俱舍論記 2.48

2.48

Regarding the passage: "The latter three are […] because it is associated with vicāra," this clarifies the latter three dhātus. Within the dharmadhātu there are four dharmas: first, vitarka; second, vicāra; third, the other associated dharmas; fourth, the unassociated dharmas. Among these four, the other associated dharmas, the manodhātu, and the manovijñānadhātu all encompass all three categories. The unassociated dharmas of dharmadhātu and the vicāra of the intermediate dhyāna (dhyānāntara) also correspond to the third category; vitarka is subsumed under the second category. Lacking a second vitarka shows that it is devoid of vitarka; being associated only with vicāra shows that it possesses vicāra. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes [the argument about] lacking a second vitarka, saying: "Supposing there were a second [vitarka], would you concede that they are associated? There is a second feeling, yet they are not associated; thus the statement that there is no second is not a definitive proof. He himself explains: at all times vitarka is without vitarka and accompanied only by vicāra, because its own nature cannot be associated with its own nature." The Kośa master rescues [his view], saying: supposing there were a simultaneous second vitarka, we would also concede their association. However, there is no second, and therefore they are not associated. Using feeling as an analogy for vitarka is also illogical. You say that whichever of the three feelings is present, the others are called 'second.' From a distinct standpoint, vitarka is also like feeling in having a 'second' vitarka. For example, among wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate vitarka, whichever one is present, the others are called 'second'—who says there is no second? When I say there is no second, it means there is no simultaneous second vitarka. Challenging the *Nyāyānusāra* in turn: why is its own nature not associated with its own nature? They must explain: because there is no second vitarka. If they offer this explanation, how does it differ from my explanation? If you claim that my statement 'its own nature is not associated with its own nature' means that the substance of vitarka is not self-associated, we then challenge: although this vitarka is not associated with this vitarka, it could be associated with another vitarka. They must reply: because there is no second vitarka. If they make this explanation, it still coincides with my explanation.