俱舍論疏 2.113

2.113

論「又若未來至無改易故」，第二反釋，文相可解。《正理》云「若爾，何緣說心為我？恒於自境自在行故。我謂於自境常自在行，心曾無有時不行自境，故一切心皆名為我。非諸心所亦得我名，意為上首故、經說獨行故、彼要依心能行境故。如諸心所雖亦調伏，而但就勝說調伏心。說我亦然，唯心非所。若法與此似我之心為不共益彼名為內，與此相違餘法名外，故諸心所無成內失。又諸心所雖復與心一生住等，而心望心獨名為內非心所者，同異類心展轉相望，為所依性皆不捨故。諸心所法異類望心，必定捨離能依性故。謂若善心望善染污及無記心，為所依性皆不捨離，染污無記心亦如是。若善心所望彼染污及無記心，捨能依性。染污無記望餘亦爾。故心望心為所依性，無相簡隔得名為內。心所望心為能依性，有相簡隔，不得內名。又諸心所望同類心，為能依性或多或少，心為所依則不如是，由此內名在心非所。若爾，大法應受內名。不爾，心所朋類壞故。如異生中不墮法者，不墮法謂不墮三惡道。雖至忍位不墮惡趣，以異生類中多墮惡趣故，經說預流名不墮惡趣。」《正理》破我執依故說心為我，云「又心少分是我執依，一切心依皆名為內。由此不應作如是釋：我執依心故，假說心為我。又少分心貪等依故，應一切心皆成染污。又少分心尋、伺依故，一切應成有尋有伺。此既不爾，彼云何然？差別因緣不可得故。」述曰。我執是我見。依有二義：一者相應，即是與身見相應心名我執依，餘相應心非我執依。此即心通非我執依。二者我執所緣名我執依，此即我執所依，通五取蘊，非無漏蘊。即應色等四蘊亦名為我，我執依故。無漏心不名為內，非我依故。無漏之心既非我執依，不得名我所依之根。既非我依，不得名內。前所引《正理》文，就相應依破宗說一切為我，我執所依唯一分故。《正理》又云「又彼何能遮心所等？我執依性，以有身見緣五取蘊為境界故。」述曰：此破第二所緣名所依也。此即我執所依通異品也。非是定因，以色等四蘊亦是我執依故。有人釋我執所依有三：一釋是相應依。二釋是境界依，如《正理》破。第三釋云我執有二：一者迷執，謂即我見，但緣有漏。二者取執，謂一切心於境自在執取前境皆名我執。二執所緣雖通諸法，心強勝故偏名依止，故於此心假說為我。此解依止遍通諸心，此是所緣說依，非相應依及自體依。此釋還同前不定過。有人又云：《正理》解心為我，恒於自境自在行故。若作俱舍師破，不異我前第三解也。今詳前第三解，與正理師其意全別。如何是同？前第三解云：一迷執、二者取執，謂一切心於境自在執取皆名我執。二執所緣雖通諸法，心強勝故偏名依止，故於此心假說為我。此即說心我執境界是依止，假說為我。正理說心恒於自境自在行故名之為我，此即是自體名，非是所緣。所緣、自體義既懸別，如何是同？必欲作俱舍師救，應云：我釋依汝宗《婆沙》，汝釋違自宗義，如何是正？《婆沙》七十四「問：云何建立內、外？為依於法？為依於我？答：一說唯依法立，然非一切。謂內六識身是染淨法所依止處，若與六識作所依者名為內處，作所緣者名為外處。故依法立內、外處名。復次，若法是根立為內處，若法是根義立為外處。復次，若法是有境立為內處，若法是境立為外處。有說：依我立內、外處。我即是心，我執所依止故。於此心上假立我名。引頌文證，與此同。乃至又云：然內、外名非圓成實，謂於我是內者，於他名外；於我是外者，於他名內故。但依一立內、外名，非不決定。」准婆沙有四釋，此論即當第四，《正理》如何破自宗義？又世想立名，依少分立，如何為難？

On the Śāstra's stating, "Furthermore, if in the future [...] because there is no alteration": this is the second part, the indirect explanation; the text is easy to understand. The Nyāyānusāra says: "If so, for what reason is the mind called the self? Because it constantly operates with sovereignty over its own cognitive object. 'Self' means that which constantly operates with sovereignty over its own object, and mind has never had a time when it did not operate over its own object; therefore all minds are called the self. Mental factors do not also receive the name 'self', because the mind is the forerunner, because the sūtras say it 'travels alone', and because they necessarily rely on the mind to be able to operate over an object. Just as mental factors, though they are also tamed, are spoken of as 'tamed mind' solely with reference to the principal, so too with the designation 'self': it belongs only to the mind, not to mental factors. If a dharma provides uncommon benefit to this mind which resembles a self, it is called internal; other dharmas contrary to this are called external; thus mental factors do not suffer the fault of becoming internal. Furthermore, although mental factors share birth, duration, and so on with the mind, yet the mind in relation to the mind is exclusively called internal while mental factors are not, because mutually between homogeneous and heterogeneous minds, their nature as the basis of reliance is never abandoned. For heterogeneous mental factors in relation to the mind definitely abandon their nature as that which relies. That is, a wholesome mind in relation to wholesome, defiled, and indeterminate minds never abandons its nature as the basis of reliance; defiled and indeterminate minds are also like this. If a wholesome mental factor relates to defiled and indeterminate minds, it abandons its nature as that which relies; defiled and indeterminate ones in relation to others are also like this. Therefore the mind in relation to the mind acts as the basis of reliance without intervening distinctions, and receives the name 'internal'; mental factors in relation to the mind act as that which relies, possessing intervening distinctions, and do not receive the name 'internal'. Furthermore, mental factors in relation to homogeneous minds may act as that which relies in greater or lesser numbers, whereas the mind acting as the basis of reliance is not like this; hence the name 'internal' belongs to the mind, not to mental factors. If that were so, the great dharmas (mahābhūmika) ought to receive the name 'internal'. Not so, because the faction of mental factors is disrupted. Just as among ordinary worldlings those who are 'dharmas not falling'—'dharmas not falling' means not falling into the three bad destinies. Although upon reaching the stage of forbearance one does not fall into the bad destinies, because the category of ordinary worldlings mostly falls into the bad destinies, the sūtras state that stream-enterers are called 'not falling into the bad destinies'." The Nyāyānusāra refutes [the view that] the mind is called the self because it is the basis of self-grasping, stating: "Furthermore, only a fraction of the mind is the basis of self-grasping, yet all bases of the mind are called internal. Therefore one should not explain it like this: 'Because it is the basis of self-grasping, the mind is metaphorically designated as the self.' Furthermore, because a fraction of the mind is the basis of greed and the like, all minds ought to be defiled. Furthermore, because a fraction of the mind is the basis of vitarka and vicāra, all ought to be endowed with vitarka and vicāra. Since this is not so, how could that be so? Because a distinguishing cause cannot be obtained." Commentary: Self-grasping is the view of self. "Basis of reliance" has two meanings: first, associated reliance, which means that the mind associated with the view of individuality is called the basis of self-grasping, while other associated minds are not the basis of self-grasping. In this case, the mind generally is not the basis of self-grasping. Second, that which is the cognitive object of self-grasping is called the basis of self-grasping; in this case, that which self-grasping relies upon extends to the five appropriation-skandhas, not the anāsrava skandhas. It would then follow that the four skandhas such as form should also be called the self, because they are the basis of self-grasping. The anāsrava mind would not be called internal, because it is not the basis of the self. Since the anāsrava mind is not the basis of self-grasping, it could not be called an internal sense-base upon which the self relies. Since it is not the basis of the self, it could not be called internal. The text of the Nyāyānusāra cited earlier refutes the thesis that all are the self based on associated reliance, because that which self-grasping relies on is only one fraction. The Nyāyānusāra also states: "Furthermore, how can they exclude mental factors and the like from being the nature of the basis of self-grasping, since the view of individuality takes the five appropriation-skandhas as its cognitive realm?" Commentary: This refutes the second [meaning, where] the cognitive object is called the basis of reliance. Here, that which self-grasping relies on extends to heterogeneous categories. It is not a determinate cause, because the four skandhas such as form are also the basis of self-grasping. Someone explained that there are three kinds of bases of reliance for self-grasping: The first explanation is the associated basis of reliance. The second explanation is the cognitive realm as the basis of reliance, as refuted by the Nyāyānusāra. The third explanation states that self-grasping has two types: first, deluded grasping, which is the view of self, cognising only the tainted; second, grasping as appropriation, meaning that all minds sovereignly grasp external objects in their respective cognitive realms, which is entirely called self-grasping. Although the cognitive objects of both graspings extend to all dharmas, because the mind is predominant it is especially called the basis of reliance, and therefore this mind is metaphorically called the self. This explanation of the basis of reliance extends generally to all minds; this is an explanation of reliance in terms of the cognitive object, not the associated basis of reliance or reliance on its own substance. This explanation also incurs the previous fallacy of indeterminateness. Someone also said: "The Nyāyānusāra explains that the mind is the self because it constantly operates with sovereignty over its own realm. If formulated as the refutation of the Kośa master, it does not differ from my previous third explanation." Now examining this: the previous third explanation and the intention of the Nyāyānusāra master are completely different; how could they be the same? The previous third explanation said: "First, deluded grasping; second, grasping as appropriation, meaning that all minds sovereignly grasp in their realms, which is called self-grasping. Although the cognitive objects of both graspings extend to all dharmas, because the mind is predominant it is especially called the basis of reliance, and therefore this mind is metaphorically called the self." This means that the cognitive realm of the mind's self-grasping is the basis of reliance, metaphorically called the self. The Nyāyānusāra states that because the mind constantly operates sovereignly over its own realm it is called the self; this is a designation of its own substance, not its cognitive object. Since the meanings of cognitive object and own substance are vastly disparate, how could they be the same? If one must construct a rescue on behalf of the Kośa master, one should say: "My explanation relies on the Vibhāṣā of your own school; your explanation violates your own school's tenets—how can it be correct?" Vibhāṣā 74 states: "Question: How are the internal and external established? Are they established based on dharmas, or based on the self? Answer: One explanation is that they are established solely based on dharmas, yet not all. That is, the six internal consciousness-bodies are the bases of reliance for defiled and pure dharmas; those that serve as the basis of reliance for the six consciousnesses are called internal āyatanas, and those that serve as their cognitive objects are called external āyatanas. Therefore the names of internal and external āyatanas are established based on dharmas. Furthermore, if a dharma is a sense-faculty, it is established as an internal āyatana; if a dharma is the object of a sense-faculty, it is established as an external āyatana. Furthermore, if a dharma possesses a cognitive realm, it is established as an internal āyatana; if a dharma is a cognitive realm, it is established as an external āyatana. There is an explanation saying: Internal and external āyatanas are established based on the self. The self is just the mind, because it is that which self-grasping relies on. On this mind, the name 'self' is metaphorically established." It cites verse passages as proof, agreeing with this. It further states: "However, the names 'internal' and 'external' are not absolute realities; that is, what is internal to me is called external to another, and what is external to me is called internal to another. They are established as internal and external names solely based on one [individual], not determinately." According to the Vibhāṣā there are four explanations; this treatise corresponds precisely to the fourth. How can the Nyāyānusāra refute its own school's doctrine? Furthermore, worldly conventional designations are established based on a fraction; how could this be an objection?