俱舍論記 20.59

20.59

「又若緣聲至有非有境」者，經部復約事徵。聲未起時，名聲先非有，望現為先。又若緣聲先時非有者，此能緣識為何所緣？既緣非有，明知緣無生心。若謂緣聲先時非有，即緣彼聲以為境者，求聲無者應更發聲。緣聲非有尚聲為境，求聲無者理應發聲。若謂聲先無時住未來位，汝宗所執未來實有，如何謂無？汝若謂過去、未來世聲，無現在世故名無者。此亦非理。若現在世性與去來聲體別不同，可得說言無現在世。此現在世與去、來聲其體一故，何得說言無現在世？又解：汝若謂過去、未來世聲無現世聲，故言無者。此亦非理。若三世聲其體各別，可得說言無現世聲。此現在聲與去來聲，雖復經歷三世不同，其體一故，何得說言無現世聲？若未來聲與其現聲而有少分體差別者，本無今有其理自成，同我經部。破訖結言：故識通緣有、非有境。亦應徵問聲後非有，略而不言。

"Moreover, if one cognizes sound ... has both existent and non-existent objects": here the Sautrāntika further questions on the basis of actual facts. Before a sound arises, it is called the prior non-existence of sound, looking at it prior to the present. Moreover, if one cognizes the prior non-existence of a sound, what is the objective condition of this cognizing consciousness? Since it cognizes non-existence, one clearly knows that a mental state arises taking non-existence as its object. If you say that cognizing the prior non-existence of sound means taking that very sound as its object, then one who seeks the absence of sound should instead emit a sound! If even cognizing the non-existence of sound takes sound as its object, then logically, one who seeks the absence of sound should emit a sound. If you say that when sound is priorly non-existent it abides in the state of the future, then according to your school's tenet the future is substantially existent—how can you call it non-existent? If you say that sounds of the past and future periods are called non-existent because they lack the present period, this also is illogical. If the nature of the present period and the substance of past and future sounds were distinct and different, one could say that they lack the present period. But because this present period and the past and future sounds are identical in substance, how can one say they lack the present period? Another explanation: if you say that the past and future sounds lack the present sound and therefore are called non-existent, this also is illogical. If the sounds of the three times were each distinct in substance, one could say that they lack the present sound. But although this present sound and the past and future sounds pass through the three different times, their substance is one; how could one say they lack the present sound? If a future sound and its present sound had even a slight difference in substance, then [the principle of] "originally non-existent, now existing" would naturally be established, agreeing with our Sautrāntika view. Having concluded the refutation, [the text] concludes: "Therefore, consciousness universally takes both existent and non-existent objects." One could also raise the question regarding the posterior non-existence of sound, but it is omitted for brevity.