俱舍論記 26.82

26.82

「若依此意至有癡等故」者，論主救。我以理為正，豈以前破即是非耶？若依此意，餘惑相應亦名離貪，許亦無違。然不說為離貪心者，以屬有嗔、有癡等故。准此故知，有漏、無漏善心及無覆心皆名離貪心。泛由二義心名有貪，一貪相應、二貪所繫。泛由二義心名離貪，一貪不相應、二是貪對治。上來總有三解，第一師依貪相應故名有貪心，對治貪故名離貪心。第二師依貪所繫故名有貪心，對治貪故名離貪心。第三論主依貪相應故名有貪心，貪不相應名離貪心。問：准《婆沙》一百九十亦有此三說，破初、後兩說，取此第二為正。如何論主取《婆沙》不正義？解云：論主以理為正，非以《婆沙》評家為量。初師釋經攝心不盡，第二師說不得經意，故今論主以此為正。

Regarding [the text from] “If according to this intention” up to “because it has delusion, etc.”: this is the author of the treatise's defense. I take reason as standard; how could an earlier refutation make it incorrect? If according to this intention, a mind associated with other afflictions is also called free from lust, conceding this is also without contradiction. However, the reason it is not called a mind free from lust is that it belongs to the categories of with hatred, with delusion, and so on. In accordance with this, we know that sāsrava and anāsrava wholesome minds as well as unobscured-neutral minds are all called minds free from lust. In general, a mind is called 'with lust' by two meanings: first, associated with lust; second, bound by lust. In general, a mind is called 'free from lust' by two meanings: first, unassociated with lust; second, the antidote to lust. Above, there are three explanations in total: The first master holds that it is called a mind with lust because it is associated with lust, and called a mind free from lust because it is the antidote to lust. The second master holds that it is called a mind with lust because it is bound by lust, and called a mind free from lust because it is the antidote to lust. The third, the author of the treatise, holds that it is called a mind with lust because it is associated with lust, and called a mind free from lust because it is unassociated with lust. Question: According to the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 190, there are also these three explanations, refuting the first and the last explanations and taking this second as correct. Why does the author of the treatise adopt a view that is not correct according to the Vibhāṣā? The explanation is: The author of the treatise takes reason as the standard, not the evaluative master of the Vibhāṣā as the authority. The first master's explanation of the sūtra does not fully encompass minds, and the second master's statement fails to capture the sūtra's intention; therefore, the author of the treatise now takes this [third] as correct.