俱舍論記 23.138

23.138

「又彼有餘至五上分結」者，第二解。又彼有餘七結在故，故受七生。謂二下分結欲貪、瞋恚，五上分結，謂色愛、無色愛、掉、慢、無明。《正理》破云「此亦無能證唯七有，唯貪、瞋結引七有故。又無契經說不還者受極七有，又無經說五上分結引欲界生，故彼所言無能證力。但由法爾極受七生，於中不應強申理趣。」俱舍師救云：雖上界結非引欲生，由成彼故，二下分結而有勢力引欲界生。此亦何妨？問：住預流果容受幾生？泰法師解云：「住預流果無受一生，乃至一來向中亦無受一生者。若有一生，業不可轉，令不受餘悉可轉者。彼人先斷六品惑方受一生，若先斷六品惑已，此人即是一來人。後受一生時，即是一來果上受一生，非是向中受也。如《涅槃經》云『是須陀洹凡有二種：一者利根、二者鈍根。鈍根之人，人、天七返。是鈍根人復有五種，或有六、五、四、三、二種。利根之人，現身獲得須陀洹果，乃至阿羅漢果。』若有一生，何故不說？又《成實論》云『須陀洹人，若受二生乃至七生。』若有一生，何故不說？又《婆沙》四十六云『七生天上七生人中者，此依圓滿預流而說，故人、天有，等受七生。然有預流人、天生別，謂天七、人六，或人七、天六，或天六、人五，或人六、天五，或天五、人四，或人五、天四，或天四、人三，或人四、天三，或天三、人二，或人三、天二，或天二、人一，或人二、天一。此中且說極多生者，故說預流人、天各七。』《婆沙》極多之中即說人、天各受七生，極少中不言人一、天一，故知住預流果無受一生。」更廣云云，不能具述。今解不然，住預流果有受七生，乃至有受一生。論文既說極言，為顯受生最多，非諸預流皆受七返。以此故知，不遮極少亦受一生。《婆沙》不言人一、天一各一生者，且據乘前綺互多少不言各一。以實而言亦容各受一生，若以不說即言無者，彼亦不說天六、人六等，應無人、天各六生等。故知略而不論，或影略互顯。有何道理許天二、人一，人二、天一等，而不許彼各受一生？又引《涅槃》、《成實》以為證者，非是當部，如何為證？《涅槃經》說皆有佛性，《成實論》說有諸種子，此豈同彼？不可為證。更有云云，不能廣破。

Regarding the second explanation, [beginning with] "Furthermore, because he has the remaining [...] five higher fetters": Furthermore, because he has the remaining seven fetters, he undergoes seven births. That is, the two lower fetters—sensory desire and ill will—and the five higher fetters—attachment to the form realm, attachment to the formless realm, restlessness, conceit, and ignorance. The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes this, saying: "This also cannot prove that there are only seven existences, because only the fetters of desire and ill will lead to the seven existences. Furthermore, no sūtra states that a non-returner undergoes at most seven existences, nor does any sūtra state that the five higher fetters lead to rebirth in the desire realm. Therefore, what they say lacks proving power. It is simply by natural law that at most seven births are undergone; one should not forcibly propose a rationale for it." The Kośa master defends it, saying: Although the fetters of the higher realms do not lead to birth in the desire realm, because they are possessed, the two lower fetters gain the power to lead to birth in the desire realm. What prevents this? Question: While abiding in the fruit of stream-entry, how many births may one undergo? Master Tai explains: "While abiding in the fruit of stream-entry, one does not undergo just a single birth, nor does one undergo a single birth in the candidacy for once-returner. If there were a single birth, where karma could not be turned back, while all that would cause one not to undergo the rest could be turned back: such a person would have first severed the six grades of defilements before undergoing a single birth; but if he had already severed the six grades of defilements, this person would be a once-returner. When he undergoes a single birth later, it is undergone within the fruit of once-returner, not within the candidacy. As the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'There are two kinds of srotāpanna: first, those of sharp faculties; second, those of dull faculties. A person of dull faculties returns seven times between humans and devas. Among these dull-facultied persons, there are further five kinds: some undergo six, five, four, three, or two kinds [of births]. A person of sharp faculties attains the fruit of srotāpanna up to the fruit of arhat in this very body.' If there were a single birth, why was it not mentioned? Furthermore, the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* states: 'A srotāpanna undergoes two births up to seven births.' If there were a single birth, why was it not mentioned? Furthermore, the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle 46, states: 'Being born seven times in heaven and seven times among humans is spoken in reference to a fully completed stream-enterer; therefore existences among humans and devas are equally undergone seven times. However, there are distinctions in births among humans and devas for stream-enterers: namely, seven in heaven and six among humans; or seven among humans and six in heaven; or six in heaven and five among humans; or six among humans and five in heaven; or five in heaven and four among humans; or five among humans and four in heaven; or four in heaven and three among humans; or four among humans and three in heaven; or three in heaven and two among humans; or three among humans and two in heaven; or two in heaven and one among humans; or two among humans and one in heaven. Here, speaking provisionally of the maximum births, it is said that stream-enterers undergo seven each in human and divine realms.' The *Mahāvibhāṣā* mentions undergoing seven births each in heaven and among humans within the maximum, but does not speak of one among humans and one in heaven within the minimum; thus we know that abiding in the fruit of stream-entry does not include undergoing a single birth." His argument is even more extensive, but cannot be detailed here. Our present explanation is not like that: while abiding in the fruit of stream-entry, one may undergo seven births, down to undergoing a single birth. Since the treatise uses the word "at most," it shows the maximum number of births undergone, not that all stream-enterers undergo seven returns. From this, we know it does not preclude undergoing a single birth as the minimum. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* not mentioning one each for humans and devas is merely based on following the earlier alternating permutations of more and less, thus not stating "one each." In reality, it also allows undergoing one birth each; if one were to say it does not exist simply because it is not mentioned, it also does not mention six in heaven and six among humans, etc., and so there would be no six births each in heaven and humans, etc. Therefore, we know it was omitted without discussion, or implicitly suggested through reciprocal omission. What reason is there to accept two in heaven and one among humans, or two among humans and one in heaven, etc., while rejecting undergoing one birth each? Furthermore, adducing the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* and *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* as proof does not rely on our own school; how could they serve as proof? The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states that all have Buddha-nature, and the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* states that there are seeds; how could these be the same as our school? They cannot serve as proof. There are further arguments, but they cannot be comprehensively refuted.