說有諸根生非由有用，但有因力無用亦生。男根於色雖為醜陋，設許有因於色應起。汝若言男根無因非有，我還難汝：鼻、舌無因應無。若言男根無境非有，鼻，舌無境，彼亦應無。

Regarding the passage: "If detached from craving for sensory objects […] the nose and tongue should not exist," the author of the treatise again challenges on the basis of reason. Now, craving for a faculty intends its use in apprehending an object; it is because there is craving for the object that craving for the faculty arises. From this we know that craving for a faculty arises due to craving for the object. Whenever one is detached from craving for an object, one is definitely detached from the faculty; since they are detached from attachment to odors and tastes, they should not possess nose and tongue. If you claim that the arising of a faculty is not caused by craving for an object, and that despite having no craving for odors and tastes they still have nose and tongue, then one should also concede that despite having no craving for sexual touch, they have craving for the male faculty, and the male faculty should also arise. The fourth fascicle of the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this explanation, saying: "What reason is there here for making such an assumption: that if one is detached from craving for an object, craving for the faculty also does not exist? It is not the case that if craving for a faculty is absent, craving for the physical base is also removed. The faculty and its physical base arise in close proximity, whereas sensory objects are not so; how could one hold such an inverted assumption? The physical base of the male faculty is not produced there, which precisely shows that there is detachment from craving for the male faculty there. Since you concede that the physical bases of the nose and tongue are produced there, we know that there is no detachment from craving for these two faculties there. Therefore, one should not assert that they are detached from craving for the faculties yet not detached from craving for their physical bases." That treatise's intent says: an object is distant in relation to a faculty, whereas a physical base is close in relation to a faculty; why not use what is close as evidence, instead of inverting it and using what is distant as evidence? It is not by the presence or absence of an object that the presence or absence of a faculty is established; rather, the presence or absence of the physical base is fully sufficient to reveal the presence or absence of the faculty. If we come to the rescue of the Kośa master, one should ask him: for what reason does the physical base of the male faculty not exist there? If you say it is because of the absence of sexual touch, then sexual touch is fundamental, and therefore the evidence of the sensory object is stronger, not that of its physical base. If you say it is because it is ugly that it is not produced there, the Tathāgata's concealed organ (kośagata-vasti-guhya) is secret, majestic, and included among the major marks and minor characteristics; how could it be ugly? Furthermore, you said earlier that some faculties arise not because of a use, but solely by the force of causes, arising even without a use. Although the male faculty may be deemed ugly in Rūpadhātu, supposing there were a cause, it should arise in Rūpadhātu. If you say that without a cause the male faculty does not exist, I challenge you in turn: without a cause, the nose and tongue should not exist. If you say that without an object the male faculty does not exist, then since the nose and tongue lack objects, they too should not exist.