俱舍論記 26.43

26.43

「他心智中至不緣想等」者，釋第二頌。無漏他心智雖作共相，是欣行故，而能別觀。餘文可知。問：知他無漏心作道下四行相，知他有漏心何故不作苦、集八行相？解云：將答此問，略作三門分別：一敘古解、二出過非、三述正義。敘古解者，第一遠法師云：「知他無漏心，道智為加行，故作道四行。知他有漏心，不以苦、集智為加行，所以不作苦、集八行相。」第二魏念法師云：「若知他無漏心，作道下四行相，即知他心用盡。若知他有漏心，不作苦等八行相，即知他心用不盡。知苦不知集、知集不知苦，所以不作苦、集八行相。」第三彭城嵩法師云：「能緣所緣理事須等，所緣無漏心既是理觀，能緣他心智還須作理觀知，故知他無漏心，作道下四行相。所緣有漏心既是事觀，能緣他心智還須事觀知，故知他有漏心，不作苦、集八行相。」第二出過非者，一破遠法師云：本論既言有學八智展轉相望皆容作等無間緣，而言道智他心加行，豈不相違？二破魏念法師云：無漏心上亦有四行，知一非餘還不知盡，應當不作道下行相。三破嵩法師云：有漏煖等既作理觀，能緣他心智應亦作理觀。若言非真理觀是似理觀，亦應他心智作似理觀知，非事觀知。第三述正義者，一解云：無漏心勝，難可知故。有漏他心智不能知彼，要起無漏方能知彼。所以知他無漏心，作道下四行相。有漏心劣易可知故，有漏他心智是能知彼故，不起彼無漏他心智知。所以者何？有漏他心智從無始來數數修習，起時即易。無漏他心智從無始來不多修習，起時即難。有漏起易故，知他有漏心，還起有漏他心智。無漏起難故，知他有漏心，不作苦、集八行觀。起易足知，誰復捨易從難？問：但應初定他心智知欲界心，起時易故。二定已上他心智應不能知欲界他心，起時難故。誰復捨易從難？解云：欲知欲界心，必不故起二定已上他心智知，但為餘事入二定等，因入彼定便起彼他心智知欲界心也。難云：亦可因為餘事起無漏心，便起無漏他心智知他有漏心。解云，從無漏心起有漏他心智易，起無漏他心智難。起易足知，故不起難。問：入二定等知欲界心時，何故不還起初定他心智知欲界心，而起二定等知欲心耶？解云：當地起易，故起當地。異地起難，不起初定。第二解云：欣觀容可別知，故知他無漏心，作道下四行相。厭觀必欲總遣，故知他有漏心，不作苦、集八行觀。故《正理》七十三云「他身無漏心、心所法，細故、勝故，非己有漏他心智境，其理可然。何緣己身無漏他心智，不能知他有漏心、心所？於有漏境無漏智生，行相所緣異此智故。謂無漏智緣有漏時，必是總緣厭背行相，是故決定不能別緣他心、心所成他心智。以諸聖智緣有漏時，必於所緣深生厭背，樂總棄捨不樂別觀。緣無漏時生欣樂故，既總觀已亦樂別觀。如有見聞非所愛事，總緣便捨，不樂別緣。於所愛中則不如是，總見聞已，亦樂別緣。是故於他有漏心等，必無聖智一一別觀，成緣有漏心無漏他心智，以他心智決定於他心、心所法別別知故。豈不亦有三念住攝苦、集、忍智？雖有而非但緣一法，緣多體故（已上論文）。」

As for the passage from "In the knowledge of others' minds..." to "...does not observe ideation, etc.": this explains the second stanza. Although the undefiled knowledge of others' minds produces common characteristics, because it is an aspiring mode of activity, it can observe specifically. The rest of the text is understandable. Question: When knowing the undefiled mind of another, it produces the four aspects under the path; why, when knowing the defiled mind of another, does it not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination? Explanation: Preparing to answer this question, three distinctions are briefly presented: first, stating ancient explanations; second, pointing out errors and fallacies; third, setting forth the correct meaning. Stating the ancient explanations: First, Master Yuān said: "Knowing the undefiled mind of another has the knowledge of the path as its preparatory application, and therefore it produces the four aspects of the path. Knowing the defiled mind of another does not take the knowledge of suffering and origination as its preparatory application, and for this reason does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Second, Master Nian of Wei said: "If, when knowing the undefiled mind of another, one produces the four aspects under the path, one knows the activity of the other's mind exhaustively. If, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one does not produce the eight aspects of suffering, etc., it is because knowing the activity of the other's mind is not exhaustive: knowing suffering does not know origination, and knowing origination does not know suffering; therefore it does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Third, Master Song of Pengcheng said: "The grasper and the grasped, the principle and the phenomenon, must correspond: since the grasped undefiled mind is a contemplation of principle, the grasping knowledge of others' minds must also be known by producing a contemplation of principle; therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. Since the grasped defiled mind is a contemplation of phenomena, the grasping knowledge of others' minds must also be known by a contemplation of phenomena; therefore, knowing the defiled mind of another does not produce the eight aspects of suffering and origination." Second, pointing out errors and fallacies: First, refuting Master Yuān: since the root treatise states that the eight knowledges of those in training can mutually serve as equal-and-immediate conditions (samanantarapratyaya), then saying that the knowledge of the path is the preparatory application for knowledge of others' minds—is that not contradictory? Second, refuting Master Nian of Wei: on the undefiled mind there are also four aspects; knowing one and not the rest is still not knowing exhaustively, so one should likewise not produce the aspects under the path. Third, refuting Master Song: since the defiled levels of heat, etc., produce contemplations of principle, the grasping knowledge of others' minds should also produce a contemplation of principle. If one says it is not a true contemplation of principle but an apparent contemplation of principle, then the knowledge of others' minds should also know it by producing an apparent contemplation of principle, not a contemplation of phenomena. Third, setting forth the correct meaning: The first explanation says: The undefiled mind is superior and difficult to know. The defiled knowledge of others' minds cannot know it; one must give rise to the undefiled before one can know it. Therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. The defiled mind is inferior and easy to know; since the defiled knowledge of others' minds can know it, one does not give rise to that undefiled knowledge of others' minds to know it. Why is that? The defiled knowledge of others' minds has been repeatedly cultivated since beginningless time, so it arises easily. The undefiled knowledge of others' minds has not been much cultivated since beginningless time, so it arises with difficulty. Because the defiled arises easily, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one still gives rise to the defiled knowledge of others' minds. Because the undefiled arises with difficulty, when knowing the defiled mind of another, one does not produce the contemplation of the eight aspects of suffering and origination. What arises easily is sufficient to know it; who would abandon the easy and follow the difficult? Question: Then it should only be the knowledge of others' minds of the first dhyāna that knows the mind of the desire realm, because it arises easily; the knowledge of others' minds of the second dhyāna and above should not be able to know the mind of another in the desire realm, because it arises with difficulty. Who would abandon the easy and follow the difficult? Explanation: When wishing to know the mind of the desire realm, one certainly does not deliberately give rise to the knowledge of others' minds of the second dhyāna and above to know it; rather, having entered the second dhyāna, etc., for some other purpose, relying on entering that absorption, one gives rise to that knowledge of others' minds to know the mind of the desire realm. Objection: Then it could also be that, having given rise to an undefiled mind for some other purpose, one gives rise to the undefiled knowledge of others' minds to know the defiled mind of another. Explanation: From an undefiled mind, giving rise to defiled knowledge of others' minds is easy, while giving rise to undefiled knowledge of others' minds is difficult. What arises easily is sufficient to know it, so one does not give rise to the difficult. Question: When entering the second dhyāna, etc., to know the mind of the desire realm, why does one not instead give rise to the knowledge of others' minds of the first dhyāna to know the mind of the desire realm, but gives rise to the second dhyāna, etc., to know the desire-realm mind? Explanation: Arising in its own stage is easy, so it arises in its own stage. Arising in a different stage is difficult, so one does not give rise to that of the first dhyāna. The second explanation says: An aspiring contemplation can allow specific cognition; therefore, knowing the undefiled mind of another produces the four aspects under the path. A repelled contemplation must seek to dispel generally; therefore, knowing the defiled mind of another does not produce the contemplation of the eight aspects of suffering and origination. Thus *Nyāyānusāra* 73 says: "That the undefiled mind and mental factors in another's body, being subtle and superior, are not the object of one's own defiled knowledge of others' minds is reasonable. For what reason can one's own undefiled knowledge of others' minds not know the defiled mind and mental factors of another? When undefiled knowledge arises regarding a defiled object, its aspect and object differ from this knowledge. That is to say, when undefiled knowledge observes a defiled object, it is necessarily a general observation with an aspect of repulsion; therefore, it definitely cannot specifically observe another's mind and mental factors to constitute knowledge of others' minds. Because when noble knowledges observe a defiled object, they necessarily produce deep repulsion toward the object, delighting in general renunciation and not delighting in specific observation. When observing the undefiled, because they produce aspiration and delight, having observed generally, they also delight in specific observation. Just as when someone sees or hears an unpleasant matter, upon generally observing it they abandon it and do not delight in specific observation; but regarding what is pleasant it is not so: having generally seen or heard it, they also delight in specific observation. Therefore, regarding another's defiled mind, etc., there is certainly no noble knowledge that specifically observes each one individually to constitute an undefiled knowledge of others' minds observing a defiled mind, because knowledge of others' minds definitely knows another's mind and mental factors individually. Is there not also the patience and knowledge regarding suffering and origination subsumed under the three applications of mindfulness? Although they exist, they do not observe merely a single phenomenon, because they observe multiple entities" (thus far the śāstra text).