俱舍論記 2.99

2.99

「我執依止至故說名外」者，答。我執謂我見，依止謂心。心與我見相應故，名我執依止。心是我依，假名為我。餘心雖非我見相應，是彼心類故，亦得我名。又解：心是我執所緣，故名我執依止。雖諸有漏皆我見緣，以心是勝，多執為我。餘無漏心雖我不緣，是彼心類故，亦得我名。又解：我執有二。一者迷執，謂即我見，但緣有漏；二者取執，謂一切心，於境自在執取前境，皆名我執。二執所緣雖通諸法，心強勝故偏名依止，故於此心假說為我。此解依止遍通諸心，可無妨矣。復引經證，前經調我、後經伏心，故知於心假說為我。眼等十二為此假我所依，親近故說名內；色等六境為此假我所緣，疎遠故說名外。雖諸心所依彼心王同一生等，不名內者，異類相望非所依故，不名為親。所依與心異類相望皆為所依，故名親近，可名為內。又《正理》第六解心為我云「恒於自內境自在行故。」若作俱舍師破，不異我前第三解也。

Regarding "The locus of attachment to a self... therefore they are called external": this is the answer. "Attachment to a self" refers to the view of self; "locus" refers to the mind. Because the mind is associated with the view of self, it is called the locus of attachment to a self. The mind is the basis of the self and is nominally called "self". Although other minds are not associated with the view of self, because they are of the same kind of mind as that, they also obtain the designation "self". Another explanation: the mind is the object of cognition of attachment to a self, and therefore is called the locus of attachment to a self. Although all sāsrava [phenomena] are objects of cognition of the view of self, because the mind is preeminent, it is mostly grasped as the self. Although other, anāsrava minds are not taken as objects of self, because they are of the same kind of mind as that, they also obtain the designation "self". Another explanation: attachment to a self is twofold. First is confused grasping, namely the view of self, which only takes sāsrava [phenomena] as its object; second is grasping through apprehension, meaning that all minds, operating sovereignly upon objects and grasping their front objects, are all termed attachment to a self. Although the objects of both graspings extend to all phenomena, because the mind is powerful and preeminent, it is singled out as the locus; therefore, this mind is nominally spoken of as the self. This explanation of "locus" extends universally to all minds, and so can be free from fault. Further, sūtras are cited as proof: the former sūtra speaks of "taming oneself", and the latter sūtra speaks of "subduing the mind"; hence one knows that the mind is nominally spoken of as the self. The twelve [bases] such as the eye are the supports for this nominal self; being intimate and proximate, they are called internal. The six objective fields such as form are the objects of cognition for this nominal self; being distant and loose, they are called external. Although the mental factors rely on that dominant mind and share the same arising, etc., they are not called internal because, being considered in relation to a different category, they are not supports and thus are not called intimate. The supports, when considered in relation to the mind as different categories, are all supports, and hence are called intimate and proximate, and can be called internal. Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 6, explains the mind being the self by saying: "Because it constantly moves with sovereignty over its own internal objects." If one were to frame a refutation by the master of the Kośa, it would not differ from my third explanation above.