俱舍論記 20.58

20.58

「諸有達無至彼名為無」者，經部反徵說一切有部。諸有達無第十三處，此能緣識為何所緣？若謂即緣第十三處名為境者，爾時既作無第十三處解，然名替處，是則應撥彼名為無。若撥名無，便同邪見，非是正見。謂彼意計：若撥無第十三處是正見，若立第十三處是邪見。當撥之時，彼能緣識既無第十三處可緣，即緣第十三處名為境。既撥名無，應是邪見，非是正見，以有名故而撥為無。然汝計意：撥無第十三處是正見，故言是則應撥彼名為無，是其邪見，非是正見。

"Regarding all those who realize the non-existence [of a thirteenth āyatana] ... that name is non-existent": here the Sautrāntika turns the question back against the Sarvāstivāda. For all those who realize the non-existence of a thirteenth āyatana, what is the objective condition of this cognizing consciousness? If you maintain that it cognizes precisely the thirteenth āyatana as its object, then at that time, having understood that there is no thirteenth āyatana, yet since the name stands in place of the base (āyatana), one would then have to negate that name as non-existent. If one negates the name as non-existent, this would be identical to wrong view and not right view. For their intention is: if one negates the thirteenth āyatana, that is right view; if one establishes a thirteenth āyatana, that is wrong view. When one negates it, since that cognizing consciousness has no thirteenth āyatana to cognize, it takes the name "thirteenth āyatana" as its object. Having negated the name as non-existent, it ought to be wrong view and not right view, because there is indeed a name and yet one negates it as non-existent. But according to your position, negating the thirteenth āyatana as non-existent is right view. Therefore, [the text] says: it would then follow that one must negate that name as non-existent, which would be wrong view and not right view.