俱舍論記 2.5

2.5

「論曰至說餘無見」者，謂此色界以可示現在此在彼差別不同，有能示現此彼言說，故名有見。此即言說名見，准餘無見。若依《正理》第四，總有三說，云「由二義故。一者此色定與見俱，故名有見。由色與眼俱時起故，如有伴侶。二者此色可有示現，故名有見。可示現在此、在彼別故，如有所緣。有說：此色於鏡等中有像可現，故名有見。可示如彼，此亦爾故。不可說聲有谷響等應成有見，不俱生故。」《婆沙》七十五及一百二十八亦有三說，皆同《正理》。初師以眼名見，觀照色故。第二說以言為見，能示現故。第三說以像名見，見謂現也。問：此論何故不具說三？解云：隨作論者意樂說故。又解：經部計眼無實作用，說名為見。根、境、識三和合之時，假名眼見，非實眼見。又無實像色。論主意朋經部，不言眼見、不言像現，示現名見不違經部，故依此說。一解雖同，然意違兩說。問：《雜心》第一，慧亦名見故。故彼論云「又說：一切界皆可見，慧眼境界故。」何故此論不說？解云：分別法相，意存差別。若言慧見，十八皆名有見，無無見者即無差別。論主不說，意在於茲，或略不論。

"The treatise states: ... [the verse says:] the rest are spoken of as invisible" means: because this visible form-realm (rūpa-dhātu) can be pointed out as distinct here and there, and there is speech capable of indicating it as "here" or "there," it is named "visible" (sanidarśana). Here, speech is called "seeing" [or "indication" (nidarśana)]; by this standard the rest are invisible. According to Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 4, there are three explanations in all, which state: "Because of two meanings: First, this form definitely accompanies sight (cakṣus), and is therefore named visible. Because form arises concurrently with the eye, just as one has a companion. Second, this form admits of indication, and is therefore named visible. Because it admits of the distinction of being indicated here or there, just like having an objective support. Some say: this form has a reflection that can appear in mirrors and the like, and is therefore named visible. Because it can be shown like that, this is also so. One cannot say that sound, having echoes and the like, should thereby be visible, because [sound and echo] do not arise simultaneously." Fascicles 75 and 128 of the Vibhāṣā also present three explanations, all identical to the Nyāyānusāra. The first master takes the eye as "sight" because it observes and illuminates form. The second explanation takes speech as "sight" [or "indication"] because it can demonstrate. The third explanation takes the reflected image as "sight" because "seeing" means "manifesting". Question: Why does this treatise not fully present all three? Explanation: It was spoken according to what the author of the treatise preferred to say. Another explanation: The Sautrāntika posits that the eye has no real function to be called "seeing"; when the three—sense-faculty, object, and consciousness—come together, it is metaphorically designated that "the eye sees," but it is not a real eye seeing. Furthermore, there is no real matter of a reflected image. The author of the treatise sided with the Sautrāntika; not speaking of the eye seeing and not speaking of the manifestation of reflections, defining indication as "sight" does not contradict the Sautrāntika, and he therefore relied on this explanation. Although one explanation agrees, his intention nevertheless went against the other two explanations. Question: In Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, fascicle 1, wisdom is also called "sight"; hence that treatise says: "Furthermore it is said: all realms are visible, because they are the domain of the wisdom-eye (prajñā-cakṣus)." Why does this treatise not mention it? Explanation: In distinguishing the characteristics of dharmas, the intent lies in differentiation. If one speaks of the seeing of wisdom, all eighteen realms would be named visible; having none that are invisible, there would be no differentiation. That the author of the treatise did not state it was intended for this reason, or he simply omitted discussing it.