俱舍論記 2.48

2.48

「後三謂是至伺相應故」者，明後三界。法界中有四法：一尋、二伺、三餘相應法、四非相應法。於此四中，餘相應法界及意界、意識界，皆通三品。非相應法界及靜慮中間伺，亦同第三品，尋在第二品收。無第二尋，顯無有尋；但伺相應，顯彼有伺。《正理論》破無第二尋云「設有第二，許相應耶？有第二受而不相應，無第二言，非為定證。彼自解云：尋一切時無尋唯伺，自體自體不相應故。」俱舍師救云：設有同時第二尋，亦許相應。然無第二，故不相應。以受例尋，亦為非理。汝言三受隨一現前，餘名第二。若據別義，尋亦同受有第二尋。如善、不善、無記尋，隨一現前，餘名第二，誰言無第二？我言無第二者，同時無第二尋。反徵《正理》云：何故自體不與自體相應。彼應解言：無第二尋故。若作斯解，何異我釋？若謂我言自體自體不相應者，顯尋自體非自相應。即難云：雖此尋不與此尋相應，可與餘尋相應。彼應答言：無第二尋故。若作斯解，還同我釋。

Regarding the passage: "The latter three are […] because it is associated with vicāra," this clarifies the latter three dhātus. Within the dharmadhātu there are four dharmas: first, vitarka; second, vicāra; third, the other associated dharmas; fourth, the unassociated dharmas. Among these four, the other associated dharmas, the manodhātu, and the manovijñānadhātu all encompass all three categories. The unassociated dharmas of dharmadhātu and the vicāra of the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara) also correspond to the third category; vitarka is subsumed under the second category. Lacking a second vitarka shows that it is devoid of vitarka; being associated only with vicāra shows that it possesses vicāra. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes [the argument about] lacking a second vitarka, saying: "Supposing there were a second [vitarka], would you concede that they are associated? There is a second feeling, yet they are not associated; thus the statement that there is no second is not a definitive proof. He himself explains: at all times vitarka is without vitarka and accompanied only by vicāra, because its own nature cannot be associated with its own nature." The Kośa master rescues [his view], saying: supposing there were a simultaneous second vitarka, we would also concede their association. However, there is no second, and therefore they are not associated. Using feeling as an analogy for vitarka is also illogical. You say that whichever of the three feelings is present, the others are called 'second.' From a distinct standpoint, vitarka is also like feeling in having a 'second' vitarka. For example, among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate vitarka, whichever one is present, the others are called 'second'—who says there is no second? When I say there is no second, it means there is no simultaneous second vitarka. Challenging the *Nyāyānusāra* in turn: why is its own nature not associated with its own nature? They must explain: because there is no second vitarka. If they offer this explanation, how does it differ from my explanation? If you claim that my statement 'its own nature is not associated with its own nature' means that the substance of vitarka is not self-associated, we then challenge: although this vitarka is not associated with this vitarka, it could be associated with another vitarka. They must reply: because there is no second vitarka. If they make this explanation, it still coincides with my explanation.